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The main objective of this thesis is to provide an interpretation of Heraclitus’ 
epistemology in connection with his ideas of language and communication. It proposes 
an interpretation of his philosophical doctrine that focuses on answering two 
interrelated epistemological questions: what is knowledge in Heraclitus’ doctrine? 
And how do we acquire it? These two main questions imply four other questions that 
treat the problem of the role that language and communication play in pursuing and 
understanding knowledge: why does Heraclitus consider that people fail to understand? 
Is our language a suitable medium to communicate knowledge to others? Is the way in 
which Heraclitus uses language, his obscure style, important in this process? What do 
people need to do in order to understand?  
The thesis is divided in four main sections. First, I offer a general introduction 
to the study of Heraclitus, where I argue that many of his fragments and his 
philosophical doctrines point to the problem of knowledge, its acquisition, and 
communication. Second, I argue that the object of knowledge in Heraclitus’ 
epistemology is the logos, an independent, eternal, divine, cosmic, and complete 
description of the cosmos, which cannot be directly communicated to other people. 
Third, I propose that such an idea of logos implies that Heraclitus had a theory of 
correctness of names: in the logos everything is described correctly. However, 
language is not a suitable medium to directly communicate this logos among humans. 
As a result, Heraclitus proposes the solution of referring and pointing to this logos 
indirectly, by using analogies, allegories, and different puns and word play. Lastly, I 
argue that people, and in particular their souls, are an important part of the process of 
knowledge. Heraclitus sees soul as material (by default) and locates it within his 
cosmology. Most importantly, he attributes several physiological and psychological 
functions to the human soul. I propose that, while Heraclitus cannot tell us the logos 
directly, he can direct us to it and help us in realising that our personal logoi are wrong, 
which makes our souls ‘barbarian’ and unable to properly understand the world 






Heraclitus of Ephesus was a Greek philosopher active around the early fifth century 
BC. Like most philosophers of the time, we do not have a book in which we can read 
his ideas directly. We only have quotations and paraphrases of these ideas in other 
later authors. Ancient and modern scholars and other people interested in him have 
collected and put together these phrases and ideas, his fragments. At the same time, 
from the evidence found in the fragments they have tried to understand his thought as 
a whole. The text I present here is my interpretation or my attempt at understanding 
the fragments of Heraclitus, and in particular those fragments that talk about 
knowledge, language, and communication. The goal of my interpretation is to propose 
a theory that provides an answer to the following questions: what is knowledge in 
Heraclitus’ doctrine? How do we acquire that knowledge? How can we teach others 
about knowledge? Can we just tell it to other people in a normal conversation? Is 
Heraclitus trying to communicate this knowledge to his audience? Is the way in which 
Heraclitus uses language necessary to communicate his message? I consider three 
main aspects of this problem in Heraclitus. 1) The object of knowledge: that which we 
need to understand or grasp in order to acquire knowledge. 2) The language that we 
use when we communicate knowledge. And 3) the soul (or mind) of the person 
attempting to understand this knowledge. I argue that the object of knowledge is the 
logos. This is a Greek word that means ‘speech’ or ‘account’ but that for Heraclitus 
represents a divine and perfect description of the universe. However, we cannot tell 
this logos to other people in the same way we tell them theories or stories. Even when 
we use language correctly we cannot communicate the logos directly. For Heraclitus, 
although wise people like him can help others by indirectly referring and pointing to 
this logos, people need to find this knowledge by themselves. However, their souls (or 
minds) need to be ready and cleansed so that they can see and understand the world 
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0.1. Fragments and doxography 
Heraclitus offers us a particular challenge when it comes to determining and 
interpreting his thought. Unlike most poets and the later prose-writing Presocratics, we 
do not have any long, continuous passages by Heraclitus. Most of his fragments are 
small quotations in later authors. Depending on the editors and editions, Heraclitus has 
between 110 and 150 fragments.1 Additionally, the majority of these references in 
antiquity are phrases embedded into a particular text, argument, and context. Most 
authors present the quotations followed by an interpretation. In other cases, their 
interpretation is clear by the context in which they quote a particular fragment. In 
general, these quotations in other authors, the fragments, are our most reliable source 
for understanding Heraclitus and his doctrine. Even though the fragments come from 
other authors, we can safely say that they as a whole represent Heraclitus’ original 
work.  
There is another important source about Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrine: 
ancient reports. The best known and most popular ideas attributed to Heraclitus do not 
come from the fragments themselves but from the interpretations of his doctrines in 
antiquity. The main authors of these reports are Plato and Aristotle. Another big 
portion of quotations and interpretations comes from later doxographers (Aetius, 
Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes Laertius), early Christian writers (Hippolytus, 
Clement, Origen), Stoics (Marcus Aurelius), sceptics, Neo-Platonists, and several 
other philosophers and writers.2 There is usually a difference, sometimes an important 
one, between what the fragments say and what the later authors report. Consequently, 
we may say that we have two different versions of Heraclitus, the one who speaks to 
us through his own writings, and another one, who is described, explained, updated, 
and appropriated by other authors in later texts.  
                                                 
1 There are several different numberings for the fragments depending on the editions. I will use the 
numbering of the edition by DK (1952), where a number preceded by an ‘A’ means it is considered a 
testimony, and preceded by a ‘B’ means it is considered original. The Greek texts are taken from TEGP 
and all translations are mine unless otherwise stated. 
2 A complete list and analysis of Greek doxography is Diels (1879). For the problems of doxography 





Regarding these two kinds of evidence, I agree in general with Osborne’s 
approach.3 The fragments should not be taken out of context and interpreted as isolated 
statements. The authors who quote Heraclitus were closer (in time, as well as culturally 
and linguistically) and in many cases probably had direct access to his text. This means 
that even though most of them used him with a particular agenda, they most likely had 
a good understanding of Heraclitus’ texts and ideas. The fact that some fragments are 
quoted out of context and just to serve the author’s purpose does not mean that we 
need to ignore their interpretation altogether. On the contrary, we need to understand 
why the sources thought of Heraclitus and interpreted the fragments in a particular 
way. The fragments are what we have left of Heraclitus’ work but they are not isolated. 
Their wording in many cases probably differs from Heraclitus’ originals, but the ideas 
presented in them are Heraclitean. Our interpretation of the fragments must not only 
look for coherence between the ideas expressed in the different fragments, but it must 
also look for coherence within his philosophical and historical context. In this regard, 
comparisons with contemporaneous authors prove useful when trying to identify 
whether an idea attributed to Heraclitus was current at that time or a latter development 
(and more likely wrongly attributed to him, e.g. Christian doctrines by Hippolytus). 
Hence, a doctrine which Plato attributes to a previous author or present in fragments 
of authors before Heraclitus is more likely (but not necessarily) related to Heraclitus, 
as his ideas might have influenced those authors or he might have been influenced by 
them.  
0.2. Modern approaches to Heraclitus 
My analysis takes as its starting point the standard modern editions of Heraclitus. 
These usually consist of more elaborate and holistic interpretations that aim to explain 
Heraclitean thought as a whole and connect most of the separate doctrines together, 
taking into account both the fragments and the later reception of Heraclitus.4 It is 
                                                 
3 See Osborne (1987), 1–32.  
4 I take into consideration the following editions of Heraclitus’ fragments: Kirk (1954); Wheelwright 
(1959); Mondolfo (1966); Marcovich (1967); ATH; Robinson (1987); and Mouraviev (2002), (2006a), 
and (2006b). And the following general works on the Presocratics: Burnet (1892), (1928), and (1930); 
Guthrie (1962); Barnes (1979) and (1982); KRS (1983) and (2007); McKirahan (1994) and (2010); 





important to keep in mind that modern interpretations usually extract and give 
importance to topics that perhaps were underestimated or overlooked by the ancients. 
Even though I tried to include as many as possible as part of my interpretation, certain 
modern works were more influential than others, some in regard to my general 
interpretation of Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrine, and some in respect of my view of 
particular topics or fragments. For clarity I want to acknowledge the most important 
of them here. 
The editions that were the most influential in my interpretation of Heraclitus as 
a whole are the following. Kirk’s Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments (1954) provides 
a good analysis of many individual fragments, takes into consideration other 
interpretations of the time, and provides good doxographical and textual analysis, and 
a critical apparatus for each fragment. Even though it focuses on Heraclitus’ 
cosmological thought, it offers a comprehensive interpretation of his philosophy. 
Marcovich’s Heraclitus (1967) was central in my research as it is a complete edition 
that provides very thorough analysis of all the fragments; it provides excellent 
doxographical and textual analyses, and critical apparatuses. Kahn’s The Art and 
Thought of Heraclitus (1979) was essential in helping me come closer to the problem 
of language in Heraclitus and in particular to understanding his mode of expression as 
part of his philosophical message. Robinson’s Heraclitus: Fragments (1987) changed 
several of my preconceptions about Heraclitus and helped me in particular to approach 
the difficult role of the divine in Heraclitus’ philosophy. Graham’s The Texts of Early 
Greek Philosophy (2010) was my main edition of the Presocratics; it is very compact 
and concise, and provides the most important data when working with Presocratic 
philosophy in a very precise manner and with a clear analysis. 
Regarding specific topics in Heraclitus, the following articles should also be 
mentioned. My interpretation of logos follows Robinson’s interpretation of Heraclitus 
in general and in particular his article ‘Heraclitus and logos — Again’ (2013), also 
Johnstone’s ‘On “logos” in Heraclitus’ (2014), and Tarán’s ‘The first fragment of 
Heraclitus’ (1986). For the problem of language in Heraclitus, Robinson’s ‘Heraclitus 
                                                 
where I mention some other relevant items. I include in the bibliography Laks, Most, et al. (2016), a 
recent edition of the texts of Presocratic philosophers, which unfortunately came out too late for me to 





and Plato on the language of the real’ (1991), Havelock’s ‘The linguistic task of the 
Presocratics’ (1983), and Frankel’s ‘A thought pattern in Heraclitus’ (1938b) were 
fundamental in several of my arguments. For the concept of psychē in Heraclitus, 
Nussbaum’s article ‘ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus’ (1972) guided my interpretation in what 
refers to the psychological part of the soul and its relation to language, and Betegh’s 
‘On the physical aspect of Heraclitus’ psychology’ (2007) was central in my 
understanding of its cosmic and material part. 
0.3. On Heraclitus’ book 
Some of the ancient commentators attribute a book to Heraclitus, from which we could 
suppose the fragments come. Aristotle makes the first known mention of a book 
written by Heraclitus in his Rhetoric 1407b14. Sextus Empiricus (Adversus 
Mathematicos 7.132) and Diogenes Laertius (9.5–6) attribute a book to him as well. 
Some other authors mention Heraclitus’ book during antiquity and medieval times, but 
it is likely that they did not have access to this book themselves and were just taking 
the words of previous authors as their testimony.5 
The existence of the book is well attested, and most scholars agree that there was 
a book containing Heraclitus’ philosophical thought. However, there is still 
controversy about two matters: 1) did Heraclitus himself write the book or did 
someone else, such as one of his followers? 2) In what style or format was the book 
written? Was it a treatise in continuous prose, such as the work of Melissus, or a 
collection of aphorisms or maxims, like the ones of the Seven Sages, or some sui 
generis combination of poetry, prose, aphorism, and treatise? Several scholars support 
the hypothesis that the book was a collection of separate utterances, in a manner of 
maxims, sayings, or aphorisms. Marcovich, KRS, Most, Graham, and Granger defend 
this position.6 On the other side, supporting that Heraclitus wrote a continuous prose 
                                                 
5 For a full survey of mentions of the book in antiquity, see Mouraviev (2004), 67–69.  
6 Marcovich says that he follows Kirk’s approach to Heraclitus grosso modo and uses the word ‘sayings’ 
instead of ‘fragments’, just as Kirk does to imply that they were uttered and not written down, in 
Marcovich (1967), XVI–XVII. KRS (1983), 184. See Most (1999), 349–350, 357; TEGP, 186; and 
Granger (2004a), 7–11, who says that later authors who collected the fragments could have 





treatise, we find Guthrie, West, Barnes, Mondolfo, Sider, and Mouraviev.7 Kirk and 
Kahn propose a book written in a special way that combines prose and poetry.8 All 
these positions have good arguments, and we have some evidence for corresponding 
kinds of compositions in that period.9  
Overall, however, it is not clear how useful the questions about the form and 
order of the book are for understanding Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrine. For Kahn 
and for Mouraviev it is an important matter. 10  Both understand that the internal 
structure of the book was planned and, therefore, meaningful for the understanding of 
his thought. I sympathise with Kahn that our organization of the fragments should try 
to be meaningful, as the original order was, but disagree with Mouraviev’s idea that 
finding it is a necessary condition for the understanding of Heraclitus’ thought.  
My approach to the problem of the book and its order will follow Erick 
Havelock’s idea about literacy and orality in the time of Presocratic philosophy. He 
says: 
Greek authors generally up to about the beginning of the fifth century, and 
Athenian authors down to as late as the Periclean age, composed their 
                                                 
7 Guthrie (1962), 408. West (1971), 112 n. 2. Barnes (1983), 104. Mondolfo (1958), 75. Sider (2009), 
455. Mouraviev (2009) and (2011). 
8 Kirk (1954), 7: ‘I hazard the conjecture that Heraclitus wrote no book, in our sense of the word. The 
fragments, or many of them, have the appearance of being isolated statements, or γνῶμαι: many of the 
connecting particles they contain belong to later sources. In or perhaps shortly after Heraclitus’ lifetime 
a collection of these sayings was made, conceivably by a pupil. This was the “book”: originally 
Heraclitus’ utterances had been oral, and so were put into an easily memorable form.’ ATH, 7: ‘The 
impression that the original work was a kind of commonplace work, in which sentences or paragraphs 
were jotted down as they occurred to the author, is largely due to the fact that Heraclitus makes use of 
the proverbial style of the Sages, just as he invokes the enigmatic tones of the Delphic oracle. But 
Heraclitus has many literary strings to his bow; he does not always speak in riddles or aphorisms. 
Among the quotations are four or five long passages of several connected sentences. Fragment I is a 
carefully wrought proem, which suggests the beginning of a well-planned book.’ 
9 We have the example of the Dissoi Logoi, which collect arguments and positions notable in that time, 
and dated around the fifth century BC. See TEGP, 877. Additionally, Greek gnomological tradition 
could have started before Plato. According to Searby (1998), 30, ‘the first recorded use of the word 
γνωμολογία, “speaking in gnomes”, occurs in Phaedrus (267C), where Plato uses it to describe the 
sententious style of the sophist Polus.’ This means that at this time, people started making collections 
of sayings, not that authors wrote books in aphorisms. See Searby (1998), 28–42 for gnomological 
tradition in the Classical period.  
10 Kahn (1964), 190–191: ‘There is of course no chance of restoring these shattered and incomplete 
fragments to the order in which Heraclitus himself disposed them. But once we assume that Heraclitus’ 
ordering had some plan, it becomes the interpreter’s task to arrange them in the most meaningful pattern 
he can find. Not only does arrangement imply interpretation; interpretation, in turn, involves 
arrangement; and the methodical complement to a new interpretation of Heraclitus would be a complete 






works under the form of audience control, managing their language so as 
to meet the needs of listeners rather than readers. This had precise effects 
upon the style and substance of what they said.11  
And under this supposition, he states that the Presocratics ‘too are poised between 
literacy and non-literacy. Their style of composition is a form of mediation between 
ear and eye. They expect an audience of listeners, yet look forward to a reception at 
the hands of readers.’ 12  Consequently, I believe Heraclitus’ fragments should be 
understood, first, as part of a speech or different speeches defending a particular idea 
and meant to be presented in front of people, and secondly subjected to the 
thoroughness of being preserved in a written form.  
0.4. The doctrines of Heraclitus 
Since antiquity, several doctrines have been attributed to Heraclitus. Before turning to 
my own concerns, it may be useful to survey the most relevant. These are the following. 
First, the doctrine of universal flux, also known as panta rhei. Second, that fire is the 
first principle, or archē, and that the universe is periodically destroyed by the power 
of fire in a cosmic conflagration, or ekpyrōsis. Third, that there is a unity or natural 
connection between opposites. Fourth, that there is a cosmic logos. Fifth, that 
Heraclitus was obscure and that his obscure style was part of his philosophical doctrine. 
Sixth, that soul is a cosmic element that is also responsible for some of our bodily and 
mental functions when inside body.  
0.4.1. Cosmos and flux 
Heraclitus inherited many cosmological ideas from Presocratic philosophers before 
him, especially from the Ionian thinkers Anaximander and Anaximenes. For them, 
everything in the cosmos is composed of one (or some) basic element or material. This 
basic element makes up all variety of things by blending and changing its state, and 
most natural phenomena (meteorological and astronomical) can be explained by 
                                                 
11 Havelock (1983), 8. 





understanding this elemental transformations and blending.13 In Heraclitus’ particular 
case, fire plays a central role in the configuration the cosmos, which ‘was not created 
by any mortal or god but it has always existed and will exist forever’ (B30).14 Most 
importantly, for him, the elemental transformations by which natural phenomena are 
explained and by which the cosmos is organised seem to imply that things are 
constantly changing. This idea is known as the doctrine of the universal flux. It states 
that everything in the cosmos is always changing or in motion.15 The doctrine does not 
have much support in the fragments themselves, i.e. none of the fragments in fact states 
that everything is in motion, but the notion of a material becoming and cosmic change 
can be deduced from some fragments that talk about elemental transformations (B31, 
B36, B62, B67, B76, B84a, B125, and B126) and by the famous river passage, ‘you 
cannot step twice in the same river.’ 16  This theory is especially associated with 
Heraclitus because of the testimony of Plato and Aristotle. They attribute this idea to 
Heraclitus and try to find solutions for its implications in different passages (Plato, 
Theaetetus 152d2–e8 and Cratylus 402a8–10; Aristotle, De Anima 405a25–29 and 
Metaphysics 1010a7). The main idea is that everything in the cosmos is in constant 
motion, and nothing is stable; that nothing is, but everything is becoming. The river 
passage presents us with an analogy or example for this idea: the water that constitutes 
the body of the river is constantly flowing and, therefore, is always different since it is 
continuously replaced by different waters. However, the exact functioning of this 
continuous flux in the cosmos, its reach and implications are not clear in the fragments. 
Plato himself notices in Theaetetus 181c that the flux theory can refer to two different 
kinds of motions: displacing and altering. If we take into consideration that Heraclitus 
thought this theory in the context of Milesian physics, it is probably true that the basic 
particles are always being displaced. However, it would be hard to argue that for 
                                                 
13 This is the general perception of the physics and cosmology of the first Presocratics as interpreted by 
Aristotle, in particular in Metaphysics A and in Physics A and Γ. Whether Aristotle was a good historian 
of philosophy and represented their doctrines correctly, see Cherniss (1935), Guthrie (1957), and 
Collobert (2002). 
14 For cosmology in Heraclitus, see KRS (2007), 197–203; Kirk (1954); and Lebedev (1985). 
15 For Heraclitus’ theory of flux, see Graham (1997) and (2009); Hülsz Piccone (2009); Wiggins (2016). 
16 See TEGP, 190–191 and Graham (2013). There are different versions of the river fragment (A6, B49a, 
B91; Theaetetus 160d6–8; Plutarch, Natural Questions 912a), but seemingly the most reliable is B12: 
‘On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow.’ Trans. TEGP, Greek text: 






Heraclitus everything was changing in every respect and at every moment because 
some fragments suggest that these cosmic movements and general change are directed 
by some higher power (B1, B53, B64, B80, B94) and constrained by measures (B30), 
which indicates the stability of some higher order.17 This in turn implies that the flux 
theory is connected with other doctrines such as fire and the cosmic logos. 
0.4.2. Fire 
This doctrine has been understood in different ways. The most common view in 
antiquity is that Heraclitus thought everything was composed of fire as a material 
principle or archē, and that consequently he was a material monist. This idea, however, 
does not find much support in the fragments themselves. Just as with the flux theory, 
none of the fragments states that everything is fire. However, from the fragments that 
talk about fire, or refer to it, we can infer that fire had a major role in Heraclitean 
cosmology, and that it was most likely related to his other doctrines. We know that fire 
is in exchange for everything (B90), its kindling and quenching control the universe 
(B30), it steers everything in the form of thunderbolt (B64), and it judges and convicts 
all things (B66). Plato does not attribute any fire doctrine to Heraclitus directly but in 
Theatetus 153a1–9 he suggests a connection between the flux theory and fire. The first 
explicit attribution of a fire theory to Heraclitus was done by Aristotle in his 
interpretation of physical theories of the first philosophers, whom he classifies as 
physikoi. He says that Heraclitus posited fire as a material principle, in the same way 
Thales proposed water and Anaximenes, air (Metaphysics 984a7–8).18 Aristotle is also 
the first who mentions a doctrine closely related to fire in Heraclitus’ cosmology, 
which is also one that is very controversial among modern interpretations of Heraclitus: 
the ekpyrōsis, or world conflagration: the idea that the cosmos at some point in time 
comes to its destruction into fire and, then, at some other time it is reborn out of fire 
(De Caelo 279b12).19 The exact role of fire in Heraclitus’ physics and cosmology is 
                                                 
17 The most extreme versions of the flux theory most likely correspond not to Heraclitus himself but to 
how Plato and Aristotle make use of this theory for their arguments in particular passages. For instance, 
to emphasise the contrast between Being and Becoming in Plato’s Timaeus. 
18 Also Lucretius 1.635–711, describes Heraclitus as the leader of those who think fire is a material 
principle (materies rerum). 
19 For ekpyrōsis in Heraclitus, see Kirk (1951) and Mondolfo (1958). Inwood (1984), 229, provides 





hard to determine. Most scholars tend to think that it is very unlikely that Heraclitus 
thought of fire as an exclusive material principle in the same way as his predecessors, 
as we have it in Aristotle’s interpretation. It is interesting, however, that Aristotle 
himself says in De Anima 405a25–27 that for Heraclitus the principle was soul (and 
not fire), which could lead us to think that the idea of fire in Heraclitus was connected 
to his conception of the soul and, perhaps, to his doctrine of a cosmic logos as well. 
0.4.3. Unity in opposites 
The idea that a unity or intrinsic connection is present in concepts or attributes that are 
opposite is without a doubt the most common image in the fragments.20 In general 
terms, the theory of unity in opposites proposes that there is a unity, a natural 
connection, or a sort of complementarity between opposites, such as day and night, up 
and down, life and death, satiety and hunger. There is not a formal definition of the 
doctrine presented by Heraclitus, but unlike other doctrines we have a few fragments 
from which we can deduce a clearer idea of what Heraclitus was proposing. One of 
them is B67: ‘The god is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger, and he 
alters just as <fire, which,> when it is mixed with spices, is named according to the 
aroma of each of them.’21 This seems to indicate that a totality, the god, is composed 
of several couples of opposites: two parts of a process, which are one and the same 
thing but named as two different things. Another relevant fragment for the unity in 
opposites is B88, ‘As the same thing in us are living and dead, walking and sleeping, 
young and old. For those things having changed around are those, and those in turn 
having changed around are these.’22 This fragment, in turn, seems to point to a more 
psychological and epistemological argument: notions that are opposite but 
complementary, such as life and death, can only be understood together.  
                                                 
20 Some articles that treat the topic of unity in opposites are Mourelatos (1973), 33–40; Mackenzie 
(1998); Hussey (1991) and (1999b); and Long (2007). 
21 Trans. TEGP with some modifications: ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος 
λιμός [τἀναντία ἅπαντα. οὗτος ὁ νοῦς], ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ, ὅ>, ὁπόταν συμμιγῆι θυώμασιν, 
ὀνομάζεται καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου. 
22 Trans. TEGP: ταὐτό τ’ ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε 





However, there are several interpretations of how this unity or connection of 
opposite concepts works.23 A physicalist view understands that everything is made out 
of opposite elements at the same time (e.g. that fire and water are in things in different 
proportions). There is also the idea that opposite attributes or characteristics are present 
in the same thing at the same time, as for instance in fragment B60 (‘A road up-down 
is one and the same.’24), in which the same road is at the same time going up and going 
down depending on which direction you are taking it. Additionally, we can interpret 
this doctrine as a physical process closely connected to the flux theory, and say that 
the oppositions are part of a process in which one quality cedes its place to another 
(e.g. that something cold warms up and something hot cools down in B126). Plato and 
Aristotle, who attribute this idea to Heraclitus, seem to take it as the harmony created 
by opposites present in the same object (Plato, Symposium 187a, and Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 1155b4–6). Nevertheless, most of these different ways to 
understand the doctrine are not exclusive. The idea of the unity of opposites most likely 
works on many different levels of Heraclitus’ philosophical thought, and is closely 
connected to his other doctrines, in particular to the ideas of the universal flux and the 
cosmic logos. 
0.4.4. Cosmic logos 
The logos doctrine states that there is a cosmic logos, i.e. a speech, account, measure 
or proportion, which is part of the cosmos or somehow involved in its organisation or 
governance.25 There is some evidence in the fragments for the attribution of such a 
doctrine to Heraclitus. We know that there is a logos that is eternal, and in accordance 
to which everything happens (B1). It is also common to all and not private (B2), and 
when we listen not to Heraclitus but to it we might find important truths about the 
cosmos (B50). Nevertheless, what this logos exactly is and how it works was and still 
is debated. The attribution of this doctrine to Heraclitus seems to be later than Plato 
and Aristotle. Sextus Empiricus (Adversus Mathematicos 7.127–134) provides us with 
                                                 
23 See for instance, Hussey (1999b), 93–98; McKirahan (2010), 131–134; and KRS (2007), 188–194, 
who propose different ways in which the unity of opposites can work. 
24 Greek text: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή. 
25 On the problem of logos, see Adam (1911), Minar (1939), Glasson (1952), Molina (2006), Robinson 





the first known interpretation of logos as cosmic in Heraclitus. The theory seems to 
have had much more impact in later antiquity and it has created a significant debate 
among modern scholars. Some of them defend the idea that logos does not have any 
special connotation in the fragments and that in B1, B2, and B50 it is only referring to 
Heraclitus’ own speech. However, the majority of modern scholars support the 
doctrine of a cosmic logos in some way. Fragment B115 proposes that the soul has a 
self-augmenting logos, and B45, that it has a deep logos, which could mean that the 
idea of a cosmic logos is also connected to the idea of soul. 
0.4.5. Obscurity 
The problem of Heraclitus’ obscurity refers to two different ideas, of which only one 
could be considered a doctrine. First, there is the idea that his style was obscure and 
his writings were hard to understand. Second, there is the attribution of a doctrine of 
deliberate obscurity, according to which Heraclitus’ obscurity was not only a stylistic 
characteristic of his writings but also a reflection and application of a theory of 
language. The first mention of the style of Heraclitus, if Diogenes’ (2.22) testimony is 
accurate, is done by Socrates, who says that Heraclitus’ book would require a Delian 
diver to be understood. Later, Plato says in his Theaetetus 179e1–180b3, that any 
Heraclitean, when questioned about their views, ‘will pull out some little enigmatic 
phrase from his quiver and shoot it off at you; and if you try to make him give an 
account of what he has said, you will only get hit by another, full of strange turns of 
language.’ Additionally, in the Symposium 187a3–b3 when discussing fragment B51 
(‘The one while being at variance with itself agrees with itself, just as the tuning of the 
bow and the lyre.’26), Eryximachus claims that at first sight the fragment seems absurd 
because of its meaning, but that it can be coherent and meaningful if interpreted 
correctly. 
Aristotle also thinks Heraclitus is obscure but for a more particular reason. In 
Rhetoric 1407b14, he mentions Heraclitus’ book and qualifies Heraclitus’ writings as 
                                                 






not easy to punctuate (diastixai).27 A similar observation is made in the text On Style 
191–192 attributed to Demetrius of Phalerum, where Heraclitus’ texts are considered 
difficult because of the lack of conjunctions and other connectors. Diogenes (9.6) tells 
us that Timon calls Heraclitus enigmatic and obscure, and that Theophrastus thought 
that he had melancholy and wrote incomplete and particular texts for that reason.28 
The first mention of Heraclitus’ nickname, ‘the obscure’, is in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De 
Mundo 396b20.29 There he is simply called skoteinos.30 However, the author does not 
give us an explanation for the qualification. The same adjective is used by Strabo in 
his Geography (14.1.25), without any explanation whatsoever: ‘[Ephesus] produced 
eminent men: in early times Heraclitus called the Obscure, and Hermodorus.’31 And 
Livy (23.39.3) says that he had scotinus as a nickname.  
All those comments on Heraclitus’ style led some thinkers to interpret his 
obscurity as something more than purely stylistic. Lucretius (1.635–644) says that he 
is famous for his ‘obscure tongue’ (lingua obscura) and that some people like to find 
hidden meaning in his words. Lucian (Vitarum Auctio 14) suggests for the first time 
the idea that Heraclitus’ style could be related to Apollo and his oracles, an opinion 
that has had an important influence in modern scholarship.32 The idea that Heraclitus’ 
obscurity or ambiguity is a strategy to convey his philosophical message could also be 
implied by fragment B93, where he says: ‘The lord, whose oracle is at Delphi, neither 
speaks out nor conceals but gives signs.’33 As I will argue, the way in which the divine 
communicates its message plays a fundamental role in Heraclitus’ ideas on language 
and in his epistemology. 
                                                 
27 Graham translates διαστίζω as ‘to punctuate’ but as he points out in (2010), 141 n. 1, there was not 
punctuation, understood as periods, commas, etc., in Greek texts of that time. But there was a certain 
order of the words that would let you know when a sentence ended or which words go with which.  
28  Greek text: τοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ὑπογράφει λέγων, τοῖς δ᾽ ἔνι κοκκυστής, ὀχλολοίδορος 
Ἡράκλειτος, αἰνικτὴς ἀνόρουσε. Θεόφραστος δέ φησιν ὑπὸ μελαγχολίας τὰ μὲν ἡμιτελῆ, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλοτ᾽ 
ἄλλως ἔχοντα γράψαι. Theophrastus’ comment here seems to be related to the idea that Heraclitus was 
later known as ‘the weeping philosopher’. This could also be relevant for understanding the form and 
style of his book. 
29 The date of De Mundo is not a clear matter, but it is generally thought to be late Hellenistic or imperial 
period. See Betegh and Gregoric (2014), 574. 
30 Greek text: Ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶι σκοτεινῶι λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτωι.  
31  Trans. TEGP with modifications, Greek text: ἄνδρες δ᾽ ἀξιόλογοι γεγόνασιν ἐν αὐτῆι τῶν μὲν 
παλαιῶν Ἡράκλειτός τε ὁ σκοτεινὸς καλούμενος καὶ Ἑρμόδωρος. 
32 Especially ATH, and Mouraviev’s interpretation in general and in particular see his (1996) and (2002). 






Heraclitus talks about the soul in several of his fragments. The word psychē is regularly 
used by Heraclitus, and it seems that for him it still has some of its traditional 
characteristics, as found in the Iliad and the Odyssey. For instance, he talks of the 
presence of souls in Hades (B98). However, Heraclitus radically changes the 
traditional conception of the soul by attributing new characteristics to it.34 In regard to 
cosmology, he proposes that soul is also a material or an element that takes part in the 
cosmic elemental transformations (B36). Furthermore, and most importantly, he talks 
about the soul inside the body and suggests that it is closely connected to physiological 
and mental functions such as mobility and sense perception (B117, B107), and related 
to functions of language (B107) and knowledge (B118). It is likely that the concept of 
soul and its study saw an important change with Heraclitus. This aspect of the 
Heraclitean philosophy was perhaps ignored or underappreciated by early 
philosophers and ancient commentators of Heraclitus. As mentioned above, Aristotle 
says in De Anima 405a25–27 that for Heraclitus the material principle (or archē) was 
soul, instead of fire (or as well as fire). Modern scholars, in particular Nussbaum, have 
highlighted this idea in Heraclitus and shown that we have enough information in the 
fragments to know that Heraclitus had an original theory of soul, which probably 
helped in the later development of this concept in Greek philosophy.35 Unfortunately, 
we do not have a clear account of its function and importance. However, the fact that 
Heraclitus mentions a relation between the soul and logos, and Aristotle’s commentary 
of soul as material principle, lead us to think that the soul was an important concept in 
his cosmology and in his philosophy in general.  
 
                                                 
34 For psychē in Heraclitus, see Nussbaum (1972), Claus (1981), Robinson (1986), Wilcox (1991), 
Schofield (1991), Laks (1999), Betegh (2007), and Mansfeld (2015). 





0.5. The problem of knowledge, language, and communication 
Heraclitus had a particular interest in knowledge, wisdom, understanding, and 
epistemology.36 Even though several of these topics were of interest for poets and 
philosophers before him, a general survey of the fragments shows that Heraclitus had 
plenty to say about this and especially against the way knowledge has been understood 
before him. However, the specific role that language and communication play in his 
epistemology is a topic that has not been treated as extensively as others in his 
philosophical doctrine. I owe to Havelock an important part of my interest in this topic 
in Heraclitus.37 He says that ‘At a minimum, forty-two of the surviving sayings are so 
worded as to concentrate on modes of human communication, and upon the 
consciousness expressed therein. The proportion to the total is striking, and has not 
hitherto received the attention it deserves.’ In fact, the first thing that Heraclitus 
himself tells us is that we understand neither the logos nor his explanations of it. In 
what Aristotle tells us is the beginning of his book he says the following:38 
B1: τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ 
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων 
τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ 
φράζων ὅκως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες 
ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. 
 
Of this logos that is forever humans turn out to be uncomprehending, both 
before they hear and after they have heard it. Although everything happens 
according to this logos, they seem void of experience whenever they 
experience words and actions such as I describe when I distinguish each 
thing according to nature and declare how it is. As to other men, whatever 
they do when they are awake escapes their notice, just as they forget what 
they do when they are asleep. 
                                                 
36 On epistemology and language in Heraclitus, see Disandro (1954), Fine (1979), Stuart (1982), Lesher 
(1983), Hussey (1982), Robinson (1991), and Graham (2009). I include in the bibliography a recent 
book by Tor (2017) on early Greek epistemology in Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Parmenides, which 
unfortunately came out too late for me to discuss it in this thesis. 
37 See Havelock (1983) and (1986). 
38 I follow Aristotle (Rhetoric 5, 1407b14), Sextus Empiricus (Adversus Mathematicos 7.132), and 
Hippolytus (Refutatio Omnium Haeresium 9.9.3) and agree with most modern scholars that B1 was the 





As a later analysis will show, there are many details and possible interpretations to 
take into account in understanding this fragment. Nevertheless, it is clear that one of 
the main points Heraclitus wants to make is that people do not understand this truth, 
which he is explaining and communicating to others. This complaint is repeated in 
several other fragments. For instance, in B19, ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ᾽ εἰπεῖν. 
[‘They do not know how to hear or speak.’], where he particularly criticises people’s 
ability to communicate. Additionally, B34: ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν 
ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι. [‘Having heard without 
comprehension they are like the deaf to whom the story bears witness: present they are 
absent.’] This implies that even when there is a clear message and words are heard by 
people, they still fail to understand. Here Heraclitus seems to compare these people, 
who turn out to be uncomprehending of him and of the logos in B1, to a traditional 
saying or story about people who see or hear something but have to act as if they did 
not experience anything in any way.39 
More importantly, not only many of the fragments point directly to the problem 
of knowledge and the possibility of its communication, but also most of his 
philosophical doctrines are related or later interpreted in connection to these same 
ideas. To take an important example, the flux theory is seen by Plato and Aristotle, 
among other things, as a problem for knowledge and communication. The idea that 
everything is in motion is seen in Cratylus as an essential limitation for knowledge. 
Near the end of the dialogue (440a2–b1) Plato concludes that,  
Indeed, it isn’t even reasonable to say that there is such a thing as 
knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are passing on and none remain. For if 
that thing itself, knowledge, did not pass on from being knowledge, then 
knowledge would always remain, and there would be such thing as 
knowledge. On the other hand, if the very form of knowledge passed on 
                                                 
39 Fragment B34 is probably related to a saying in antiquity that means ‘to turn a deaf ear’. Marcovich 
(1967), 13, gives some examples. They probably refer back to this story in the Homeric hymn To 
Hermes 90–93, where an old man sees Hermes trying to steal some divine cattle in Pieria, and to 
persuade him not to tell on him he says: ὦ γέρον ὅς τε φυτὰ σκάπτεις ἐπικαμπύλος ὤμους/ ἦ 
πολυοινήσεις εὖτ’ ἂν τάδε πάντα φέρηισι/ καί τε ἰδὼν μὴ ἰδὼν εἶναι καὶ κωφὸς ἀκούσας/ καὶ σιγᾶν, ὅτε 
μή τι καταβλάπτηι τὸ σὸν αὐτοῦ. [‘Old sir with bent shoulders, digging your vines, you will indeed be 
well in wine when these all bear fruit, <provided you do as I say: keep your own counsel,> and don’t 
see what you’ve seen, and don’t hear what you’ve heard, and keep silent so long as it isn’t harming your 
own affairs.’ Trans. West (2003)]. People who hear the logos and Heraclitus without understanding 






from being knowledge, the instant it passed on into a different form than 
that of knowledge, there would be no knowledge.40 
The flux theory is at its core an ontological problem. However, the main problem Plato 
sees in the fact that everything is changing is not about the actual nature of the existing 
things but an epistemological problem: how can we acquire knowledge of a reality that 
is constantly changing? Moreover, in Theaetetus 152e2–e7, this problem is also 
connected to language because of the fact that when we give a name or a characteristic 
to an object, we use the wrong terminology when referring to things that are changing 
in this manner: how are we to be able to name things correctly before they change into 
something else?  
Aristotle understands the flux doctrine as a problem related to knowledge and 
language as well. 41  He sees Heraclitus’ flux theory as an impediment for true 
statements about nature, which at the same time results in a violation of the law of  
non-contradiction.42 He says, in Metaphysics 1010a7–10 and 1012a24–26 that,  
Further, since they [certain early thinkers who believed sensation was 
knowledge] observed that the whole of nature was in motion and were 
aware that no statement was true of what was changing, or at least about 
what was completely changing in every way, it was not possible to make 
true statements [...] It seems that the theory of Heraclitus, which maintains 
that all things are and are not, makes all statements true.43  
For Aristotle, the problem in Heraclitus’ theory of flux is that it makes knowledge 
impossible and language useless. If the flux theory is right, then everything we say is 
true and false at the same time.  
The reception of the doctrine of the unity in opposites points in the same 
direction. Even though Plato and Aristotle see the theory in a good light in some 
contexts, their general appreciation is that it leads to uncertainty, subjectivity, and 
contradiction when it comes to the problem of knowledge. Plato plays with the idea of 
                                                 
40 Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997). 
41  Probably an interpretation inherited from Plato. See Theaetetus 183a1–b9, which is similar to 
Aristotle’s comment on Cratylus’ views on language in Metaphysics 1010a. 
42  The idea that Heraclitus violates the law of non-contradiction appears in different passages in 
Aristotle’s works: Topics 159b30–33, Physics 185b19–25, and Metaphysics 1012a33–b23. In some 
contexts, it seems that the violation of the law of non-contradiction is a consequence of Heraclitus’ 
doctrine of unity of opposites. 





unity of opposites in several dialogues, and usually relates it to the flux theory.44 For 
instance, in Theaetetus (152d2–e2) he says the following: 
I’ll tell you a story that’s not half bad, how nothing is one thing all by itself, 
and you could not rightly call anything this or such, but if you call it big it 
will appear small, if heavy, light, and all thing are like this, for nothing is 
one single thing or has one determined character.45  
Here the fact that things have opposite characteristics implies for Plato that we cannot 
call them either thing correctly, and in the end fail to address them as one. Therefore, 
it seems that if you try to say that something has a characteristic, then you will be 
proven wrong because it has the opposite in another way. Aristotle sees in this doctrine 
a potential threat to the law of non-contradiction, just as he does for the flux theory. 
He says, for instance, in Topics 159b30–34: 
It is for this reason too that those who bring in other people’s opinions  
— for example, Heraclitus’ statement that good and evil are the same  
thing — refuse to concede that it is impossible for contraries to belong to 
the same thing at the same time, not because this is not their view, but 
because, according to Heraclitus, they must say so.46 
Additionally, the logos doctrine is closely connected to the problem of knowledge, 
language, and communication. My own view, as I will argue later, is that the logos 
represents a complete, best description of the universe and, as such, it is tantamount to 
divine and objective truth. Understanding it and grasping its meaning is what 
constitutes knowledge. The logos is both knowledge and the object of knowledge: the 
goal of human enquiry. But as we will see, different interpretations of logos also lead 
to a connection with the problem of language and communication. Even though the 
word logos means many things in different contexts and in different periods, whatever 
it may actually mean in Heraclitus, any meaning you choose for logos between Homer 
and the fifth century BC will necessarily be related to language and the act of 
communicating something to someone, be it, ‘word’, ‘speech’, ‘report’, or ‘account’. 
From the fragments we know that Heraclitus gives to this logos special characteristics, 
                                                 
44 For instance, see also Phaedo 70c4–72a5, Symposium 187a1–c6, Philebus 24d, and Sophist 242c7–
243e7.  
45 Trans. TEGP. 





such as that it exists forever (B1), that everything happens according to it (B1), and 
that we can and should listen to it (B50). If we follow the most common opinion, that 
logos has a more specialised meaning than merely Heraclitus’ speech, that it is cosmic 
logos that makes part and, perhaps, governs and directs the whole universe, we will 
probably find a close relation between this kind of logos and language.  
Most of Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrines are related, at least to a certain extent, 
to the problem of knowledge and of how we acquire it and communicate it to others. 
We do not find an explicit reference to the role of language or a theory about 
communication by Heraclitus, but we find many fragments and early interpretations 
of his doctrines that talk about this. My main objective, therefore, is to make these 
ideas explicit and to present an epistemological theory that is both coherent with the 
fragments and with Heraclitus’ philosophical thought as a whole. I aim to address the 
following questions: how do we achieve knowledge? Is there an object of knowledge 
and what are its characteristics? What is the role of language in this process? And, can 
we communicate knowledge to others? What do we need to change in ourselves in 
order to understand it? Also, what is the role of Heraclitus in teaching others this 
knowledge?  
0.6. General overview  
The main objective of the first chapter is to define and understand the object of 
knowledge in Heraclitus’ epistemology: the concept of the logos. The goal of the first 
section is to provide the background and a context of the concept of logos in Heraclitus: 
how the word was used before and in his time, its occurrences in Heraclitus’ fragments 
and the problem of its interpretation in fragments B1, B2, and B50, and the different 
interpretations of the logos-doctrine by modern scholars. The second section is devoted 
to finding the most important characteristics of the logos and its definition. I side with 
those who interpret logos in Heraclitus as cosmic and argue that the logos of which 
Heraclitus speaks in fragments B1, B2, and B50, given what is said in those fragments 
and some other remarks by ancient authors, has the following characteristics: 
ontologically, the logos is independent of Heraclitus (and of any other speaker), is 





however, a logos, which means it is speech or some sort of linguistic entity, an account 
or a description. I propose that, in Heraclitus’ epistemology, it is a perfect, best and 
unique description of the universe, which is tantamount to true knowledge. The logos 
is speech (even if internal speech or thought) and, as such, it possesses meaning. What 
it says is the truth. It is the divine and perfect description of the universe as a whole. I 
argue that it can be understood in three ways, which are not mutually exclusive: first, 
as an informative description, similar to the logos spoken by the world-soul in Plato’s 
Timaeus. Secondly, as a prescriptive description, which not only describes what the 
universe is at any time, but also its regular behaviour and future configuration. A third 
idea, inspired by Borges’ La Biblioteca de Babel, states that the logos represents an 
abstraction and extrapolation of our imperfect human logoi: just as some human 
descriptions are correct, there must be a description of the whole cosmos that is the 
correct one. In the third section, I argue that, as such, the logos cannot be 
communicated to other people directly. This is supported by the context and heritage 
of Heraclitus, where not only a divine truth is out of reach for human beings but also 
where the way in which we communicate and understand is put in doubt (Xenophanes 
B34). This is supported as well by the fragments themselves, and is one of the reasons 
why Heraclitus says that people fail to understand him and the logos: the object of 
knowledge is too complex and great for us to communicate in the same manner as any 
other speech. 
The second chapter deals with the problem of language in Heraclitus’ 
epistemology, with the role it plays in the understanding of the logos, and whether 
language is useful for teaching this kind of truth to others. In the first section I propose 
that Heraclitus’ own theory of naming and correct language is hard to define but an 
approximate idea can be suggested based on the fragments and testimonies. 
Additionally, the context in which Heraclitus operates (his probable knowledge of 
Xenophanes’ B34 and his connection to Cratylus) shows that there was an interest in 
the problem of the relation between names and things, and in the problem of whether 
knowledge can be defined as using correct language to describe reality. I argue that 
some of his fragments indicate similarities with the theory of correct naming attributed 
to Cratylus by Plato. The second section deals with Heraclitus’ reception in antiquity 





ancient and modern Heraclitean studies. I propose to approach this problem based on 
a differentiation of three categories. 1) Unintentional ambiguity or obscurity, which 
includes misunderstandings in the interpretation of the fragments for doxographical, 
palaeographical, textual, contextual, and other accidental reasons. 2) Following Kahn, 
intentional ambiguity or obscurity, which refers to fragments where we perceive that 
the author deliberately wanted to convey a second or more meanings in addition to the 
literal one.47 3) The concealment of a true message. This means that a hidden account 
or picture, which is different from the literal message or meaning and can be decoded 
or deciphered from it, is the true message of the words, sentences or fragments of 
Heraclitus. In the third section, I propose two ways in which language and style work 
and communicate for Heraclitus. The first one is to communicate information without 
understanding, which is the way in which traditional poets and other authors mislead 
and indoctrinate people into false knowledge. The second way in which language is 
useful is by communicating the logos indirectly, this is by telling people what is not 
the logos, by telling them how to reach after and prepare themselves to acquire the 
logos, and by making people aware of their ignorance, usually by shocking them out 
of their wrong prejudices and suppositions. This last function of language has an 
important role in Heraclitus’ philosophical views: the wise man must direct and steer 
other people towards the understanding of this logos. This idea is similar to Meno 
79e9–80b7 when Socrates is accused of being like the torpedo fish: making people 
doubt their previously acquired opinions, leading them to an aporia and then to 
pursuing the truth.  
The third chapter is devoted to the last step in Heraclitus’ epistemology: people, 
and their personal souls and logoi. In the first section I explain the background and the 
context of the concept of soul before and in Heraclitus’ time. Then I argue why 
Heraclitus’ concept of the soul is very innovative and significant for his time. Even 
though the soul is still connected to our biological life and may represent death in the 
afterlife, many other characteristics are attributed to it, which transform this new idea 
of the soul into an antecedent of the idea of the mind. The soul is now a proper part of 
the cosmos, as an element, but most importantly, it is responsible for many 
                                                 





psychological and physiological activities during life, including sense perception and 
understanding. In the second section I argue that, for Heraclitus, the only way in which 
we can gain access to knowledge is by ourselves through sense perception, which is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding. One of the other requirements 
is having a ‘non-barbarian’ soul; our senses are capable of reporting truthful 
information about the world but we need to re-educate and attune our souls in order 
for this process to work correctly. In the last section, I propose that a major part of this 
adjustment of our souls is done by exploring and knowing ourselves (perhaps in the 
same way as the Delphic maxim and the tradition suggested self-knowledge). When 
we have cleaned our soul of previous interpretations of the world (wrong logoi) and 





Chapter 1: Logos in Heraclitus’ philosophical 
doctrine 
The main purpose of the present chapter is to analyse the concept of logos in Heraclitus’ 
philosophy in general and in his epistemology in particular. The problem of the 
interpretation of logos has been addressed by many scholars, and it is closely related 
to the problem of communication, language, and knowledge in his philosophical 
doctrine, particularly because Heraclitus seems to present this logos to us both as 
knowledge and as an object; it is that which you need to grasp in order to truly achieve 
understanding of the cosmos and its events. Logos is a difficult subject in Heraclitus’ 
doctrine, and one that has opened a great variety of interpretations both in ancient and 
modern times. Since the logos is potentially a part of the core of Heraclitus’ 
epistemology and closely related to his ontology, it is necessary to define it and take a 
position in its interpretation.  
For this purpose, the chapter will be divided in the following sections. First, there 
will be an introduction to the concept of logos and its usage before and in Heraclitus’ 
time, and about the use attributed to it in his extant fragments. In the second section, I 
will take a position in the interpretation of logos in Heraclitus’ doctrine and will argue 
that the logos, especially in fragments B1, B2 and B50, is 1) independent from 
Heraclitus and not the same as his words or speech, 2) that it is eternal and divine, and 
3) that it is cosmic. Although several scholars interpret Heraclitus’ logos in a analogous 
way, I will advance the argument that the concept of logos in Heraclitus should be 
understood similarly to the logos present in the world-soul in Plato’s Timaeus, a 
similarity that was first proposed by Robinson and one that in my view can help solve 
some of the problems of the two most common interpretations of logos in Heraclitus.1 
Following this last interpretation and other scholars, the logos will be presented as a 
cosmic characteristic or feature, which represents a complete and perfect, unique best 
description of the universe. In the last section, I argue that if the logos is such and 
                                                 





Heraclitus sees a problem in communicating it to others, even after explaining how 
things really are, then the logos cannot be directly communicated to others. 
1.1. The concept of logos 
Even though the word logos has been interpreted as a central concept in Heraclitus’ 
philosophical doctrine, the meaning of the word is very difficult to establish in the 
contexts where Heraclitus uses it.2 This is mainly because, before Heraclitus’ time (late 
sixth to early fifth century BC), it was not as widely used as it was in the Classical 
period. Therefore, there are not many occurrences that can be compared in order to 
easily understand Heraclitus’ use of the word. There are somewhere over a dozen 
registered occurrences of logos in Homer, Hesiod, and early Greek philosophers close 
to Heraclitus’ time.3 In all of them the word can be translated as ‘story’ or ‘words’, 
with the general meaning of ‘things said’ or ‘things meant’. In this period, I believe 
Nussbaum is right in pointing out that ‘the Homeric picture of language presents 
similar features: ἔπεα, frequently mentioned, are a series of unordered units’ while 
logos, by contrast, implies a certain ‘order or connection’.4 However, there are two 
points to notice. First, that in Theogony 229, Logoi are presented to us as divinities, 
sons of strife, eris. 5  Moreover, it is worth noticing that in Parmenides’ Poem  
(B8.50–51) the trustworthy logos (πιστὸς λόγος) of the goddess is contrasted to human 
opinions (δόξαι βροτείαι). These two points do not substantially change the meaning 
of the word but can give it overtones that involve a relation to the divine.  
In Herodotus (active c. 450–420 BC), the meaning of logos does not change 
extensively, but we find some more specialised uses, perhaps caused, too, by an 
increase in the number of occurrences (447). Powell’s Lexicon to Herodotus gives us 
the following definitions: (1) ‘word’; (2) ‘thing said’; (3) ‘talk’; (4) ‘account’, ‘report’; 
                                                 
2 For clarity, most of the time I will just transliterate the word logos instead of offering a translation. 
And I will refer to ‘the logos’ as the cosmic entity, in opposition to ‘a logos’ or ‘logoi’ as ‘speech’ or 
‘accounts’. 
3 Homer, Iliad 15.393 and Odyssey 1.56. Hesiod, Theogony 229 and 890; Works and Days 78, 106, and 
789. Xenophanes, Poem B1.14, B7. Parmenides, Poem B1.15, B7, B8.50. 
4 Nussbaum (1972), 3.  
5 Theogony 225–231: Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα/Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα/ Ὑσμίνας τε Μάχας 
τε Φόνους τ’ Ἀνδροκτασίας τε /Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ’ Ἀμφιλλογίας τε /Δυσνομίην τ’ Ἄτην τε, 
συνήθεας ἀλλήληισιν/ Ὅρκόν. It is perhaps unrelated but maybe Heraclitus saw a connection between 





(5) ‘estimation’; (6) ‘condition’; (7) ‘debate’; (8) ‘discourse’; (9) expressions for 
‘truth’; (10) other idioms; and (11) other expressions, including kata ton logon as 
‘proportionately’, ‘naturally’ and ‘in the same way’. 6  It is clear, though, that the 
general meaning of the word did not change much from what we can find in the poets 
and early Presocratics. Most of the meanings fit into the category of ‘things said’, 
except for (9), (10), and perhaps (11).  
1.1.1. Logos in the fragments 
Given that before and after Heraclitus’ time the word logos has a meaning related to 
verbal expressions, it is not surprising that in most cases he did not use the word in a 
substantially new way.7 In his fragments we find the word logos 11 times, in fragments 
B31, B39, B87, B108, B45, B115, B1, B2, B50, and B72. In the first four (B31, B39, 
B87, and B108) the meaning of logos follows the expected use: it means ‘speech’, 
‘account’, or the like. Fragments B45 and B115 present us with a context in which the 
meaning of logos seems to stray away slightly from the usual usage but still consistent 
with the period. However, in four fragments, B1, B2, B50, and B72, the word is not 
very easy to interpret.8 These fragments are the main reason why Heraclitus is said to 
have a logos doctrine, mostly because none of the expected meanings of the word logos 
make much sense when translated as ‘account’ or ‘speech’. 
Let us examine all of them starting with fragment B1. As mentioned above, in 
fragment B1 Heraclitus introduces his logos in a quite strange way: τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ 
ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι. This means that in the first occurrence of 
logos, Heraclitus is saying either that this logos exists forever (ἐόντος αἰεὶ) or that 
                                                 
6 Powell (1938), s.v. λόγος. 
7 As it did happen with the use of logos in Plato and Aristotle. Guthrie makes an analysis of the term 
logos in the fifth century BC, in which he includes some other and more specialised meanings later used 
by Plato and Aristotle. See Guthrie (1962), 419–424. 
8 I follow most scholars in that the main fragments that posit a problem to understanding logos in the 
usual way are B1, B2, and B50. See Johnstone (2014), 3, and Robinson (2009), 94–97. However, I do 
not fully agree with the interpretation of logos as ‘measure’ in B45 and B115. I discuss these two 
fragments in section 3.1.3. Regarding fragment B72, since it seems to repeat or summarise some ideas 
of fragments B1 and B2, most scholars consider it a Stoic (Marcus Aurelius’) interpretation of 
Heraclitus’ doctrine, but not Heraclitean properly. See Marcovich (1967), 18. He says that ‘λόγωι–
διοικοῦντι are an explanation of Marcus himself’. Kirk (1954), 44, thinks similarly. TEGP, 142–143, 





humans are always unable to understand it (αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται).9 Either way, its 
translation into ‘account’ or ‘things said’ in general does not seem to be the best choice. 
Why would a speech or words exist forever? And how could there be an account which 
people are always unable to understand? A second mention of the word in B1 tells us 
that everything happens in accordance to this logos (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν 
λόγον τόνδε). If we use the regular translations of logos, we would get as a result that 
everything happens in accordance to the things that someone or Heraclitus said, which 
does not seem absurd at all in a conversation; and yet it does if we take γινομένων γὰρ 
πάντων literally, as ‘everything that happens in the cosmos’. Therefore, in both cases 
it would not feel particularly right to take logos as ‘things said’. It could mean, however, 
that we are dealing with a special kind of ‘account’ or ‘speech’. It is important to 
mention again here that, according to Aristotle (Rhetoric 1407b14), Sextus Empiricus 
(Adversus Mathematicos 7.132), and Hippolytus (Refutatio Omnium Haeresium 9.9.3), 
this fragment was the beginning of the book attributed to Heraclitus. If their testimony 
is true, this logos would be the first thing mentioned by Heraclitus in his book or speech, 
without a previous explanation of what he is referring to.10 
We find ourselves in a similar situation when trying to translate logos in 
fragment B2: 
B2: διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῶι ξυνῶι (τουτέστι τῶι κοινῶι· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός). 
τοῦ λόγου δ᾽ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἱδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. 
Because this fragment most likely followed B1, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that both fragments are referring to the same logos.11 From other fragments we know 
                                                 
9 I will discuss the problem of the position of the aiei in section 1.2.2. Regarding the interpretation of 
the first fragment, I do not think Heraclitus meant to show a difference between einai and gignomai. 
Apparently, this idea was first proposed by Gigon (1935). See contra Kirk (1954), 40–41: ‘Whether the 
contrast between εἶναι and γίνεσθαι was one which Heraclitus deliberately made, and one which was 
instrumental in the further shaping of his ideas, is extremely doubtful.’ In this regard see also Tarán 
(1986), 9. Furthermore, it has been proposed that the first genitive can be interpreted as genitive absolute. 
However, I believe that semantically it makes no difference, since what is heard and not understood is 
in both interpretations the logos. There would be a slight difference in the concessive force of the 
genitive absolute but the change would not be semantically meaningful. 
10 Most modern scholars agree with this supposition, however see Mouraviev’s reconstruction of the 
book (2011), who understands B1 as the opening of the doctrinal section, after a proem in which logos 
is previously mentioned.  
11 According to Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.133, fragment B2 came right after B1. 
Marcovich makes a good case, however, when he argues that B114 and B2 are part of the same saying. 





that, for Heraclitus, there is a contrast between what is common and what is private; 
between these two what is common is more desirable.12 We are told that logos is 
common and should be followed. However, with this information, it is not easy to 
assign a meaning to the word logos in B2. An account and a speech can be followed 
indeed, but you would not say that they are common in an absolute sense, i.e. not only 
common to a few people. Again, we have to consider that logos here could represent 
something different.  
The same is the case for fragment B50: 
B50: οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν 
πάντα εἶναι. 
The most striking feature of the use of the word logos here is that it suggests to us the 
meaning of ‘account’, ‘speech’, or ‘things said’ because of the natural relation between 
a speech and the verb ‘to hear’, akouō, but, at the same, it seems to deny that this logos 
belongs to Heraclitus or to somebody else. It invites us to listen to a logos that would 
make us agree to an important truth about the universe. Heraclitus could be saying that 
we should not listen to him but to what he says. However, this is an idea that, as a later 
analysis will show, seems hard to understand form the wording and the Greek of his 
time.  
Those three fragments have driven scholars to adopt different positions 
regarding the interpretation of the word logos in particular, and regarding the 
interpretation of Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrine in general. There are two main 
interpretations. One view is that logos is some sort of cosmic entity, independent of 
Heraclitus’ pronunciations, which governs and stirs all things in the universe.13 On the 
                                                 
12 See fragments B114, B103, B113, and B17. That which is common is usually related to mental 
abilities, but in B103 it is related to the unity of opposites, i.e. the beginning and ending of a circle.  
13 E.g. Marcovich (1967), 92: ‘Reason or intelligence spread all over the world as the air.’ Kirk (1954), 
39: ‘What we are trying to summarize is an idea like “the organized way in which (as Heraclitus had 
discovered) all things work”; “plan” (in a non-theological sense), “rule”, even “law” (as in “the laws of 
force”) are possible summaries.’ Kirk proposes that the best translation could be ‘formula of things’. 
See also KRS (1983), 187: ‘[Logos] is perhaps to be interpreted as the unifying formula or proportionate 
method of arrangement of things, what might almost be termed their structural plan both individual and 
in sum.’ TEGP, 188, goes a little bit farther and states that fragments B108, B41, and B50, ‘hint that 
there is a wise being which orders all things, in such a way that they make up a unity. The content of 
the Word [logos] (introduced in F1-2), the objectively accessible message, is precisely the unity of all 






other hand, we have the idea that Heraclitus always used logos within the regular 
meanings of the word, and that in B1, B2, and B50 he is only referring to his own 
speech or book.14 However, these two interpretations do not necessarily contradict 
each other: the matter is not black and white, and there are some interpretations that 
understand that logos is somehow both a cosmic entity that guides the cosmos and 
Heraclitus’ speech, which corresponds with the former.15 
There are three main arguments against accepting logos as a cosmic entity and 
in favour of taking it just as Heraclitus’ speech. First, that there are no other mentions 
of the word logos meaning anything similar to a cosmic entity before or in Heraclitus’ 
time. Second, — an argument from silence — that had Heraclitus wanted to state a 
new meaning for the word and had his doctrine of the logos been of major importance, 
Plato and Aristotle would have said something about it or reacted to it in some way. 
And third, had all that been the case, it is strange that Heraclitus never explained that 
he was talking about a different kind of logos anywhere, especially in the beginning of 
his book.16 Additionally, it is important to notice that even when most authors think 
that this logos is cosmic, its definition and its characteristics seem to differ from one 
interpretation to another. Consequently, for Kirk and Marcovich, for instance, it is 
some sort of entity that moves and controls everything, whilst for Molina, Minar, and 
                                                 
14 See mainly Burnet (1930), 133 n. 1: ‘The “logos” is primarily the discourse of Heraclitus himself; 
though, as he is a prophet, we may call it his “Word”.’ Also Barnes (1982), 59: ‘A logos or “account” 
is what a man legei or says […] the noun logos picks up, in an ordinary and metaphysically unexciting 
way, the verb legei.’  
15 For instance, Guthrie (1962), 434: ‘To sum this up, it is first of all the everlasting truth to which he is 
giving verbal expression, but which is independent of his utterance of it (frr. 1, 50). Next, it is the subject 
of that truth, the One which is everything (fr. 50). And this One is at the same time the divine, intelligent 
principle which surrounds us and causes the ordering of the cosmos, and that within us to which we owe 
whatever intelligence we possess. In us it is adulterated with lower elements and therefore with 
foolishness. At the same time it is fire, the hot and dry, and what corrupts it in us is its encounter with 
moisture and cold.’ Also ATH, 22: ‘The logos which is at once the discourse of Heraclitus, the nature 
of language itself, the structure of the psychē and the universal principle in accordance with which all 
things come to pass.’ And Minar (1939), 340–41: ‘The logos is first of all Heraclitus' story, his 
explanation, and perhaps even his book. This appears from frag. 1. But the word carries also the 
implication that it is a true account; it is the "meaning" of things. And since it is considered, in a sense, 
as itself a thing, it carries definite implications also as to the content of this true report.’ 
16 See Glasson (1952), 236: ‘It should also be observed that Plato in his treatment of the Heraclitean 
school does not mention the Logos. Nor does Aristotle in his account of Heraclitus. This would be most 
surprising if it really were the case that the doctrine of the Logos was his central message. Again, it is 
highly significant that no instances can be quoted of the use of Logos as cosmic principle in the period 
which lies between Heraclitus and the Stoics.’ As it will be argued in section 1.2.3, there was at least 






Johnstone it is closer to something that describes or speaks to us about the order of the 
universe without having an active influence in its behaviour and processes.17 
1.2. Characteristics of the logos  
1.2.1. The logos is independent of Heraclitus 
The first problem I want to approach is that of the status of this logos, whether 
Heraclitus is referring to his own speech, or perhaps to the book attributed to him, or 
to an entity different from what he says. Another option is that there is an entity outside 
Heraclitus and that his speech coincides with it. I will argue that the logos is 
independent of Heraclitus, that it exists on its own as part of the cosmos, and that it is 
not the same thing as what Heraclitus says nor does it correspond to the book attributed 
to him in antiquity. For this purpose, I will consider fragment B50 in particular: 
B50: οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν 
πάντα εἶναι. 
 
Having listened not to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree that 
everything is one. 
A first reading of the fragment shows sufficiently that there is a personification of the 
logos. Kirk is the first one to point this out, but he says this due to his overall 
interpretation of the logos as a cosmic entity and not just based on what the fragment 
itself says. 18  Different translations of this fragment reflect, in turn, different 
                                                 
17 Molina (2006), 68: ‘Sería quizás ésta la primera intuición del mundo como lenguaje, pues todo lo 
conocido en el cosmos, toda razón, todo pensamiento, todo sentimiento está contenido en el lenguaje. 
Heráclito nos indica que no existe nada fuera del Logos, fuera de la palabra, pues nada existe si no puede 
ser nombrado, todo está mediado necesariamente para el hombre por la palabra.’ Minar (1939), 333: 
‘[Snell] points out that λέγειν can frequently be translated “to signify” and holds that this connotation 
passes into the verbal noun logos. Thus logos has the double sense of meaningful human speech and the 
meaning which lies in things. Things speak to us, as it were.’ Johnstone (2014), 23: ‘Heraclitus 
understood the cosmic logos as something that can be understood by us in much the way that a written 
text or spoken account can be understood by us.’ See also Lebedev (2017), who proposes that logos in 
Heraclitus is a metaphor for the liber naturae: ‘The phrase λόγος ὅδε at least in two fragments of 
Heraclitus (fr. 1–2 Leb./DK 22 B 1, B 50) is a metaphor which on the iconic (metaphorical) level of 
meaning retains the semantics of a “spoken word” that can be “heard” and interpreted, but on the 
referential level denotes the Universe, τὸ πᾶν.’ Lebedev (2017), 235. 
18 Kirk noticed about the beginning of B50, οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, that it is an expression that 
implies to a certain degree a personification of logos, since, ‘the Logos is present in all things, it is 





interpretations. For instance, Burnet renders it, ‘It is wise to harken, not to me but to 
my word.’19 And Graham proposes, ‘Having harkened not to me but to the Word, you 
should agree that wisdom is knowing that all things are one.’20 Hence, Burnet and 
Barnes do not think that the text of the fragment implies a personification of the logos, 
but just an uncommon way to refer to one’s own speech.21 Graham’s translation, 
‘Word’, on the other hand, shows that he understands logos differently, as having ‘rich 
religious overtones, including implications of a transcendent truth.’22  However, is 
there anything in the fragment that could guide us in order to decide whether with this 
logos Heraclitus is referring to his own speech or to something else? 
According to the standard use for the verb akouō, the thing heard is indicated by 
the accusative case as a direct object, and the person from whom it is heard takes the 
genitive case or sometimes can be introduced by a preposition.23 What is surprising is 
that in the fragment Heraclitus uses the genitive case for both himself and the logos. 
This would literally mean ‘pay attention or listen not “from” me but “from” the logos’, 
i.e. as if the logos was the speaker itself and not what is heard from the speaker. 
Moreover, as some scholars have pointed out, if he wanted to say ‘listen not to me but 
to my speech’, first, he would have used a possessive adjective and, second, he would 
have used the accusative case for logos.24 However, there are some exceptions for this 
rule of the use of akouō. Homer uses kluō and akouō regularly. The former is mostly 
used in direct speech to get the attention of the audience or the interlocutor, ‘Listen to 
me’, ‘Heed my words’ (for instance κέκλυτέ μευ Τρῶες καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί in Iliad 
3.86), and the latter is used as general listening (as in ἀλλ’ ἄγε δεῦρο, ἄναξ, ἵν’ ἔπος 
καὶ μῦθον ἀκούσηις/ ἡμέτερον in Odyssey 11.561–2).  
Homer and Hesiod regularly use a genitive of person and an accusative of object 
when using akouō. It even seems that the expression μῦθον ἄκουσε (sometimes in a 
                                                 
113: ‘It becomes clear that Logos has an objective existence, not depending on Heraclitus himself, i.e. 
that it is a universal Law operating in all things around us.’ 
19 Burnet (1930), 133. My emphasis. 
20 TEGP, 149. 
21 See Burnet (1930), 133 n. 1, and Barnes (1982), 59. 
22 TEGP, 187. The ‘Word’ is meant to evoke the Christian logos doctrine. 
23 LSJ, s.v. ἀκούω. 
24 For instance, Robinson (2013), 321: ‘Had Heraclitus wanted to say “My account”, he could have said 
it with great clarity by saying tou logou mou. But he simply said tou logou.’ And Johnstone (2014), 7: 





different tense, mood, and person for akouō) is an ending formula with at least twenty 
occurrences. This shows that the object of the verb, what is heard, is most of the times 
in the accusative case. Although in most of the instances the verb is used in relation to 
a word that indicates speech (mythos, phthongos, epos), there are a couple of cases in 
which the object is in the genitive case (e.g. Od. 21.292–3: αὐτὰρ ἀκούεις/ μύθων 
ἡμετέρων καὶ ῥήσιος). This one example threatens to make the general rule invalid. 
Nevertheless, in the few places where the genitive is used for the object of akouō there 
is always a possessive adjective or a pronoun indicating to whom those words belong 
(ἡμετέρων in Od. 21.292–3). This means that before Heraclitus there is not one 
occurrence of the object of the verb in genitive and without a possessive indicating to 
whom the speech belongs, which is the case for fragment B50. Thus, if the object is 
never in genitive on its own, it seems that someone who listened to or read fragment 
B50 would not have thought Heraclitus was speaking about his own speech. Therefore, 
if Heraclitus used the genitive case for logos and opposed it to him, he most likely 
wanted us to listen not ‘from’ him but ‘from’ the logos, and this implies that this logos 
is personified as something that speaks for itself. 
I also agree with Heidegger’s idea that the positioning of the οὔκ ἐμοῦ at the 
beginning of B50 is meaningful.25 This ‘not to me’ is emphatic, and it opposes the 
regular and traditional way to address a crowd.26 The verb akouō means ‘hear sounds’ 
as well as ‘obey’, like in ‘heed my words’. So there is a paradox in not listening to 
Heraclitus: if we do decide not to listen to him but to the logos, we would be, at the 
same time, following his advice about listening to the logos.27 Although I agree with 
                                                 
25 Heidegger (1975), 76: ‘The saying begins οὔκ ἐμοῦ... it begins with a strict, prohibiting “not...” It 
refers to the saying and talking of Heraclitus himself. It concerns the hearing of mortals. “Not to me,” 
i.e. not to this one who is talking; you are not to heed the vocalization of his talk. You never hear 
properly so long as your ears hang upon the sound and flow of a human voice in order to snatch up for 
yourselves a manner of speaking. Heraclitus begins the saying with a rejection of hearing as nothing but 
the passion of the ears. But this rejection is founded on a reference to proper hearing.’ I do not agree 
with Heidegger, however, on relating it to the basic meaning of legō as ‘to pick up’; rather, I follow LSJ 
in that logos only takes the later meanings of legō. See Heidegger (1975), 59–64, and LSJ, s.v. λὀγος. 
Nussbaum (1979), 11, suggests a similar approach of a different kind of listening/understanding for a 
different kind of message: ‘Men are misled by their atomistic conception of language. Fragment 1 shows 
us that men's ears are bad witnesses so long as they remain on the level of ἔπεα and fail to grasp the 
λόγος.’ 
26 Homer and Hesiod frequently use kluō with the personal pronoun when someone is addressing a 
crowd. It is a formula for the beginning of the verse that can vary from κλῦθί μευ, κέκλυτέ μευ, and 
κλῦτέ μευ, depending on the metric necessities.  





Kirk’s opinion that ‘οὐκ ἐμοῦ should not of course be taken as prohibiting men from 
listening to Heraclitus’, I do not agree with what he says next, that ‘rather it implies 
that his words have an absolute authority from outside’.28 I think Heraclitus is in fact 
saying that it is better to listen to the logos and not to him, which of course implies that 
the logos is something different from Heraclitus’ speech. Heraclitus, in this picture, 
plays the role of a messenger of the logos, but Heraclitus’ speech, his own logos, is 
not equal to the cosmic logos but, as I will argue, directs people to it so that they can 
hear it themselves. 
The second part of fragment B50 points, as well, to an interpretation in which 
logos is of a different kind, whose existence does not depend or is related to Heraclitus 
or his own logos. The verb homologeō is chosen by Heraclitus most likely because its 
etymology suggests a relation to the word logos.29 So, what is wise, after having heard 
the logos, is to come to the same logos (or a common logos as in fragment B2),  
homo-logein, or agree, that everything is one. This, in turn, means that there is only 
one logos with which we should all agree, and which encompasses everything in the 
cosmos, as other fragments suggest.30 Thus, it seems that understanding, not Heraclitus, 
but this logos, is tantamount to understanding other important features of the cosmos: 
that everything is one and, possibly, that there is a unity in opposites. Whether 
Heraclitus knows this logos or is able to express it is not clear yet. However, the way 
he refers to it and its relation to other of his theories about the cosmos indicate that he 
thought of this logos not as his own speech and ideas but as something independent 
and greater than himself. 
1.2.2. The logos is eternal and divine 
In this next section, I will argue that the logos is eternal and divine by focusing mainly 
on the analysis of fragment B1. It is important to clarify that when I say ‘divine’ I do 
not mean that the logos was necessarily related to the traditional gods and divinities, 
or connected to any particular religious practices. By ‘divine’ I mean an entity that is 
                                                 
28 Kirk (1954), 67. 
29 I agree with Marcovich (1967), 115, that the word ‘was chosen by Heraclitus for the sake of the word-
play ὁ λόγος : ὁμολογεῖν […] implying “not being at variance with the universal Logos both in 
philosophical theory and in life-practice”.’ See also Robinson (1987), 114–115. 





a part of something bigger and more powerful than human nature, which in ancient 
Greece usually includes but is not reduced to natural phenomena. 
As previously mentioned, most of the occurrences of the word logos before 
Heraclitus refer to the result of the act of speaking, and, hence, they mean ‘things said’, 
‘tale’, or ‘account’. This is a strong premise for the argument used by those who argue 
that Heraclitus could not have meant logos as a cosmic and metaphysical entity, since 
he would be using the same word in a significantly different way from his ancestors 
and contemporaries. However, there are some examples in antiquity of the word logos 
being used in this different way. As previously mentioned, in Hesiod’s Theogony 223–
231, Logoi are included in the genealogy of the gods, as sons of Strife. Of course, this 
apparently isolated mention should not lead us to conclude that logoi were in fact 
considered as divinities; just in the same way as ‘Quarrels and Lies’, mentioned in the 
same passage, were not gods of cult, as far are we are aware. Most of the entities 
mentioned by Hesiod in this passage were considered some sort of natural divinity, but 
this is not the same as understanding logos as a cosmic and divine entity. However, 
the fact that these logoi are mentioned as divine in the Theogony, one of the most 
influential pieces of literature of the time, at the very least could have influenced the 
later reception of the idea of such a logos. From this passage we can infer two 
important points about the concept of logos in that time. First, that one of the first 
mentions of the word is connected to the divinity. This implies that the divinity of logoi 
was not something unheard of. Secondly, we have an example in which the word 
means something different from ‘things said’, even if in a personification of verbal 
entities.  
However, the most important argument in favour of an eternal and divine logos 
is in Heraclitus’ first fragment. As mentioned above, ancient sources put B1 at the 
beginning of Heraclitus’ book or speech.31 Those comments seem sufficient evidence 
that the first thing that he mentions is our mysterious logos. However, neither they nor 
Heraclitus seem to be concerned with explaining what logos means in the passage. As 
mentioned above, Aristotle comments on the ambiguity of the passage but does not 
say anything about logos, in Rhetoric 1407b11–18: 
                                                 
31 Aristotle (Rhetoric 1407b17–18), Sextus Empiricus (Adversus mathematicos 7.132.), and Hippolytus 





ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὔφραστον, ἔστιν δὲ 
τὸ αὐτό· ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐδ’ ἃ μὴ ῥάιδιον 
διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ 
τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρωι πρόσκειται, τῶι ὕστερον ἢ τῶι πρότερον, οἷον ἐν 
τῆι ἀρχῆι αὐτῆι τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ 
ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται· ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί, πρὸς ποτέρωι <δεῖ> 
διαστίξαι.  
 
In general writing should be easy to read and to phrase. These are 
manifestations of the same quality — one which is lost when words make 
too many connections and are difficult to punctuate, as in the writings of 
Heraclitus. For it is difficult to punctuate his text because it is unclear 
whether a word goes with what follows or what precedes. For instance, in 
the beginning of his treatise, he says, Of this Word’s being forever do 
men prove to be uncomprehending [F1]. It is unclear which phrase 
‘forever’ <should> go with.32 
Aristotle’s point is not fully clear to us modern readers, since texts in that period did 
not have punctuation marks.33 However, his concern about the position of the word aei 
is clear: aei could go either with the first part of the sentence, referring to eontos, or 
with the second part, referring to axunetoi, which would lead to two different meanings 
of the whole sentence. If we assume that it goes with the first part of the sentence 
(ἐόντος ἀεὶ), this would mean that logos exists forever, which in turn would imply or 
at least strengthen the case for an eternal and cosmic logos. On the other hand, if we 
take aei to go with the second part of the sentence (ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται), then the 
sentence would mean that people always fail to understand this logos, but the logos 
would not necessarily be eternal.  
Modern scholars are divided in the interpretation of the aei, regardless of their 
position in the general interpretation of logos.34 For instance, Burnet seems to take it 
with eontos but understand logos as Heraclitus’ words. For him, what Heraclitus says 
                                                 
32 Trans. TEGP. 
33 As TEGP, 141 n.1., points out. Tarán (1986), 7 n. 30, suggests that ‘Aristotle seems to mean some 
sort of dot or stop to be made at appropriate places of a text in order to facilitate the reading of it.’ The 
verb διαστίζω here should mean something like ‘to tell apart’, ‘to distinguish between two’, or ‘to clarify 
which of two’. See Epictetus’ Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae 1.17.5–6: ἀλλ’ ἄν μοι λέγηις ὅτι ‘οὐκ 
οἶδα πότερον ἀληθῶς ἢ ψευδῶς διαλέγηι’, κἄν τι κατ’ ἀμφίβολον φωνὴν εἴπω καὶ λέγηις μοι ‘διάστιξον’, 
οὐκ ἔτι ἀνέξομαί σου, ἀλλ’ ἐρῶ σοι ‘ἀλλ’ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον’. And Arianus Didymus In Stobaeus’ 
Anthologium 2.7.3c4–6: Ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν δημοτελὲς εἰσήγαγε τὸ τέλος, Πλάτων δὲ διέστιξε πρῶτος τὸ 
κατ’ ἄνδρα καὶ βίον ἰδιάζον ἔν τε τῶι Τιμαίωι κἀν τῶι Πρωταγόραι. 
34 I follow Tarán’s interpretation, in particular, regarding the problem of the position of the aei, that it 





is true forever.35 Kirk and Marcovich take it with axunetoi but understand logos as a 
cosmic entity; which means that humans are never able to understand the logos.36 Kahn 
takes it with both aei and axunetoi, and logos is both a cosmic entity and Heraclitus’ 
words.37 Graham takes it with both and for him logos is cosmic.38  
The first argument in favour of taking the aei with the participle is that, although 
Aristotle himself does not suggest a solution, Hippolytus and Sextus Empiricus, who 
are the other sources of the fragment, take the aei to go with eontos.39 A second 
argument, posited by some scholars, is that if we take it to go with the second part, 
Heraclitus would be making an emphasis that is not useful or necessary. The fragment 
already says that people fail to understand before and after they have heard (καὶ 
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον), and adding the aei, so that they always 
fail to do so, would not add any significant meaning, since we know from the wording 
that they fail to do so in any case.  
An additional argument in favour of Heraclitus’ logos existing forever takes us 
back to Homer and Hesiod. Let us begin by considering a quotation of Xenophon that 
could have the exact same ambiguity as Heraclitus’ B1. In Hiero 4.11, he says: ὥσπερ 
γὰρ πολέμου ὄντος ἀεὶ ἀναγκάζονται στράτευμα τρέφειν ἢ ἀπολωλέναι. This sentence 
has the same ambiguity in the position of an aei after a participle. I would render it, 
‘since, as it were, there is always war, they are forced to maintain an army, or they 
die.’40 The same problem that Aristotle sees in Heraclitus’ first fragment could be 
applied to this passage of Xenophon; we can take aei with ontos, ‘since there is always 
war, then they are forced…’ or we can take aei with anankazontai, ‘since there is war, 
then they are forever forced…’ However, in this passage it seems more natural to take 
the aei with ontos. Why? I believe it is because of the expression ‘as it were’ (ὥσπερ). 
In this case, it is introduced to indicate that what follows should not be taken literally, 
                                                 
35 Burnet (1928), 58. 
36 Kirk (1954), 34–35. Marcovich (1967), 9. 
37 ATH, 97. 
38 TEGP, 187. 
39  Hippolytus uses the following words to introduce Heraclitus’ quotation in Refutatio Omnium 
Haeresium 9.9.3: ὃτι δὲ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τὸ πᾶν διὰ παντὸς ὤν [‘that the logos exists forever being 
everything and through everything’]. Sextus, perhaps influenced by the Stoics, takes logos as a divine 
entity, in which case it could not mean the words of Heraclitus in the first fragment. Adversus 
mathematicos 7.129. However, the aei is omitted in our version of Sextus’ manuscript.  
40 It is taken in the same way in other translations. E.g. ‘Living, as it were, in a perpetual state of war, 





precisely the expression πολέμου ὄντος ἀεὶ.41 Additionally, it should not be taken 
literally because it is a reference to the way in which Homer and Hesiod describe the 
gods (θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες), as for instance in εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαμείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων 
(Theogony 801). Since Xenophon is not talking about a god in the proper sense (not 
Ares but war), he uses ‘as it were’ to say that war exists forever (as if war were a god).  
Even though Heraclitus does not use the ‘as it were’, I believe the expression aei 
eontos plays the same role in fragment B1 as in Xenophon’s passage. The combination 
of the words aien (Homeric for aei) and the present participle of eimi is used, in that 
order, fourteen times in Homer and six times in Hesiod and, what is most important, 
in all those twenty occurrences it is only used to refer to the gods.42 It is an epithet for 
the gods and an ending formula for the verse; no matter which case the participle takes, 
the two words in that order always make up a dactyl ( ‾ ˘ ˘ ) in the fifth foot and a 
spondee ( ‾ ‾ ) or a trochee ( ‾ ˘ ) in the sixth foot.43 This remark about the metre is 
important because for Homer and Hesiod the words could not have been put together 
at the end of a verse in a different order, as eontos aien would be harder, if not 
impossible, to fit in the verse. In support of this point, many other writers who refer to 
this expression keep the same order as the poets: first aei and then eontos. For instance, 
Aristophanes in Birds, 688–692 says: 
προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν τοῖς ἀθανάτοις ἡμῖν, τοῖς αἰὲν ἐοῦσιν, /τοῖς αἰθερίοις, 
τοῖσιν ἀγήρωις, τοῖς ἄφθιτα μηδομένοισιν, /ἵν᾿ ἀκούσαντες πάντα παρ᾿ 
ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, /φύσιν οἰωνῶν γένεσίν τε θεῶν ποταμῶν 
τ᾿ Ἐρέβους τε Χάους τε /εἰδότες ὀρθῶς, Προδίκωι παρ᾿ ἐμοῦ κλάειν εἴπητε 
τὸ λοιπόν.  
 
Pay attention to us, the immortals, the everlasting, the ethereal, the ageless, 
whose counsels are imperishable; once you hear from us an accurate 
account of all celestial phenomena, and know correctly the nature of birds 
and the genesis of gods, rivers, Erebus, and Chaos, thenceforth you’ll be 
able to tell Prodicus from me to go to hell!44  
                                                 
41 LSJ, s.v. ὥσπερ II. 
42 Iliad 1.290, 1.494, 21.518, and 24.99; Odyssey 1.263, 1.378, 2.143, 3.147, 4.583, 5.7, 8.306, 8.365, 
12.371, and 12.377; Theogony 21, 33, 105, and 801; Works and days 718; Fragment 296.2. 
43 Though the last syllable is usually understood as irrelevant or always long.  





In this passage of Birds, Aristophanes makes fun of the solemn tone of Hesiod’s Work 
and Days. He uses the same dialect (aien and eousin instead of aei and ousin) and fits 
the two words at the end of the verse and in the same order because of metric 
constrains.45 In the context of the play it is easy to understand that it is a reference to 
the traditional religion as portrayed by Homer and Hesiod. 
Xenophon uses the same epic formula when talking about the gods in two other 
passages: θεοὶ δέ, ὦ παῖ, αἰεὶ ὄντες (Cyropaedia, 1.6.46) and ἀλλὰ θεούς γε τοὺς ἀεὶ 
ὄντας (Cyropaedia, 8.7.22). In both cases he keeps the traditional order but, as we saw, 
he changes the order in Hiero 4.11. Nevertheless, the fact that the expression is 
generally used in some order does not mean that in the first passage Xenophon is 
changing the meaning of the statement or that the aei could be interpreted in a different 
way.46  
I believe that in ὥσπερ γὰρ πολέμου ὄντος ἀεὶ ἀναγκάζονται στράτευμα τρέφειν 
ἢ ἀπολωλέναι it would be hard to argue that the aei goes with the second part of the 
sentence (or with both parts of it for that matter), even though syntactically and 
semantically the phrase could make sense that way. That is because the expression is 
a traditional way of referring to the gods. Most likely, at first, the word order was kept 
as in Homer and Hesiod because of tradition and metrical constraints, but when prose 
gained more popularity, the order did not matter to understand the reference. I think 
Heraclitus used eontos aei in fragment B1 referring to this same expression related to 
the divinity in Homer and Hesiod, hence understanding that the aei only goes with the 
eontos. Consequently, I will assume that when he uses the expression aei eontos he is 
perhaps not quoting Homer and Hesiod and agreeing with their views on divinity, but 
making a reference and establishing some kind of relation between what he is saying 
and what they said.47 One would be tempted to think that if the gods are described and 
                                                 
45 He needs to end the anapestic tetrameter with ˘ ˘ ‾ ‾, which would not be possible if he inverts the 
word order. 
46 Other examples with the opposite word order are Thucydides 3.12.3; Plato, Philebus 59a7, 61e3; and 
Timaeus 50c5, 59c7.  
47 This interpretation is strangely rejected by Marcovich, who is the first to notice a similarity between 
aei eontos in the epic formula and fragment B1. He says that it would be a lectio facilior to understand 
a reference to the epic poets in B1. However, as Tarán says, that is a misuse of a principle for textual 
criticism. Tarán (1986), 6: ‘This is really a misapplication of a valid principle of textual criticism. There 
a variant reading is considered to be a lectio facilior when it can be explained as an intentional change 
from a reading that is more difficult to understand.’ I completely agree with Tarán’s argument, he 





perhaps defined as ‘always existing’ in the traditional poems, and since logos is 
mentioned in Hesiod as a minor divinity, then Heraclitus could be just talking about 
one of these gods who ‘are forever’. However, his position towards Homer and Hesiod 
in particular, and towards divinity in general, makes it hard to think that he is agreeing 
with their views on gods and religion.48 
One last argument supporting the divinity of the logos depends on the idea that 
fragment B1 was the beginning of Heraclitus’ speech or of the book attributed to him.49 
Since the times of Homer and Hesiod it was customary to invoke or call upon the gods 
or a muse for inspiration and help. This invocation usually had the following 
characteristics: it appeared right at the beginning of the poem, the divinity was urged 
to tell the poet a story that the poet was about to recite or the divinity was urged to 
come and help the poet tell the story correctly. Homer and Hesiod always use it thus 
in their major poems. It was so common that Plato in Timaeus 27c1–d5 shows how 
important it is to invoke the divinity before starting a discussion, even more when 
talking about the universe: 
Timaeus: That I will, Socrates. Surely anyone with any sense at all will 
always call upon a god before setting out on any venture, whatever its 
importance. In our case, we are about to make speeches about the universe 
— whether it has an origin or even if it does not — and so if we’re not to 
go completely astray we have no choice but to call upon the gods and 
goddesses, and pray that they above all will approve of all we have to say, 
and that in consequence we will, too. Let this, then, be our appeal to the 
gods; to ourselves we must appeal to make sure that you learn as easily as 
possible, and that I instruct you in the subject matter before us in the way 
that best conveys my intent.50  
                                                 
without intending his readers and/or hearers to recall the formula of immortality applied to the gods of 
traditional Greek mythology.’ 
48 For Heraclitus’ views on religion and divinities see Adoménas (1999); Trépanier (2010), 282–288; 
Most (2013). Additionally, Heraclitus mentions Xenophanes in B40. He accuses him of not having 
understanding, but it would be natural to suppose that Heraclitus was aware of Xenophanes’ critique of 
the traditional divinities and religion. See next section and section 2.3, for further analysis of these 
topics. 
49 As mentioned above, this is what we find in the doxography, and most scholars agree with this theory. 
Some even propose that B1 was written as an introduction or proem, e.g. KRS (1983), 184, and ATH, 
7. However, in Mouraviev’s reconstruction of Heraclitus’ book, he places a proem before B1. See 
Mouraviev (2011), 1, and 43–44. 





What is most interesting about this invocation is that some philosophers used it as well, 
and not just the poets. Parmenides not only invokes the divinity at the beginning of his 
Poem, but also the goddess is the one who is actually explaining Parmenides’ views, 
and not Parmenides himself.51 Empedocles asks for the help of the muse as well.52 
Consequently, Heraclitus in fragment B1 is talking about an independent logos that 
exists forever, and if said fragment is the beginning of his book or of a speech of some 
sort, then is it possible that he is invoking this logos as muse or a divinity?  
I believe Heraclitus is implicitly referring to Homer and Hesiod or to the 
traditional way of calling upon the divinities at the beginning of a poem, but the 
formula is not exactly the same. What Heraclitus does is in a way similar to what 
Aristophanes does in the passage of Birds quoted above. There Aristophanes is clearly 
following the tradition, but he is not completely agreeing with what the traditional 
meanings attributed to the invocation of the gods. He uses the same serious tone, but 
ends it with a joke. It is clear that, in doing so, he is not trying to convince people that 
what he says is true or better because it comes from the divinity, but he is using the 
tradition of calling upon the gods in an ironic way. The case of Heraclitus, I think, is 
different. He, just as Aristophanes, seems to use it as a reference to tradition, imitating 
the structure of the prayer, but not completely agreeing with what invoking the divinity 
means for the tradition. In most of the examples, quoting the divinity implies the 
following. First, that the gods know more than us, and therefore what they say is better 
or truer than what a mere human says. Second, there is the idea that the writer or poet 
communicates with the divinity, emphasising that they have been somehow chosen by 
the gods; the gods or muses answer their callings and tell them the divine version of a 
                                                 
51 Parmenides B1.1–3: Ἵπποι ταί µε φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ΄ ἐπἱ θυµὸς ἱκάνοι, πέµπον, ἐπεί µ΄ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν 
πολύφηµον ἄγουσαι δαίµονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ΄ ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα. [‘The mares which bear me as 
far as my desires might reach were conveying me, when they led me into the many-voiced way of the 
deity, who leads the knowing mortal straight on through all things.’ Trans. TEGP]. 
52  Empedocles B3.1–5: ἀλλά θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,/ ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στομάτων 
καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν./ καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,/ ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν 
ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,/ πέμπε παρ’ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἅρμα. [‘But you gods, turn away from 
my tongue their madness,/ and from holy mouths channel a pure fountain./ And you, Muse, white-armed 
memorious maiden,/ I implore: what things are fit for creatures of a day to hear,/ send, driving your 





story, or at the very least they inspire or possess the interpreter, using them as a 
mouthpiece, in order to convey their message directly in their words.53  
In the case of Heraclitus I believe we do not have the exact same format, although 
it is a similar kind of implicit invocation. That the logos is truer and better than people’s 
opinions and stories, and that divinity is better than humans can be read in the 
fragments. B78 (‘Human disposition does not have (sound) judgements but divine 
disposition does.’), B83 (‘The wisest person seems like an ape in front of a god in 
regard to wisdom, beauty, and everything else.’), and B79 (‘A man sounds silly to a 
divinity, just as a kid to a man.’), for instance, show us that the divinity is better than 
humans in almost every respect, including wisdom and understanding.54 Additionally, 
fragment B2 points in the same direction. It states that ‘That is why one must follow 
to xunon (that is, the common. For the xunos is the common). Although this logos is 
common, the many live as if they had private understanding.’55 One thing is that which 
each individual believes, their ‘private understanding’, some sort of subjective or 
personal truth, and another is the logos, which is common to all and should be 
followed.56  The mention of a common logos, which is above all or universal, in 
opposition to personal opinions or private understanding, means that this logos is some 
sort of truth above mortals. In Heraclitus’ context, such a conception of truth most 
likely implies some involvement with the divine.57  
Thus, it seems that for Heraclitus it is true that the gods (his divine logos) know 
more than us, and their understanding is better than the personal opinions of mortals. 
However, that Heraclitus communicates with the divine or is inspired by it does not 
seem that clear. Some scholars say that Heraclitus is some sort of prophet of the 
divinity, and that he speaks the logos.58 What he does is not exactly the same as 
                                                 
53  See Plato, Timaeus 27c1–d5 quoted above. Other ways of divine inspiration are discussed, for 
instance, in Plato, Ion 533d–536d. For poetic inspiration in Plato, see Murray (1997), 1–33, 235–238.  
54 B78: ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει. B83: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς 
θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίαι καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν. B79: ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς 
δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός. 
55 Trans. TEGP with modifications. Greek text: διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῶι ξυνῶι (τουτέστι τῶι κοινῶι· ξυνὸς 
γὰρ ὁ κοινός). τοῦ λόγου δ᾽ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἱδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. 
56 I agree with TEGP, 187, that ‘Heraclitus makes something like the modern distinction between 
objective truth and subjective interpretation here. The Word is out there for those who can grasp it.’ 
Curd (2010), 3 n. 9, offers a similar conception of logos. 
57 See Most (1999), 332–348, for the inheritance from epic poetry in early Presocratic epistemology. 
58 Namely, those who defend that logos is simply Heraclitus’ speech or book. Burnet (1930), 133 n. 1, 





speaking for the gods or that the gods speak through him, or even that he speaks a 
divine message or the logos itself.59 However, it is clear that this logos is eternal and 
divine, and he wants us to understand it; he thinks people should know this logos. 
Consequently, if we take B50 into account, it would be safe to say that Heraclitus 
himself is not speaking the divine message to us, but the logos itself speaks to us or is 
available to all of us, and, even though Heraclitus is not directly telling us the truth by 
divine revelation or inspiration, he wants to teach us how to listen to the logos, he is 
telling us where we can find it and pointing us to this eternal and divine truth, which 
does not correspond to the traditional idea of divinity but fulfils a similar role. 
1.2.3. The logos is cosmic  
I have argued, and followed the scholars that argue, that the logos is independent of 
Heraclitus, eternal and divine. This means that in my interpretation Heraclitus is not 
referring to his own speech but to something greater than him in some of his mentions 
of the word logos. However, there are still a few questions that need to be considered 
about this definition of logos. First of all, if this logos is not Heraclitus’ speech, then 
what is it and where does it exist? Also, why did other philosophers before the Stoics 
not react to this idea or explain it as part of Heraclitus’ theory? And, why would 
Heraclitus use the word logos in such a novel way without any apparent explanation? 
I will try to provide a solution for these questions by arguing for a cosmic logos. By 
‘cosmic’ I mean that the logos is a thing essential to the composition of the cosmos 
and one that, possibly, has a fundamental part in its processes and functioning, which 
seems to be the general interpretation of Heraclitus’ logos doctrine made by the 
Stoics.60 My analysis in this chapter, however, will not deal with the problem whether 
the Stoics misinterpreted Heraclitus, or attributed to him more than what he actually 
said. This part will rather focus on why there seems to be an absence of reaction to this 
idea in the period between Heraclitus and the Stoics.  
                                                 
59  See e.g. Burnet (1928), 58. For a more detailed analysis of this idea, see Hussey (1982), 53: 
‘Heraclitus differs from the average prophet in the important respect that he does not rely on an 
essentially private revelation.’ 





The idea of an entity or a part of the cosmos that guides, governs or steers the 
universe is not uncommon in the Presocratics. 61  Before Heraclitus, we find in 
Xenophanes (c. 570–c. 475 BC) the idea of a single and great god that is not like 
mortals (B23), that has a different level of perception and thought (B24), and that 
moves everything with his mind (B25). In Parmenides (most likely a contemporary of 
Heraclitus), Being resembles a cosmic logos in several ways.62 Indeed, the goddess 
distinguishes between her true logos, which refers to her description of the path of 
Being, and mortal opinions (B8.50–51). Additionally, in fragment B12, Parmenides 
tells us of a goddess that steers all things (ἐν δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα 
κυβερνᾶι).63 In Anaxagoras (c. 510–c. 428 BC), the concept of nous in fragment B12 
presents us with a similar idea of an organisation of the cosmos, guided by some sort 
of intelligent and divine agent. Diogenes of Apollonia (fifth century BC) talks about a 
similar idea in his fragment B5: ‘For this very thing seems to me to be God, and to 
reach everywhere, to arrange all things, and to be present in everything.’64 All these 
examples show that there was the idea of a cosmic entity or a feature of the cosmos, 
which controls and is present in everything. However, the idea of a logos with these 
properties is not as clear before Plato.65 
                                                 
61 This entity usually has divine aspects. See Trépanier (2010) for context on divinities. See Adomenas 
(1999) and Most (2013) for Heraclitus’ views in particular. 
62 For the chronology of Heraclitus and Parmenides see Graham (2002). 
63 About this governing goddess in Parmenides B12, Aetius identifies her as Dike (see Parmenides A37), 
and TEGP, 240, says: ‘The goddess who governs generation exercises a creative force over the world. 
This is the first time something like a force is distinguished form a natural body, and it prefigures 
Empedocles’ Love (and Love’s contrary Strife) an more remotely Anaxagoras’ Mind.’ 
64 Trans. TEGP, Greek text: αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφῖχθαι καὶ πάντα 
διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. 
65 In his Stromata, Clement of Alexandria (AD 150–215) quotes a very interesting passage about logos 
in the ancient times. He attributes it to Epicharmus, a writer of comedy active in the early fifth century-
late sixth century BC (Diogenes Laertius 8.78), to whom Plato refers as the ‘king of comedy’ in 
Theaetetus 152e. The passage taken from Kassel and Austin (2001), 139, reads: ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπους 
κυβερνᾶι κατὰ τρόπον σώιζει τ’ ἀει./ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπωι λογισμός, ἔστι καὶ θεῖος λόγος./ ὁ δέ γε 
τἀνθρώπου πέφυκε ἀπό γε τοῦ θείου λόγου,/ [καὶ] φέρει [πόρους ἑκάστοι] περὶ βίου καὶ τᾶς τροφᾶς./ ὁ 
δέ γε ταῖς τέχναις ἁπάσαις συνέπεται θεῖος λόγος,/ ἐκδιδάσκων αὐτὸς αὐτοὺς, ὅ τι ποιεῖν δεῖ συμφέρον./ 
Οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρώπος τέχναν τιν’ εὗρεν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς τὸ πᾶν. [‘The logos governs humans appropriately and 
preserves always. A man has calculation, and there is the divine logos. But the one of humans was born 
from the divine logos, and it gives to each man the means of life and nourishment. And the divine logos 
attends all the arts, thoroughly teaching itself to them that it is necessary to do what is good for oneself. 
For no man discovered any art, but god discovered all of them.’] The similarity to Heraclitus’ logos is 
striking. However, the authorship and date of the passage are uncertain. See Miller (1965) for more 





Robinson proposes that there is a similarity between Heraclitus’ idea of a cosmic 
logos and the description of the world-soul in Plato’s Timaeus. He argues that 36d–
37c sounds ‘remarkably Heraclitean, and evinces a much more accurate understanding 
of what Heraclitus was after by his use of the word logos in what we know as fragments 
1, 2 and 50 than anything achieved by the Stoics, or by Hippolytus.’66 I quote here a 
longer passage of the Timaeus (36d–37c) in order to provide a better understanding of 
the context in which Plato uses such a concept of logos: 
When the complete composition of the soul came to be according to the 
mind for the creator, after that, all that is corporeal was created within it, 
and joining centre to centre he fitted the two together. The soul was woven 
together with the body throughout the heavens every way from the centre 
to the extremity, and covered it all around on the outside. And revolving 
within itself, began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life for 
all time. And while the body of the heavens came to be visible, the soul 
was invisible, taking part in reason and harmony, since it came into 
existence by the agency of the best of things intelligible and ever-existing, 
as the best of things generated. 
Because the soul is a mixture of these three components, the nature of the 
Same and of the Different, and Being; and it is divided and bound 
proportionately, and it revolves around itself, whenever it passes through 
something that has scattered or undivided being, it, while moving through 
its whole self, says [legei] what that thing is the same as and what it is 
different from, additionally and, most importantly, it says in what manner, 
how and when it happens that each thing exists and comes to be in relation 
to what becomes and according to itself, or according to what is always 
the same. And when this logos, which is true about the different and the 
same in the same way, brought upon itself within the mover without 
utterance or sound, on one hand becomes about perceptible things, and the 
circle of the Different going straight proclaims it to its whole soul, firm 
and true opinions and convictions result. When, on the other hand, it [the 
logos] is about an object of reasoning and the circle of the Same running 
well proclaims it, understanding and knowledge are produced by necessity. 
And if anyone should ever call that in which these two arise, not soul but 
something else, what they say will be anything but true. 
There are many parts of this passage that show a striking similarity to the idea of the 
logos expressed in Heraclitus’ fragments. First of all, I believe that it is manifest that 
this logos spoken out by the world-soul is an essential feature of the cosmos. It is a 
logos that does not depend on the speech of any human in particular; it exists in the 
                                                 





world-soul and is a part of the configuration of the cosmos. This means that Plato not 
only was familiar with this idea of a cosmic logos but actually used this idea, perhaps 
not as an actual doctrine (if we take the introduction of this dialogue into account) but 
at least as some probable story.67 
It is equally clear, however, that not everything that Plato says in this part of the 
Timaeus is similar or can be attributed to Heraclitus’ doctrine, in particular when he 
refers to ideas such as the forms and the demiurge. We do not have enough evidence 
to argue that Plato is talking about a Heraclitean doctrine. That Plato uses an idea 
similar to the logos doctrine attributed to Heraclitus does not mean either that this 
interpretation is necessarily correct. It means, however, that such interpretation is 
independent of later Stoic influence.  
Nevertheless, the characteristics of the logos described by Heraclitus in his 
fragments and by Plato in his Timaeus are the same. First of all, in both theories the 
logos is immortal. Plato does not say it explicitly, and in his creation story the cosmos 
and everything else could be understood as everlasting but not eternal, unlike in 
Heraclitus’ cosmology, where the cosmos was not created and has always existed 
(B30). However, Plato does say that the world-soul is immortal, because with its 
revolving begins ‘a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life for all time’. This 
means that after the creation, Plato’s cosmos and its corresponding logos are immortal 
and, perhaps arguably, divine as well.  
It is worth pointing out that the idea of logos presented by Plato in this passage 
fits many of the problematic characteristics given by Heraclitus to his logos in 
fragments B1, B2 and, perhaps, B50. First of all, Plato’s logos describes how all things 
are, just as Heraclitus says in B1 about his description of the logos. Furthermore, that 
everything in the cosmos happens according to the logos is equally true for Plato and 
Heraclitus. In B2 we are told that the logos is common, as opposed to private 
knowledge. The fact that Plato in this passage relates knowledge and true opinions 
with this logos could make us think that what his logos describes is true for everyone; 
thus implying an idea similar to the common logos of B2. Furthermore, Plato claims 
that the world-soul ‘says [legei] what that thing is the same as and what it is different 
                                                 





from, additionally and, most importantly, it says in what manner, how and when it 
happens that each thing exists and comes to be in relation to what becomes and 
according to itself, or according to what is always the same.’ This idea and the 
vocabulary used in the passage echo Heraclitus’ description of himself explaining the 
logos in the second part of B1: ‘Although everything happens according to this logos, 
they seem void of experience whenever they experience words and actions such as I 
describe when I distinguish each thing according to nature and declare how it is’. Both 
conceptions of logos present us with the idea of describing, in the most exact and 
precise way, how things really are. Therefore, it seems that Plato was familiar with 
such a notion of a cosmic logos.  
Lastly, this same passage of the Timaeus provides us with an argument against 
the idea that the word logos was inexplicably used in a very novel way by Heraclitus. 
For Plato the word logos not only represents a cosmic feature or an entity that is part 
of the cosmos; it also represents a speech or a description: logos keeps the regular and 
mundane meaning of ‘things said’, ‘speech’, etc., while at the same time representing 
a fundamental cosmic characteristic. That is why he says that this logos was ‘brought 
upon itself within the mover without utterance or sound.’ Because while it is a speech 
or an account, it is at the same time a special kind of logos (in the same way that in 
Plato the world-soul and the human soul are similar in nature but different in kind), 
and, unlike human speech, it is produced and kept alive in a different way. 
Nevertheless, in both cases it is the same concept of a speech or an account but in a 
cosmic and divine scale. 
To sum up, the idea of an all-governing entity, present in the cosmos, was 
common in the Presocratics and, therefore, familiar to Heraclitus. However, it is true 
that we do not have any example before Heraclitus of somebody who talks of a logos 
that organises everything, which was one of the counterarguments for understanding 
logos as something different from ‘speech’ or ‘things said’ in fragments B1, B2, and 
B50. Nevertheless, Plato’s Timaeus gives us a quite clear example of a use of the word 
logos in which it represents a divine part of the cosmos, before the Stoics interpreted 
Heraclitus’ doctrine in that way. We can draw two conclusions from this analogy to 
Plato. First, that Heraclitus probably used the word logos just as Plato did in the 





can be understood both as a logos, that is, as an account, speech, or ‘things said’, and 
as cosmic at the same time.  
1.2.4. The logos is the eternal, unique, and best description of the universe  
This last idea, that Heraclitus’ logos is similar to the logos of the world-soul in the 
Timaeus, opens up a range of possibilities for the interpretation of logos as a part of 
the cosmos. When considering the meaning of the expression γινομένων γὰρ πάντων 
κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε in fragment B1, it is usually thought that logos somehow guides 
or steers everything, like the thunderbolt in B64, or that it moves the cosmos like the 
ever-living fire in B30.68 Nevertheless, if we take Plato’s passage into consideration, 
could Heraclitus mean that everything happens just as is spoken (or thought) in the 
logos? Could the logos be not the actual cosmic force that moves everything or the 
source of this motion but just a divine and exact account of the universe? As mentioned 
above, defining and finding a good translation for the Heraclitean logos is not an easy 
task. However, we now have some of its main characteristics and an example of a 
similar logos in a cosmological context. Therefore, I shall now aim to suggest a 
translation of logos that is coherent both with the standard uses of the word by 
Heraclitus (fragments B31, B39, B87, B108, B45, B115) and that can express the idea 
of a cosmic logos, and thereafter I will proceed to define more specifically this cosmic 
logos.  
There are several proposals for the translation of the word logos in Heraclitus: 
from a simple ‘word’ to a more complex idea such as a ‘formula of things’.69 For me, 
as I will argue, the best way to understand it in general is as ‘description’, and the 
cosmic logos in particular as the unique and best description.70 In the Theatetus 201c5–
                                                 
68 B64: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός. B30: κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε 
ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον 
μέτρα.  
69 TEGP, 187, as mentioned above, translates logos for ‘Word’ because ‘the latter term shares some of 
the former’s multivocity, and partly because of the term’s rich religious overtones, including 
implications of transcendent truth.’ See the discussion in Kirk (1954), 33–47. He suggests that the ‘less 
ambiguous’ translation for logos in B1, B2, and B50 is ‘formula of things’. Marcovich (1967), 6–9, 
chooses to translate it ‘Truth’. ATH, 97, translates it ‘account’. See, for instance, Robinson (1987), 114: 
‘One does not “listen to” patterns, or structures […] one listens to persons, and the things they say.’ He 
argues, however, that Heraclitus here is distinguishing between himself and his argument, with which I 
do not agree, as I have argued before in this chapter. See also Johnstone (2014), 20–25. 
70 I prefer ‘description’ over ‘account’ mainly because a description includes simpler and more basic 





210b1, when considering the argument that knowledge is true judgement with a logos, 
Plato proceeds to define what logos means. He considers three definitions of the word. 
Thus, in Theatetus 206d1–4: ‘The first would be, making one’s thought apparent 
vocally by means of words and verbal expressions — when a man impresses an image 
of his judgement upon the stream of speech, like reflections upon water or in a 
mirror.’71 This idea is perhaps the most general way of referring to speaking: an image 
or reflection in words of what is in your mind, i.e. a judgment or opinion about 
something else, internal or external. The second option, when asked about something, 
is that the logos of a thing is a ‘reference to its elements’ (207a1–2: τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ 
τῶν στοιχείων). This seems to be a list of its most important or composing parts, as 
Plato explains later in 207a3–7: ‘As for example, what Hesiod is doing when he says, 
“One hundred are the timbers of a wagon.” Now I couldn’t say what they are; and I 
don’t suppose you could either. If you and I were asked what a wagon is, we should 
be satisfied if we could answer “wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke”.’72 Finally, the third 
possible meaning is ‘being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked 
about differs from all other things’ in 208c6–9.73 As for example in 208d1–3: ‘Well, 
take the sun, if you like. You would be satisfied, I imagine, with the answer that it is 
the brightest of the bodies that move round the earth in the heavens.’74 This last one 
could be described as a definition, closer perhaps to Aristotle’s idea of definition by 
genus and differentia in Metaphysics 10. 
It is important to make a few remarks about this discussion in the Theaetetus. 
The first one is that, even though Plato himself uses the word logos in many more 
different ways throughout his dialogues, when it comes to determining a proper 
                                                 
more complexity and connection than ‘things said’. That is, all accounts are descriptions but not all 
descriptions are accounts, and simple sentences, such as ‘Socrates is mortal’, for instance, which 
sometimes are meant by the word logos, are not necessarily accounts but are descriptions in some way. 
71 Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997). Greek text: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν 
ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν 
ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. 
72 Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997): οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ ‘ἑκατὸν δέ τε 
δούραθ᾽ ἁμάξης.’ ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ: ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαπῶιμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες 
ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν. 
73 Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997): τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ὧι τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ 
ἐρωτηθέν. 
74 Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997): οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι 





definition of the term, those three options seem to be sufficient for him.75 This lack of 
options could be explained by the context in which the definition is required in the 
dialogue. Those three options need to be considered when logos is part of the question 
whether knowledge is true judgment with a logos. However, it seems that Plato is 
aiming to define a more general idea of logos here, since he makes the connection with 
the verb legein.76 In any case, what is relevant to the case of logos in Heraclitus is that 
all three possible definitions are some sort of description, some more specific and 
accurate than others, but descriptions nonetheless. I do not mean to argue that every 
time Heraclitus uses the word logos we should rendered it as ‘description’ in English, 
but that the idea of describing something can be understood as a root for all of its 
occurrences.  
This would allow us to posit a logos theory in which the word logos has 
something in common in most of its uses, especially in the fragments where the word 
is considered difficult to understand. If the cosmic logos is a description of the universe, 
other mentions of the word by Heraclitus would make sense as descriptions of some 
sort as well. For instance, in fragment B108 (‘Of all those logoi I have heard, not one 
has achieved to know that the wise is separate from everything else.’77), those who 
have logoi, which could be understood as theories or views, could be seen as having 
descriptions of the universe or of particular phenomena. Hence, the term could be 
understood in the same way in most fragments. Even the logos that the soul is said to 
have in fragments B45 and B115, could be understood similarly.78  
However, understanding the word logos as some sort of description does not 
provide us with a solution to the problem of determining what the cosmic logos is in 
Heraclitus. Even though it is a first step in its understanding, there are still some 
unanswered questions about the nature and characteristics of this logos. First of all, 
what kind of description is it? The passage in Theaetetus shows that a logos or a 
description can be understood in different ways, as we can see, as well, in the many 
                                                 
75 On logos in the Theaetetus see Fine (1979).  
76 Theaetetus 206d3–6: ‘Don’t you think this kind of thing is a logos? Theaetetus: Yes, I do. At least, a 
man who does this is said to be giving an account (legein).’ Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997) 
with some modifications.  
77 Greek text: ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο, ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι 
πάντων κεχωρισμένον. 





interpretations offered by modern and ancient scholars. I follow the previous 
comparison between the Heraclitean logos and the logos in Timaeus 36d–37c, as well 
as the different definitions of logos in Theaetetus to propose that the cosmic logos in 
Heraclitus’ theory is the best, that is complete and divine, description of the universe. 
However, how the logos describes the universe can be understood in three ways. It 
could describe things as they are and be just an informative description; it could also 
describe how things should be and how they will behave in the future, and be some 
sort of prescriptive description; additionally, in an ontological level, it could be some 
sort of extrapolation of our human descriptions and be an abstract description.  
The first option, the informative description, is the one that the logos in Timaeus 
36d–37c seems to be more close to. In this case, the universe is already set in motion 
and constructed when the world-soul says (without speaking) its logos. The cosmos is 
formed with the elemental geometrical figures as material, the forms serve as the 
model, and the soul as the force that makes it move. This means that the logos in the 
Timaeus is not a material or formal cause of the universe.79 Neither does it seem to 
guide or steer the universe in any way. Consequently, its purpose seems to be 
descriptive or informative; alongside the universe there is a perfect and accurate 
description of it. In Plato this description is itself contained in the soul of the universe, 
so it exists forever and, somewhat, objectively. In my interpretation of this passage of 
the Timaeus, the idea of this logos is connected to an epistemological problem in Plato, 
to the possibility of a correct and objective knowledge of the cosmos. Since there is a 
correct description that does not depend on human perspective, in a way, we could 
compare our views to that one in order to confirm whether ours is correct or not. 
Heraclitus’ logos could be defined in this same way: an ideal description that does not 
have any actual influence in the cosmos’ functioning but that allows us to understand 
the cosmos when we grasp it. 
The second option, adopted by many scholars, is that the logos is a prescriptive 
description of the universe: it does not only describe what the universe is but also has 
a more active role in the cosmic processes, that it is an actual force or at least that it 
                                                 
79 As some scholars think about Heraclitus’ logos. For instance, Guthrie (1962), 434, and ATH, 22. 
They think that logos encompasses not only a description or order of things but sometimes plays the 





acts as a guide or blueprint for the movement of the universe.80 Most scholars propose 
an interpretation of the cosmic logos along those lines, in which logos has a more 
active role in the cosmos. Most of them tend to incline for the idea of a guide or 
blueprint and few for the idea of an active principle.81 That logos is an active principle 
I do not find it very persuasive because just as in Plato’s case, in Heraclitus’ theory 
there are other concepts or elements that could perform this or a similar role in the 
cosmos: strife, war, fire, soul, and nature (physis) could perform the function of 
properly moving. However, the idea of a logos in charge of guiding, steering, and 
ordering the cosmos is still an interesting one. It is true that the analogy with Timaeus’ 
logos favours the idea of a descriptive and more passive logos. Nevertheless, even 
when in Timaeus Plato does not explicitly say that the logos steers or governs the 
cosmos but just that it describes everything as it is, when Plato talks about the relation 
of logoi and the human soul in other dialogues, he reaches the opposite conclusion: 
logoi have a great influence in the soul and, then, in people’s behaviour.82 It would be 
reasonable to argue, therefore, that logos in Heraclitus’ theory has a similar function. 
The third and last option is an abstraction of the possibility of a perfect 
description. In his short story La Biblioteca de Babel, Jorge Luis Borges describes an 
infinite library that contains every possible book we can imagine: 
From those incontrovertible premises, the librarian deduced that the 
Library is ‘total’ — perfect, complete, and whole — and that its 
bookshelves contain all possible combinations of the twenty-two 
orthographic symbols (a number which, though unimaginable vast, is not 
                                                 
80 For instance, Kirk’s ‘formula of things’ implies this idea. See Kirk (1954), 39: ‘What we are trying 
to summarize is an idea like “the organized way in which (as Heraclitus had discovered) all things work”; 
“plan” (in a non-teleological sense), “rule”, even “law” (as in “the law of force”) are possible 
summaries.’ 
81 See section 1.1. 
82 Phaedrus 270e3–9: ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς, ἄν τώι τις τέχνηι λόγους διδῶι, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς 
φύσεως τούτου πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει: ἔσται δέ που ψυχὴ τοῦτο. [‘It is clear that someone who 
teaches another to make speeches as an art will demonstrate precisely the essential nature of that to 
which speeches are to be applied. And that, surely, is the soul.’ Trans. Nehamas and Woodruff in Cooper 
(1997)]. Phaedrus 271c9: ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα. [‘Since the nature of speech 
is in fact to direct the soul.’ Trans. Nehamas and Woodruff in Cooper (1997)]. Gorgias 504d8: οὐκοῦν 
πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς 
οὓς ἂν λέγηι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας. [‘So this is what that skilled and good orator will look to when 
he applies to people’s souls whatever speeches he makes as well as all of his actions.’ Trans. Zeyl in 
Cooper (1997)]. Republic 345b3–6: καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νυνδὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι 
ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον. [‘And how am I to persuade you, if you aren’t 
persuaded by what I said just now? What more can I do? Am I to take my argument and pour it into 





infinite) — that is, all that is available to be expressed, in every language. 
All — the detailed history of the future, the faithful catalogue of the Library, 
thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of 
those catalogues, a proof of the falsity of the true catalogue, the gnostic 
gospel of Basilides, the commentary upon that gospel, the commentary on 
the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your death, the translation 
of every book into every language, the interpolations of every book into 
all books, the treatise Bede could have written (but did not) on the 
mythology of the Saxon people, the lost books of Tacitus.83  
If we follow Borges’ idea, there must inevitably be one book in this library that 
contains the actual and true description of the universe and its explanation. According 
to Borges’ story, there would not be any causal relation between this description and 
the cosmos, but only chance. What I want to suggest is that the idea of the cosmic 
logos in Heraclitus could be understood in the same way as the perfect book in this 
library. Mainly because of what I will argue next: that we know there is a logos, a 
description which is perfect and complete, but we do not know its specific contents, 
we just know that in potency there is such a description. In this case, the idea of a 
perfect description comes from an abstraction, or an extrapolation of a regular, human 
(not divine) description. If we consider that the cosmos is there, that words are able to 
describe things that are part of the cosmos, and that some of those descriptions are 
right and others are wrong, then we can easily infer that there has to be one description 
of the whole universe that is the correct one as a whole. This works in the same way 
as in Borges’ library in which we know that there are all the possibilities of 
combinations of letters. One combination must have the actual and correct description 
of the universe, even when we do not know the actual contents, form, or purpose of 
this description. In Borges’ story, the combination is lost in one or some books in the 
                                                 
83 Trans. Hurley (1998), 115, original text: ‘De esas premisas incontrovertibles dedujo que la Biblioteca 
es total y que sus anaqueles registran todas las posibles combinaciones de los veintitantos símbolos 
ortográficos (número, aunque vastísimo, no infinito) o sea todo lo que es dable expresar: en todos los 
idiomas. Todo: la historia minuciosa del porvenir, las autobiografías de los arcángeles, el catálogo fiel 
de la Biblioteca, miles y miles de catálogos falsos, la demostración de la falacia de esos catálogos, la 
demostración de la falacia del catálogo verdadero, el evangelio gnóstico de Basilides, el comentario de 
ese evangelio, el comentario del comentario de ese evangelio, la relación verídica de tu muerte, la 
versión de cada libro a todas las lenguas, las interpolaciones de cada libro en todos los libros, el tratado 





library, but in Heraclitus perhaps the logos is a deification of this abstraction held in 
the divine realm and known only by the gods.84 
Given that in Heraclitus’ doctrine the logos is divine, eternal, cosmic, and similar 
to Timaeus’ logos, I tend to incline for the first option, i.e. that the logos’ function in 
the cosmos is only descriptive. However, I consider that the most likely possibility is 
that logos is a combination of elements of the three ideas. We do not have enough 
evidence in Heraclitus in order to fully understand the logos and to describe it in detail. 
My interpretation takes it as an eternal and complete description of the universe, not 
only of its parts and whole, but also of its processes in the present time and in the future 
(in this way it is prescriptive). It is not spoken out nor composed by sounds, but, as I 
will argue later, it shows itself to us, and we can ‘hear’ it in a certain way and 
understand it.  
1.3. The logos cannot be directly communicated to others 
The characteristics of this unique and best logos that describes the universe, its 
immenseness and completeness, lead us to ask about the possibility of its 
comprehension and of its communication. Heraclitus is very pessimistic about the 
amount of people who have understood it and who would be able to understand it 
eventually. However, his general attitude and what we can read in some fragments 
(B116, B113, B50, B35, and B18) indicate that people have the potential to reach it.85 
We can safely assume that at least one person, Heraclitus himself, has grasped the 
logos or has some understanding of it.86 But if Heraclitus knows the logos, why are 
people unable to understand it when he clearly explains it to them? I will propose that 
one of the causes of this failure in understanding is that the logos cannot be 
communicated directly to other people. I use three arguments to support this claim. In 
the first section, I will show that the idea of the impossibility of communication was 
                                                 
84 See Xenophanes B34. I argue in the next section that Heraclitus shares with Xenophanes the idea of 
a divine truth, which humans cannon access directly through language. 
85 Those fragments indicate that Heraclitus has some hope in human knowledge. The fact that he is 
encouraging people to look for the logos, telling them that they are not correct and showing them the 
correct way, means that he believes some people can understand it eventually.  






present in Heraclitus’ time, and theories about the relation between words and things 
started developing in this time. One significant example of this idea is Xenophanes 
B34, where we are told that if a mortal by chance correctly stated the truth, they would 
not have understanding of it. In the second part, I will argue that the idea that logos is 
a complete and divine description of the universe works as a reminder that, for 
Heraclitus, divinity still plays a significant role in our access to the truth, just as in the 
traditional theology. However, in his new philosophical model of divinity, this 
communication of the truth is not as simple as it was before. In the last section, I will 
propose an interpretation of the fragments in the light of the problem of the 
impossibility of a direct communication of the logos.  
1.3.1. Saying and understanding a divine truth  
The idea of a divine account that is true (or that at least carries more authority) and of 
mortals who have a restricted access to it is not particularly novel. When it comes to 
the picture shown to us in ancient Greek literature, it was a common assumption that 
the gods had better knowledge and sometimes, as explained above, they would disclose 
some of it into chosen mortals, who by themselves had a poor or basic knowledge if 
any at all.87 The actual process by which the gods disclosed divine knowledge into the 
human world was not very troubling for the poets. In Homer, communication coming 
from the divinities was usually not a complicated matter. However, for Hesiod 
sometimes the muses could tell lies that resemble the truth (Theogony 27–28) and there 
were some words or voices ‘only for the gods to understand.’88 Nevertheless, usually 
in Hesiod’s world when the gods send a message to mortals, they are able to understand 
it, even when false. We could say that in the world as pictured by the poets truth was 
in some way a divine logos too: it was an account brought form the divine realm or at 
least inspired by someone there.  
                                                 
87 This is clear in Iliad 2.484–487: ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχουσαι/ ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί 
ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα,/ ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν. And the same idea is 
implied in Theogony 25–28: Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο:/ ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ᾽ 
ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,/ ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,/ ἴδμεν δ᾽, εὖτ᾽ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα 
γηρύσασθαι.  
88 As previously mentioned, in Theogony (829–835) he says that the voice of one of the one-hundred 
heads of the Typhoeus is only for the gods to understand. This probably only means that gods have 





However, this notion started to change with the first philosophers, and 
particularly with Xenophanes’ critique of traditional theology. The gods as portrayed 
by Homer and Hesiod were very human, in particular when it comes to language and 
the way they communicated among them and with humans. Even when defined as the 
opposite of human and as far superior in strength and wisdom, the gods had mouths 
and spoke Greek. Consequently, when Xenophanes criticises their human appearance 
(B14, B15, B16, B17,) behaviour (B11, B12), and thought (B23), he not only causes a 
change in the conception of what a god is, but at the same time he questions the nature 
of this divine message and the way in which it could be communicated to humans and 
understood by them. This divine communication was not yet problematised in the 
traditional understanding of anthropomorphic gods. The reason is that in that context 
the validation of the message and the messenger, in epic poetry for instance, was done 
by the fact that it came from the divinity. Then in this process it was presupposed that 
the message would be understood by humans. However, this necessarily has to change 
with a new idea of gods that are nothing like mortals. Consequently, in fragment B34 
Xenophanes says: 
Now the plain truth no man has seen nor will any know concerning the 
gods and what I have said concerning all things. For even if he should 
completely succeed in describing things as they come to pass, nonetheless 
he himself does not know: opinion is wrought over [or: comes to] all.89 
In this fragment we can see that no human has or will ever have access to this kind of 
divine truth. Xenophanes himself does not tell us who knows this, but presumably his 
main god and perhaps the plural gods do.90 The idea of a truth held by the gods is 
common in the tradition, and that human beings ignore it is usual as well. However, 
what the fragment says afterwards is a new idea: not only does divinity have the truth 
and humans ignore it but human kind will never understand this kind or level of truth, 
even if they were able to state it. The reason seems to be that understanding, language, 
                                                 
89 Trans. TEGP. Brackets in original. Greek text: καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνήρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται/ 
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων./ εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,/ 
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε. δόκος δ’ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται. 
90 See Xenophanes B18, B23, B24. Also, on the characteristics of the one god see Trépanier (2010), 
280. On cognition in the Presocratics, see Lesher (1994), and on Xenophanes, Lesher (2001). For divine 
knowledge in Xenophanes and Heraclitus, see Curd (2013). TEGP, 132–133, gives a good overview of 





and communication are not equivalent for human and divinities anymore. For even if 
someone managed to describe or say how these things really are, that would not mean 
they have knowledge of it. For Xenophanes, the cause of this impossibility seems to 
be that mortals can only produce opinions and not truth.91  
Xenophanes’ critique of the anthropomorphic gods provides Heraclitus with 
many problems not only about the nature of the divine but about epistemology. One 
problem is very clear in Xenophanes’ B34: the object of knowledge, what we aim to 
grasp or understand is no longer a simple account; the gods have changed and so has 
the nature of their truth. Other problems, which deal with different parts of the 
epistemology and which will be treated in their respective chapters, are implicit: if the 
gods are not like mortals anymore, does that mean that humans do not have a common 
language and cannot communicate with them? And, could humans learn a divine 
language in order to understand this truth? 
1.3.2. Divine and human knowledge 
The logos is divine, and for Heraclitus the true knowledge of the universe still belongs 
to the divine realm. Just as Xenophanes, he is critical of traditional religion.92 However, 
Heraclitus is still far from a clean separation between nature and divinity, i.e. for him 
nature is divine and ordered by divine powers.93 Several fragments show this, as for 
example:94 
B41: ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.  
 




B78: ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει. 
 
                                                 
91 Xenophanes’ fragment B34 has been object of many interpretations since antiquity. Here I just take 
the idea of the divine and of the description of things. For a deeper analysis of the fragment see Lesher 
(1978). 
92  See Adomenas (1999) and Most (2013) for Heraclitus’ views on traditional religion. For the 
philosophical context of the views on nature and divinity, see Trépanier (2010). 
93 Perhaps the closest we can get to this separation in the Presocratics is the atomists. See Trépanier 
(2010), 308–317. See also Lesher (1983), and Hussey (1982). 





Human disposition does not have (sound) judgements but divine 
disposition does.95 
Heraclitus’ view of traditional divinities is not easy to interpret, even though it is clear 
in the fragments that he wants to talk about things that belong to the divine realm.96 I 
believe that his attitude and treatment of the divine show that he is aware that the 
relation with the divine has to change, that their truth is very hard to come by, even 
when he describes it correctly, as in Xenophanes.  
Frankel shows that Heraclitus uses a particular device in order to get his message 
through.97 He calls it a ‘thought pattern’, and it is similar to the use of proportions in 
geometry to compare lengths of the sides of triangles sharing a common angle, or to a 
rule of three in maths. He says, referring to B79 (‘A man sounds silly to a divinity, just 
as a kid to a man.’),98 ‘For the sake of convenience, we call this pattern by the name 
of the geometrical mean and transcribe it by formulae such as God/man = man/boy, or 
else A/B = B/C, using mathematical language rather loosely and disclaiming 
mathematical strictness.’99 
This form of comparison is present in many fragments and, as Frankel points out, 
is usually related to the gods. Just as with the adult-child comparison, many other 
                                                 
95 LSJ, s.v. γνώμη A.II.1. says that gnōmēn echein can mean ‘to understand’. Compare with Herodotus’ 
use, in Powell (1938), where it usually means ‘to have the opinion’ (3.82.5, 7.47.1, 7.236.3), ‘to have a 
theory’ (2.27, 2.56.1, 4.31.1, 7.18.3). Cf. the meaning and the attitude towards true knowledge with 
Phaedrus 278d3–6: Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῶι μόνῶι πρέπειν· τὸ 
δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλόν τε ἂν αὐτῶι καὶ ἁρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι. [‘To call him 
wise, Phaedrus, seems to me too much, and proper only for a god. To call him wisdom’s lover — a 
philosopher — or something similar would fit him better and more seemly.’ Trans. Nehamas and 
Woodruff in Cooper (1997)]. For ēthos here see Marcovich (1967), 478. Guthrie (1962), 398, and ATH, 
172–173, suggest ‘nature’. I follow KRS (2007), 191 n. 1, in rendering it ‘disposition’. Cf. with a man’s 
ēthos in B119. 
96 See Adomenas (1999); Trépanier (2010), 282–288; Most (2013). Heraclitus mentions some of the 
gods of the tradition by name (B15, B32, B92, B94, B120?) and refers to Apollo indirectly (B93), but 
he also mentions a one and greater god. His unclear position is reflected in B32: ‘One being, the only 
wise one, wants and does not want to be called by the name of Zeus/life.’ I agree with Trépanier (2010), 
288, that Heraclitus still fits in the idea of one big god and many lesser ones, he says: ‘His scheme of 
greatest and lesser gods, on the other hand, is reminiscent of Xenophanes, except that both the one, wise 
god and the lesser mortal gods are explicit parts of the furniture of the physical cosmos [...]’ Additionally, 
the way in which Herodotus refers to the divinities suggests an influence of the philosophers, as Scullion 
(2006), 202, proposes: ‘Perhaps we might adapt Heraclitus’ phrase (VS 22 B 32, above) and say that 
Herodotus, like many of the philosophers and sophists, is both uncomfortable and comfortable with 
Greek polytheism as a matter of nomos, but is really only comfortable with “the divine” conceptually.’ 
97 Frankel (1938b). 
98 Greek text: ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός. 





comparisons make more sense when we understand them to refer to an analogy of the 
divine realm and the human realm.100 We have comparisons about children and adults 
(B52, B56, B73-74, B117, B121), sleep and waking (B1, B21(?), B26(?), B73-74, 
B75(?), B89), and private and common (B2, B89, B114). However, in most of the 
cases the final purpose of these analogies is not explaining the mortal side of the 
comparison, but the divine. Let us consider some examples. B83: ‘The wisest person 
seems like an ape in front of a god in regard to wisdom, beauty, and everything else,’101 
or B79 above. Both fragments have three kind of components or represent different 
realms or levels: the god represents the divine level, a human the intermediate human 
level, and the child and the ape represent a level below the human. Indeed, these 
fragments tell us something about the human condition in general, but their main focus 
is the divine realm. Heraclitus’ audience know that adults are smarter than children 
and humans more beautiful than apes. The message Heraclitus wants to get across is 
that the divine truth is much farther and much better than tradition has supposed. 
Therefore, the fragments are showing us how to understand this divine realm in 
comparison to the human realm and something below it. Frankel explains it as follows, 
where A=God, B=human, and C=child/ape: ‘The equation [A/B=B/C] may be 
rewritten, on this view, with an x instead of an A: x/B= BC. What is God? God is that 
compared to which the most perfect man will appear as an infant or as a hideous and 
ridiculous ape.’102 We are familiar with humans, children, and animals, and know the 
difference between them. We do not know, however, what the divinity is like, at least 
not by direct experience. The divine, the logos, cannot be so easily described. 
Consequently, Heraclitus’ way to get around this problem is to infer what that divine 
is in comparison to us humans, in the same way as something lower than us is in 
comparison to us. 
                                                 
100  I am using the expression ‘divine realm’ and ‘human realm’ loosely. I do not think they are 
ontologically separate for Heraclitus. The divine part represents the real, and perhaps objective, 
understanding of the cosmos, while the human part is just our own and private opinions about the 
cosmos. I agree with TEGP, 187, that Heraclitus makes a sort of division between objective truth and 
subjective interpretation. 
101 Greek text: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίαι καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις πᾶσιν. I agree with TEGP, 178–179, that B82 (‘The fairest of apes is ugly in comparison with 
the human race’) and B83 go together. However, the example here works without putting them together.  





I propose that the motivation for this particular usage of analogies, or his 
‘thought pattern’, is that this new idea of the divine cannot be transmitted to others 
directly. The reason is that, as Xenophanes noticed before, we do not know what a 
god’s eye view of reality is really like, and describing it with our language is not 
enough to understand it. Heraclitus can only tell us how this realm is by an analogy 
with our human world.103 In this sense, giving information about the divinity to a 
human would be the same as giving information to an ape or to a toddler about the 
most complex matters of humanity; they would not understand it. In that same way, 
we would not understand (or it is hard for us to do so without the proper training at 
least) information about the divine logos. Reality is more difficult to grasp than the 
poets thought; Heraclitus cannot tell us directly what the world is really like, but only 
refer to it by comparison with the human world.  
1.3.3. Reinterpreting fragment B1 
Let us go back to the fragments in which Heraclitus talks about the logos and put them 
in this context, having in mind the idea that it is very hard to access this divine truth, 
which cannot be easily described and directly transmitted by language. Heraclitus’ 
main point and complaint in B1 is that people fail to understand the logos. I believe 
this failure is to some extent fault of the people, to another extent fault of the process 
of communication and language, and to another extent it is also caused by the object 
being communicated, the logos itself. Just as Xenophanes thought that the truth cannot 
be understood by humans, even when accidentally described by them, Heraclitus 
thought that the logos cannot be communicated to others directly. 
Fragment B1 is divided in three parts, all of which point to the problem of 
communicating the logos.104 The first idea is that people fail to understand the logos 
before and after they have heard it. What needs to be stressed here is the ‘after having 
                                                 
103 For the use of analogy in early Greek thought, see Lloyd (1966). 
104 Fragment B1 with the three divisions I mention in this section: ‘1) Of this logos that is forever 
humans turn out to be uncomprehending, both before they hear and after they have heard it. 2) Although 
everything happens according to this logos, they seem void of experience whenever they experience 
words and actions such as I describe when I distinguish each thing according to nature and declare how 
it is. 3) As to other men, whatever they do when they are awake escapes their notice, just as they forget 





heard it’, and not so much the ‘before hearing it’.105 For Heraclitus, this truth, the logos, 
is right there in front of your eyes, and it is showing itself to us and, if we were keener, 
we would be able to understand it. 106  This is why Heraclitus expects people to 
understand the logos before hearing it from him. The puzzle here is why people fail to 
understand it after having heard it from him. People usually understand and follow 
other things, especially when it comes to the incorrect logoi of other philosophers, 
poets, and historians.107  Then, why do they fail to understand Heraclitus’ correct 
description? This is what Heraclitus is actually asking himself and his audience in this 
first part. To a certain extent, part of the answer is that Heraclitus thought everyone 
else was not as smart or as connected/attuned to the divine as he was. This is how it 
was understood by Diogenes (9.1–2) and others in antiquity.108 However, as I argue 
here, the object of knowledge, the logos, plays an important part in this failure as well.  
This idea is emphasised in the second part of fragment B1. The main point is that 
the logos, to which people have access and which is in front of them all the time, is 
carefully and correctly put in words by Heraclitus, but people who experience his 
words are somehow unaffected by them, they seem to experience without experiencing 
(ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι πειρώμενοι). This means that the message does not get through, 
even when Heraclitus describes (διηγεῦμαι) each thing by properly distinguishing 
them (διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν)109 and indicating how they are (φράζων ὅκως ἔχει). The 
wording and emphasis of the second part of the fragment indicate that Heraclitus is 
doing everything in his power to make people understand the logos.110 This failure in 
understanding is usually explained by Heraclitus’ conception of people as dumb and 
ignorant, and, therefore, unable to understand in general. Indeed, there is some truth to 
this idea; not only Diogenes Laertius says in 9.1–3 that Heraclitus was arrogant and a 
                                                 
105 I agree with Marcovich (1967), 8. ATH, 97–98, suggests we should focus on the ‘before hearing it’ 
but reaches the same conclusion: that this is because the logos is showing itself to us all the time. 
106 Self-knowledge and not having a barbarian soul seem to be the requirements to understand. See 
section 3.2. 
107 This is a common compliant by Heraclitus. See section 2.3.1. 
108 ATH, 99, suggests something similar. 
109 This is a very early use of the expression κατὰ φύσιν, so it is doubtful that it had the later meaning 
of ‘according to nature’. I follow Tarán (1986), 12, in that it means something like ‘correctly’, ‘properly’. 
See also Marcovich (1967), 10. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.11.11.3: πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τε 
καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνθρώπωι προσφέρεσθαι. 
110 As I mentioned above, the wording of the second part of B1 is very similar to how the logos describes 
the cosmos in the world-soul in Timaeus 36d–37c. They both seem to mean that it is a thorough and 





misanthrope, but also in some of the fragments we can see or infer that this is what 
Heraclitus meant. He considered that at least some people were not very bright or did 
not make an effort to understand (B17, B19, B87, B34), or that they took the words of 
others for granted (B87, B57, B104).  
However, in the case of B1, those people who are simply hopeless when it comes 
to wisdom and knowledge are not those mentioned in the first and second parts of the 
fragment, they surely are those people mentioned in the third part of the fragment: ‘As 
to other men, whatever they do when they are awake escapes their notice, just as they 
forget what they do when they are asleep.’ The sentence starts with ‘As to other men’, 
which indicates that Heraclitus is not talking about the same people who fail to 
understand the logos as described by him. These other people are sleepwalking through 
life, and it would not be surprising if they fail to understand.111 Heraclitus must have 
produced his books, or aphorisms, with a particular audience in mind.112 Therefore, 
the people who fail to understand the logos even when carefully described by 
Heraclitus are people who have a chance in understanding it, not the ignorant 
sleepwalkers. The fragment is telling us that the logos, even when being in front of us 
in the cosmos, and being described to us by Heraclitus, cannot be directly 
communicated. Just as the divine truth in Xenophanes, we cannot tell our (intelligent) 
neighbours the logos and expect them to understand it. If I may propose a rough 
paraphrase of fragment B1, it would be the following:  
1) There is a divine and always present perfect description of the cosmos, 
people should know it because it is out there all the time, but they do not 
know it. However, people do not understand even after hearing it from me.  
2) I describe things as they are described in the logos, which is the same 
way they are happening in reality. But even after all this, people hear me 
and do not understand, they seem untouched by my words, as if they did 
not have an experience of them or of the things I carefully described.  
                                                 
111 I disagree with ATH, 99, and Kirk (1954), 43–44, in that τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους refers to the 
majority of people in opposition to Heraclitus. Had Heraclitus wanted to say that everyone but him is a 
sleepwalker, he would not have used the ἄλλους but simply say τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, like he does in the 
first part. This phrase talks about the majority of people, perhaps, but as opposed to the people he 
mentions before in the first two parts of B1. 
112 Heraclitus was probably expecting an audience of cultivated, educated people, and he probably felt 
his message would not be understood by or meant for the general public. On Heraclitus’ expected 
audience, see Gemelli Marciano (2002), 103–104. TEGP, 195, ‘[…] to all appearances Heraclitus’ 





3) There are some people who do not understand anything at all ever. I am 
not talking about them. 
People listen to Heraclitus. They hear his detailed description of things, which is in 
accordance to the logos. However, they are void of experience when they experience 
his words. They do not experience themselves those things that he describes. It seems 
that they lack that direct experience. If this was the introduction of Heraclitus’ book or 
speech, then it was probably describing the problem of communicating the logos to 
people. Heraclitus’ conclusion is very similar to Xenophanes’: even when correctly 
described, the logos cannot be communicated to others directly, in part because people 
are not receptive to it, but in particular because of the nature of this logos. That is why 
in B50 he urges us to listen not to him but to the logos, because he cannot tell us the 
logos. This divine logos cannot be simply told to other people, as the tradition 
understood it; only the logos itself can convey its meaning.  
1.4. Conclusion 
The objective of the present chapter was to analyse the concept of logos in Heraclitus’ 
philosophical doctrine, which represents the object of knowledge in his epistemology, 
and to suggest my preferred way of understanding it. When Heraclitus uses the word 
logos, especially in fragments B1, B2, and B50, he is not referring to his speech but to 
something different and independent of him. This is mainly supported by the 
exhortation in B50 to listen to the logos and not to Heraclitus. Additionally, an analysis 
of fragment B1, in particular of the words aei and eontos in the first line, and of 
Timaeus 27c1–d5 shows that Heraclitus is alluding to the epic formula for the 
immortality of the gods and to the traditional invocation of the divinity. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to conclude, too, that the logos is eternal and divine. Furthermore, the 
similarity between Heraclitus’ description of the logos in the fragments and the logos 
in the world-soul in Plato’s Timaeus 36d–37c suggests that the idea of a cosmic logos 
was not unheard of in Heraclitus’ time. A similar idea was probably used by him when 
thinking of his logos. Finally, based on the previous characteristics and an analysis of 
the word logos in Theaetetus 206d1–208d3, I propose that the logos is an eternal, 





understood as a combination of three ideas: a descriptive description, a prescriptive 
description, and an abstract description. 
Given that the logos has such characteristics, it cannot be communicated directly 
to others using language. The idea of the impossibility of communication of a divine 
truth was present in the time of Heraclitus. It was present in a way in the epic poets. 
For Xenophanes, the access to this kind of truth was completely closed for humans, 
even if they by chance managed to describe it correctly. Heraclitus most likely had a 
position similar to that of his predecessors and contemporaries regarding the problem 
of communication of the divine message. For him there is a difference between two 
realms: the divine and the mundane. The truth we seek in order to achieve knowledge 
is part of the divine realm and it is so immense and complex that Heraclitus cannot 
communicate it directly. The nature of the object of knowledge, that which we want to 
reach in order to achieve understanding of the cosmos, is by itself one of the obstacles 





Chapter 2: The limits of language and 
communication  
The logos is the divine, complete, and best description of the universe, which 
represents the truth that is common to all and could be tantamount to the modern notion 
of objective truth. One of the problems for achieving knowledge and understanding is 
that the logos’ divine nature, its comprehensiveness and greatness, seems to impede 
Heraclitus to communicate it directly to others. This implies that language plays an 
equally important part in Heraclitean epistemology. If the logos describes reality, a 
proper use of language is implied in the process of understanding the logos and 
knowing the universe that it describes. Additionally, language is relevant if we 
consider that communicating this logos must have been part of Heraclitus’ 
philosophical project.  
In this chapter we will discuss the topic of language and its relation to knowledge 
and the communication of the logos in the following way. First, I provide a general 
context for this problem and show what other people said about it before and after 
Heraclitus’ time. Then I address the problem of the doctrine of correct naming in 
Plato’s Cratylus, and whether we have evidence in the fragments to attribute such a 
doctrine to Heraclitus. The second section of this chapter deals with the problem of 
Heraclitus’ obscurity, namely, whether it was unintentional or intentional, and whether 
he used a writing technique, such as allegorical writing, in order to hide a message in 
his texts. Additionally, I will consider the relation between this obscurity and fragment 
B93, which mentions Apollo, the lord of the oracle at Delphi, and has been usually 
taken as a stylistic example for Heraclitus. The third section proposes that if Heraclitus 
criticised most of his contemporaries for learning from the poets and other people who 
are wrongly considered wise, then communication is not completely useless and futile 
for Heraclitus. Even though we cannot transmit the truth directly, we can convey some 
other information about the logos indirectly. This information perhaps is not the truth 
itself but it is connected to it. With language we can communicate the idea that 
something is not the logos and whether people have correct knowledge of it, and we 





2.1. Heraclitus on language and communication 
The language used by Heraclitus, his mode of expression, is an interesting and difficult 
topic. However, there is another important point here that has been left out of my 
account. Did Heraclitus have a theory or some ideas about the nature and purpose of 
language? And, if so, is there a relation between his ideas about language and 
communication, and the problem of knowledge? Many of Heraclitus’ fragments 
mention listening, understanding, saying, and naming. However, the problem of 
Heraclitus’ views on language is not easy at all because we do not have an explicit 
theory of language from Heraclitus; we only have fragments that mention activities 
and concepts related to those topics. Nevertheless, in the fragments, we can identify 
two main themes connected to language, communication, and knowledge. First, the 
problem of naming, i.e. the question of what kind of relation there is between words 
and things. Second, the role of language in communicating something to someone else. 
What is the procedure in which a speaker transmits information to a listener by using 
certain words?  
To clarify how Heraclitus communicates his message, I proceed in the following 
way. First, I provide a summary of early Greek thinking about language and naming, 
in order to define problems that could have been close to Heraclitus and probable 
influences on him by other authors or by him on other authors. Afterwards, I look into 
the fragments for each topic and see where they fit in that context. I argue, first, that 
Heraclitus had a theory of language in which names and things were connected by 
nature, as in naturally suited for describing them, but not as strictly as in the theory of 
Cratylus in Plato’s dialogue. Secondly, I argue that the truth about the cosmos, the 
correct and complete description of the logos, represents this idea of correctness of 
names. However, this language is not accessible by humans, and even if it were, using 
it would not mean an effective communication of the truth held in the logos.  
2.1.1. Context 
From the time of Homer and Hesiod Greeks were interested in language and in the 
problem of understanding and communication. In neither author do we find theorising 





expressed. For example, Homer tells us the story of Bellerophon at Iliad 6.155–211. 
There, Anteia says to her husband, king Proteus, that he must either kill himself or kill 
Bellerophon. Proteus did not want to kill him himself, so he sent Bellerophon to his 
father-in-law with some symbols carved on a tablet. The symbols were a message 
indicating that Bellerophon should be killed. Bellerophon did not understand the 
symbols (he could not read) and delivered the message ordering his own death. This 
story shows how knowledge of a particular language can prove useful in avoiding 
being deceived and killed. A similar story, where language is used to trick someone, 
is when Odysseus deceives Polyphemus, by means of wordplay and use of puns in 
Odyssey 9.364–367. Polyphemus fails to understand the similarity between the fake 
name Outis (Οὖτις)/Odysseus and the indefinite pronoun outis (οὔτις), ‘nobody’. 
When Odysseus and his men attack Polyphemus, leaving him blind, the cyclops calls 
for help. But he fails to get help from other Cyclopes because, when they ask him what 
is wrong, he replies that ‘nobody’ (Οὖτις/οὔτις) is hurting him. Additionally, we find 
another meaningful pun with a similar motif as the previous one. The other Cyclopes 
reply to Polyphemus that there is nothing they can do to help if ‘nobody’ is hurting 
him. In this case, the expression mē tis (μή τίς), ‘nobody’, is identical to the word mētis 
(μῆτις), ‘craft’, but with a different accent. So, what reads ‘If nobody is hurting you’ 
could be understood as ‘If craft is hurting you’, a punning reference to Odysseus, since 
he is given the epithet polymētis (πολύμητις), ‘of many crafts’ (Il. 1.311 etc. and Od. 
2.173 etc.). This episode and the wordplay used in it seem to imply that one of the 
abilities that made Odysseus a clever person was his crafty use of language. As for 
Polyphemus, he ends up being defeated because he did not use language correctly or 
did not have a better understanding of it. 
In Hesiod’s Theogony 829–835 there is a passage, previously mentioned, that 
shows a similar idea, in which there are sounds, in another language perhaps, which 
we are not able to understand. Hesiod is describing a son of Earth and Tartarus, 
Typhoeus, a monster with a hundred snake heads. Each of the heads makes sounds of 
different animals, but sometimes it produces sounds for the gods to understand (ἄλλοτε 
μὲν γὰρ φθέγγονθ᾽ ὥστε θεοῖσι συνιέμεν). This expression seems to suggest that those 
sounds are unintelligible and do not resemble any sounds understandable by mortals. 





different language, as they could understand some message in a different language that 
mortals cannot understand.1 This idea emphasises the gap between the divine truth and 
human understanding, but giving an important role to language. 
Later, several philosophers explicitly treat the problem of language. Gorgias (c. 
485–c. 380 BC) presents us with a shocking idea about language, communication, and 
knowledge in his On What Is Not. He proposes that that which exists cannot be 
communicated, and that, even if it could, we would not be able to understand it. It is 
hard to know whether Gorgias himself held the doctrines presented in this text, or 
whether they were just exercises to train his students in debating a paradoxical 
position.2 In his treatise he uses different arguments to prove the impossibility of 
communication. The first argument proposes that the objects that we want to 
communicate are different from what we really communicate when we talk to others. 
For, when we communicate, we transmit words, speech, descriptions of the objects but 
not the objects themselves, i.e. their physical properties: shape, colour, or sound.3 For 
Gorgias, you cannot communicate reality to others, not because it is out of human 
reach, but simply because language does not work this way.4 The other version of the 
text, in Pseudo-Aristotle’s Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, adds two arguments: 
the argument of sameness and the argument of perspective. He says in 980b7–18: 
[1] But even if it is possible to know and to speak what one knows, how 
can the hearer get the same thing in his mind? For it is not possible for the 
same thing to be at the same time in several separate beings. For then one 
thing would be two. [2] But if it were possible, he says, for the same thing 
to be in many beings, nothing would prevent it from appearing to be unlike 
to them, if they are not completely alike and in the same place; if they were 
in the same place they would be one and not two. But the same person 
clearly does not even perceive the same things at the same time, but 
different things by hearing and by sight, and different things at different 
times. So one person would hardly perceive the same as someone else.5 
                                                 
1 Another similar case is the plant called mōly (μῶλυ) by the gods in Odyssey 10.305. 
2 See TEGP, 725. There are two versions of the text, none of them considered original but paraphrases. 
See TEGP, 782–785. See Ariza (2014).  
3 Sextus’ report in 7.84 says: οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λὀγον, ὃς ἕτερος ἐστι τῶν 
ὑποκειμένων. [‘We do not communicate to our neighbours the existing things, but speech, which is 
different from the subsisting things.’] Text and trans. TEGP. 
4 For the problem of language in Gorgias, see Segal (1962) and Mourelatos (1987). 
5 Trans. TEGP, my brackets. Greek text: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται γιγνώσκειν τε καὶ ἃ ἂν γιγνώσκηι λέγειν, 





The argument of sameness seems to rely on the supposition that, in order to 
successfully communicate something, the thing that is being communicated has to 
transfer itself from one mind to another. For, if the object that the speaker conveys in 
the message is different from that of the listener, there is no accurate communication 
since the two objects are not the same thing. The perspective argument just adds that 
even if one thing can be in two minds at the same time, i.e. if it is effectively 
communicated, the fact that it is in different minds and ‘seen’ (or thought) by different 
people would make it a different thing in any case.6 For Gorgias, regular and mundane 
communication was impossible just because language does not transmit things from 
one person’s mind to another’s. This means that the effectiveness of the medium by 
which we communicate was questioned near Heraclitus’ time. 
Let us now turn to Plato and his Cratylus. Plato deals with several problems 
about language and tackles many of them in different dialogues.7 He himself makes a 
connection between these problems and Heraclitus in his Cratylus, and Aristotle tells 
us that not only Cratylus was a Heraclitean but also that Plato himself was a pupil of 
Cratylus.8 There are two issues concerning naming in the Cratylus in which I am 
interested with respect to Heraclitus. First, the correctness of names, this is, that names 
and the things they name have a natural connection.9 Second, that falsehoods cannot 
be stated.10 The correctness of names is the main topic of Plato’s Cratylus, and it is 
introduced in 383a4–b1 as follows: ‘Cratylus says, Socrates, that there is a correctness 
of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by nature. A thing’s name isn’t whatever 
people agree to call it […] but there is a natural correctness of names, which is the 
                                                 
γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν. εἰ δὲ καῖ εἴη, φησιν, ἐν πλείοσι καὶ ταὐτόν, οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ ὅμοιον φαίνεσθαι αύτοῖς, 
μὴ πάντηι ὁμοίοις ἐκείνοις οὖσιν καὶ ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῶι αὐτῶι εἴη, εἷς ἂν ἀλλ’ἕτερα τῆι ἀκοῆι 
καὶ τῆι ὄψει, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρος. ὥστε σχολῆι ἄλλωι γ’ἂν ταὐτὸ αἴσθοιτό τις.  
6 See Caston (2008), section 3, who attributes the first concern about intentionality to Parmenides’ Poem, 
when the goddess forbids us to think or say what is not. 
7 For a complete analysis of this problem in Plato and Aristotle, see Denyer (1991).  
8  Aristotle, Metaphysics 1078b9 and 1010a7. For a critique of this position, see Kirk (1951). 
Additionally, there seems to be a connection between Heraclitus and Cratylus in their interest in correct 
naming and etymologies. See Sedley (1998b), 145–146, where he plays with the idea that Plato changed 
his name because of the influence of Cratylus and his theory of correct naming.  
9 Some modern discussions on Cratylus’ theory of names, see Ademollo (2011); Barney (2001); Sedley 
(1998a), (1998b), and (2003); Ackrill (1997); and Williams (1982).  
10 This idea was defended also, in different ways, by Parmenides and Protagoras. In Parmenides’ Poem 
B2 the goddess forbids us to take the path of what is not or even to pronounce it. Protagoras’ theory of 
man as measure (B1) could be interpreted as that nothing can be false, since anything someone says is 





same for everyone, Greek or foreigner.’11 This means that objects in the world have a 
name (or names?) that is naturally correct.12 In modern terminology, we can say, first, 
that a sign refers to a particular object, and it describes it somehow or agrees with it 
by nature. This sign is not arbitrary or purely conventional nor can it be changed by its 
users. The sign and the sound do not seem to be distinguished, i.e. sound and sign are 
the same thing, words or names; their connection is intrinsic to them and does not 
happen in the mind of the speakers, as is understood in modern linguistics.13  
The second problem is a consequence of adopting such a theory of naming. Since 
things can only have natural names, incorrect names would mean nothing and be just 
empty sounds. Plato says in 429e2–430a4: 
Cratylus: In my view, one can neither speak nor say anything falsely.  
Socrates: What about announcing something falsely or addressing 
someone falsely? For example, suppose you were in a foreign country and 
someone meeting you took your hand and said, ‘Greetings! Hermogenes, 
son of Smicrion, visitor from Athens,’ would he be speaking, saying, 
announcing or addressing these words not to you but to Hermogenes — or 
to no one? 
Cratylus: In my view, Socrates, he is not articulating them as he should.  
Socrates: Well, that’s a welcome answer. But are the words he articulates 
true or false, or partly true and partly false? If you tell me that I’ll be 
satisfied.  
Cratylus: For my part, I’d say he’s just making noise and acting pointlessly, 
as if he were banging a brass pot.14 
Cratylus seems to be proposing a theory of language in which names only make sense 
when used correctly. This implies that when you state a falsehood, e.g. attribute wrong 
characteristics to an object, your statement is not wrong or describing its object 
incorrectly; rather, you are using language incorrectly by not referring to anything at 
all. This, in turn, implies that whenever language is used correctly, there is truth in 
what is being said. The reason for this is that, for Cratylus, names and things are 
                                                 
11 Trans. Reeve in Cooper (1997). 
12 It is not completely clear or explicitly treated in the dialogue whether in Cratylus’ theory false names 
may refer in some other way to their objects, and whether there could be cases in which two names 
describe correctly one object. See Ademollo (2011) 23–32. 
13 As for instance, Saussure (1986), 66: ‘A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but 
between a concept and a sound pattern. The sound pattern is not actually sound; for sound is something 
physical. A sound pattern is the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the 
evidence of his senses […] the linguistic sign is, then, a two-sided psychological entity.’ 





connected by nature and independently of humans; the connection that they have is 
not psychological, as we understand it nowadays. 15  Objects have names already 
assigned to them, which describe them correctly, and it seems that if someone manages 
to use language correctly and say those names, they will ipso facto understand and 
know the objects themselves.  
2.1.2. Names and things 
The relation between Gorgias’ and Cratylus’ theories on language and Heraclitus’ is a 
difficult topic, and a full exploration is out of the scope of the present study. However, 
we know that Heraclitus was concerned with this problem. Many fragments talk about 
language and communication, as pointed out above, and in particular a few of them 
treat the problem of naming. It is fair to assume that Heraclitus believes that he uses 
language correctly. As McKirahan points out, the fact that Heraclitus says in B1, ‘I 
describe things as they are’, suggests that ‘Heraclitus believed that when properly used, 
language mirrors reality: the correct description or account of X accords with X’s 
nature and says how X is, in that the account itself reflects the nature of X.’16 I believe, 
as previously argued, that the correct and complete description is found in the divine 
logos. The problem is that even when this logos is described correctly by Heraclitus, 
it is not understood by people. This means that even if Heraclitus used language 
correctly, this would not mean that such a language would be sufficient in transmitting 
the truth to others. But what evidence do we have of all this in the fragments? 
B48: τῶι οὖν τόξωι ὄνομα ΒΙΟΣ, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.  
 
The name of the bow is life but its work is death.  
Most scholars agree on the interpretation of fragment B48. For them, the fragment is 
an indication that for Heraclitus names have a real connection with the thing they name. 
The word bios means ‘life’ if accented on the iota (βίος), and ‘bow’ if accented on the 
omicron (βιός). The same word, when ignoring the accents, can mean ‘life’ or ‘bow’, 
but the bow is used to bring death. Since life and death are present in the same object, 
                                                 
15 See Saussure (1986), above. 
16 McKirahan (1994), 133. Graham (2009), 79, agrees that the language of Heraclitus ‘imitates the 





this could be an exemplification of the doctrine of unity in opposition.17 One exception 
of this interpretation is Poster, who argues that the fragment is a critique of the epic 
language of the poets.18 Her approach is interesting when we take into consideration 
that Heraclitus shows certain disdain towards his predecessors and his contemporaries. 
Homer, Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus, and Archilochus are all targets 
of his criticisms. 19  However, Poster’s two main arguments seem somewhat 
problematic.20 The main reason is that it is hard to know whether Cratylus was actually 
a disciple of Heraclitus.21 And, even if he was, we do not know for sure they both had 
the same theory of naming. On the other hand, it is very dubious that Heraclitus would 
have seen a contradiction, i.e. that something is not right, in that life and death are 
present in the same object.22 Heraclitus himself does not seem to have a problem with 
opposites being present in the same object, as for instance in B88: ‘As the same thing 
in us are living and dead, walking and sleeping, young and old. For those things having 
changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these.’23 
Rather, fragment B48 shows that there is a connection between names and the 
things they name. Moreover, bios seems to be a name that describes its object well. 
But where does that leave toxon? The fact that Heraclitus uses it in the fragment means 
                                                 
17 ATH, 201; Marcovich (1967), 161; Guthrie (1962), 420. Marcovich (1967), 192 says on B48 that 
‘Heraclitus shared the Greek belief that name reveals a great deal of the true φύσις of its object’. Kirk 
(1954), 116–122 agrees that the fragment is example of the doctrine of opposites, and that names have 
a real connection with things. ATH, 201 says: ‘We find a comparable interest in Parmenides, though 
with a different philosophic bias. In the Eleatic conception of language, names typically express a false 
or mistaken view of reality.’ Robinson (1987), 111: ‘The fragment serves also as a striking instance of 
how names can indicate the reality (or an aspect of the reality) of a thing’. TEGP, 191 says that the 
fragment is ‘an insight based on a pun’. 
18  Poster (2006), 12: ‘The critique of the epic “biós” in DK22b48 thus addresses two issues 
simultaneously, first whether the poets are using the wrong word (as biós [bow] has the wrong 
connotation due to its similarity in sound to bíos [life]) and second whether the epic misuse of the term 
is indicative of a misunderstanding of the thing in particular and the nature of weapons and strife in 
general.’  
19 Cf. fragments B40, B42, B56, B57, B81, B104, and B129, where some of them are accused of not 
having understanding (νόος), intelligence (φρήν), or of having a wrong kind of wisdom (πολυμαθίη). 
See section 2.3.1. 
20 Poster (2006) proposes (1) that since Cratylus was a follower of Heraclitus, then Heraclitus must have 
advocated a Cratylian-type theory of correctness of names. This means (2) that the name bios is not a 
correct name for the bow because its name indicates something contrary to its function. 
21 Kirk (1954), 118–19 opposes to this idea. 
22 Kirk (1954), 116–122, uses this argument as well in his analysis of fragment B48. An additional 
argument is that Homer and Hesiod use both names, and not just βιός, depending on the position in the 
verse.  
23 Trans. TEGP: ταὐτό τ’ ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε 





that toxon is a functional and meaningful name, otherwise he could have avoided it. 
The presence of two names for the same object shows that to a certain extent Heraclitus 
did not subscribe to correct naming as Cratylus, at least not to the most extreme version 
of it. However, could each different name of the bow show different aspects of it in 
Heraclitus’ theory? In my view, bios is a better name than toxon because it reveals 
more about the object and about the nature of the universe as well: life and death are 
the same process and a bios that humans use to kill, either enemies or prey, in order to 
survive helps us understand this complex idea. 
Another fragment in which we find a reference to naming is B23: 
B23: Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ἤιδεσαν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν.  
 
If those things did not exist, they would not know the name of Justice.  
Most scholars agree that tauta refers to acts of injustice and, therefore, the idea of the 
fragment is that we know that there is justice from the presence of its opposite, 
injustice.24 However, there is a question that needs to be asked: why did Heraclitus add 
the word onoma? Why do they know the ‘name’ of Justice and not Justice directly? 
Kahn proposes that ‘the thought is expressed not in terms of concepts but in terms of 
the name by which Justice is known. If there were no judgments and penalties, men 
could not know or understand the word dikē that denotes them. But then they would 
not know the name of Justice.’25 Under this interpretation, this mention of onoma 
could mean that things only have a name, or an understandable name, if they exist, or 
that we can only understand names that denote something.26 In this fragment, as well 
as in all others in which Heraclitus talks about naming, he relates this idea with his 
doctrine of unity in opposites. Just as with life and death above, justice and injustice 
are two sides of the same coin: we could not understand the existence of one without 
the other. Without acts of injustice there would not be Justice, therefore, there would 
not be anything to name at all. Heraclitus talks about human understanding of unjust 
                                                 
24 TEGP, 191; Marcovich (1967), 229–30; ATH, 185; Kirk (1954), 129.  
25 ATH, 185. Kirk (1954), 129 says: ‘What we are concerned with here is the human view of Dike rather 
than its abstract essence. This is shown by the word ὄνομα.’ I am not sure the distinction of ‘abstract 
essence’ vs ‘human view’ could be easily applied to Heraclitus’ thought. I see it more as an example of 
a division between the language and knowledge of human and divine.  





and just things in fragment B102: τῶι μὲν θεῶι καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, 
ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ δίκαια. [‘For the god all things are beautiful, 
good, and just, but humans suppose that some are unjust, and some are just.’] As 
previously argued, for Heraclitus divine understanding is superior to human 
knowledge.27 Does this mean that there are no injustices in reality, and they are just 
invented by humans? If so, why do we have a name for them? I believe that in this 
fragment we are seeing one of the results of the theory of unity in opposition: both 
opposites are one and the same thing, as parts of a process or elements of a complete 
whole.28 This wholeness is their reality, it is both opposites taken together at the same 
time, but not each one in particular taken separately. Naming one alone may refer to 
something in our human understanding of the world, but it is not correct in the view 
of a god (or in the perfect description of the logos), who can see above the world of 
change.29  
This same idea is present in fragment B67: 
B67: ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός 
[τἀναντία ἅπαντα. οὗτος ὁ νοῦς], ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ, ὅ>, 
ὁπόταν συμμιγῆι θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου.30 
 
The god is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger, and he 
alters just as <fire, which,> when it is mixed with spices, is named 
according to the aroma of each of them.31  
Although the Greek text presents some problems and could be read in different ways, 
the general idea of the fragment is clear: the god represents each pair of opposites, 
which change into one another but are one and the same thing. I believe it is meaningful 
that there is neither a conjunction between each opposite nor between all of them at 
all: the god is not one opposite and the other as a sum of different (separate) entities, 
but both opposites are part of one more complex process, which represents their real 
                                                 
27 Cf. B78, B79, B82, and B83. See sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. 
28 Cf. B57, where day and night are one. 
29 For the cosmological and metaphysical implications of the unity of opposites, see Mourelatos (1973), 
33–40. 
30 I use Graham’s version of the text, which is Marcovich’s originally. The manuscript does not include 
the word πῦρ and the text is not corrupt. Most authors add ‘fire’ or something else, but I follow ATH, 
276–281, in that there is no need to correct the text. Since it is not part of my argument, I will not defend 
my position here. On fragment B67 see Frankel (1938a), Marcovich (1986), 347, and (1967), 413–17. 





nature and refers to their correct name. Just as fire (or the fiery part of smoke) is named 
according to the scent of the spice balm it is burning, instead of being named (properly) 
as what it is: fire. Kirk says that ‘just as the differentiation of the scent of burnt 
offerings depends upon a common element in them all, and one which is usually left 
unspecified, so all differentiation in the world is dependent upon the underlying 
connection, and all the pairs of opposites and all the extremes in these pairs are 
ultimately but facets of the underlying unity, whether it be called god or the Logos (or 
even perhaps fire).’32 If there is an underlying unity and we just name one of its parts 
(night, winter, war or hunger) instead of calling it god (or the name that the totality 
has), does that mean that there is a whole that we divide, and name each part differently 
depending on the part of it that we see, when in reality it is just one thing for which we 
should have one name, which is correct?33  
Heraclitus himself seems to offer an answer to the question of the name of the 
totality in fragment B32: 
B32: ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα. 
 
The only one wise thing wants and does not want to be called by the name 
of Zeus. 
However, the answer appears to be more problematic than the question.34 We can infer 
from B50 that this one wise thing is this totality.35 The fact that it wants and does not 
want to be called by the name of Zeus indicates the idea of correct naming again; 
calling it ‘Zeus’ may be correct in a way, as the highest divinity, but perhaps not 
enough to describe it in its wholeness. Kahn also makes a connection of this fragment 
                                                 
32 Kirk (1954), 201.  
33 Cf. with Parmenides’ Poem B8.50–59: ‘Here I cease from faithful account (logos) and thought/ about 
truth; from this point on learn mortal opinions,/ hearing the deceptive order of my words./ For they 
made up their minds to name two forms,/ of which it is not right to name one — this is where they 
have gone stray — / and they distinguished contraries in body and set signs/ apart from each other: 
to this form the ethereal fire of flame, being gentle, very light, everywhere the same as itself,/ not the 
same as the other; but also that one by itself/ contrarily unintelligent night, a dense body and heavy.’ 
Trans. TEGP, my emphasis.  
34 The fact that Heraclitus does not use the most common genitive form for Zeus, Dios, but the poetic 
variation, Zēnos, might imply that he had in mind a wordplay with the concept of life (zōē). See TEGP, 
194. Guthrie (1962), 463. Contra Kirk (1954), 392, who thinks Zēnos was a normal alternative, and one 
that does not imply anything else. Marcovich (1967), 445–446, thinks similarly to Kirk. 
35 B50: οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἶναι. [Having listened 





with B67 and says: ‘This wisdom will not accept any one name as uniquely appropriate, 
for it may equally well be called “Fire”, “War”, “Justice”, or “Attunement” (harmoniē). 
Indeed, it may be “named according to the pleasure of each one”.’36  
I follow Kirk in that there is a connection between names and things, and when 
something is named just in part and not as whole, the description would not be false 
but incomplete, since it at least describes some of its elements.37 And this is the case 
in particular when referring to the divine: the name of Dike, of the god, and of Zeus 
seem to depend on the understanding of a connection between opposites. Therefore, 
names and things are connected, and some names are better than others in describing 
the things they name. However, they do not do that as in the doctrine of Cratylus, 
where there is one correct name for one thing.38 Most likely, the correct description of 
the logos uses the correct names, but it seems that our human language (or our 
understanding of it) is not good enough to convey the most complex features of the 
cosmos, in particular when dealing with the divine realm. Additionally, even if that 
were the case, using the correct names and describing correctly is not sufficient to 
communicate the truth to others, as is stated in fragment B1.39 
2.2. The obscure and oracular  
When it comes to Heraclitus’ doctrines about language and divine communication no 
other fragment seems to be more pertinent than the one where he mentions how Apollo 
communicates his message:  
B93: ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει 
ἀλλὰ σημαίνει. 
 
The lord, whose oracle is at Delphi, neither speaks out nor conceals but 
gives signs.  
It is standardly argued that Heraclitus follows the style of the oracle: he does not state, 
straightforwardly, what he means, nor conceals it, but rather gives signs pointing to 
                                                 
36 ATH, 267. 
37 Kirk (1954), 118. 
38 Otherwise, in B32 the name of Zeus would be either correct or incorrect.  





his real message. Many modern scholars agree with this interpretation, or at least that 
Heraclitus has certain oracular characteristics.40 Therefore, this proposed similarity in 
style to the oracle is frequently used to advocate in favour of Heraclitus being 
deliberately obscure or hiding a truer message: since he needs a different language and 
nature is hidden (B123: φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.41), he follows the ambiguous style of 
the oracle at Delphi.42 
As previously mentioned, Heraclitus was known in antiquity as ‘the obscure’. 
This could indicate that his views on the divine message of Apollo are coherent with 
an obscure use of language. This idea is certainly very important to the problem of the 
role of language in the communication of the logos. If the logos cannot be 
communicated directly, not even with a correct description, then perhaps Heraclitus 
seeks to show this logos indirectly by referring to it but not naming it or by hiding his 
real message in his obscure words. Nevertheless, this interesting and potentially useful 
idea has to be analysed carefully. This is mainly because ‘obscurity’ is not a clear 
concept and when he is called obscure it is not evident what that means in regard to 
his style. Sometimes it is related to particular formal aspects of his writing, sometimes 
to his philosophical ideas, and, at times, the obscurity attributed to him seems to be 
related to anecdotes of his personal life.  
In this section I propose a differentiation between three kinds of obscurity: 1) 
unintentional obscurity or ambiguity, 2) intentional obscurity or ambiguity, and 3) 
hiding a message under the literal meaning of a text. I analyse the possibly and the 
                                                 
40 In addition to those mentioned afterwards, see Warren (2007), 59; Hölscher (1974), 229–233. Guthrie 
(1962), 414, says: ‘Just this imagery and double meaning were a mark of Heraclitus’ own style, and he 
was evidently following the oracle’s example.’ Kahn (1979), 123, agrees with ‘Delphic elements’. See 
also Tor (2016). There could be another relation between Heraclitus and the oracle at Delphi, namely, 
that some fragments of Heraclitus (B101, B116) resemble the famous saying ‘know thyself’, see 
Wilkins (1979), 12–13. 
41 I follow Graham (2003) for the translation of this fragment. His main point is that φιλεῖ with the 
infinitive does not mean ‘loves to’ but it states a general rule or principle. This is a very early mention 
of the term physis. I agree with TEGP, 191: ‘Here we are presumably dealing with individual natures 
of things rather than with nature as a whole (rerum natura), a later conception.’ 
42 KRS (1983), 210, says: ‘The method adopted by Apollo in his Delphic pronouncements is praised in 
244 [B 93], because a sign may accord better than a misleading explicit statement with the nature of the 
underlying truth, that of the logos. Probably Heraclitus intended by this kind of parallel to justify his 
own oracular and obscure style.’ Additionally, TEGP, 194, proposes something similar: ‘Heraclitus 
admires the Delphic Oracle’s ability to provide a symbol that admits of multiple interpretations and 





meaning of each of these ideas in Heraclitus. Finally, in the last part I examine the 
relation between Heraclitus’ obscure style and the Delphic Oracle in fragment B93. 
2.2.1. Unintentional obscurity or ambiguity 
The dividing line between unintentional and intentional obscurity or ambiguity is, of 
course, very blurry, and for some fragments it is a difficult task to decide which kind 
of ambiguity we are dealing with, or whether we are dealing with both. However, in 
most cases it is clear to which side of this line the obscurity belongs. 
We can classify in the category ‘unintentional obscurity or ambiguity’ most of 
the comments from antiquity that refer to Heraclitus’ writing style. In particular, those 
comments that say that he was not easy to understand because of external and 
contextual problems with the text or lack of context. In particular, when the obscurity 
seems to represent more of a subjective perception, interpretation or opinion of the 
reader. In this regard, reports such as Plato’s Theaetetus 179e1–180b3 and Symposium 
187a3–b3, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1407b11–18, as well as most opinions in antiquity, that 
state that Heraclitus was simply obscure, not clear or hard to understand, belong to this 
section.43 It is significant that Diogenes (9.7) notices that ‘sometimes, in his writings, 
he [Heraclitus] expresses himself with great brilliancy and clearness; so that even the 
most stupid man may easily understand him and receive an elevation of soul from him. 
Additionally, the brevity and weightiness of his exposition are incomparable.’44 This 
implies two points: first, not all of his book or fragments are obscure and, second, some 
of this obscurity is subjective and depends on the reader’s understanding.  
Another important part of this type of obscurity comes from fragments that are 
difficult to understand because of textual problems, i.e. the manuscript is corrupt or 
perhaps the scribe skipped a word, as for instance the word apparently missing in 
fragment B67, which most authors supply with ‘fire’.45 This happens too when the 
original context of the quotation is not clear for semantic or syntactic reasons. For 
                                                 
43 See section 0.4.5. 
44  Trans. Yonge (1853), 378, with some modifications. Greek text: λαμπρῶς τ᾽ ἐνίοτε ἐν τῶι 
συγγράμματι καὶ σαφῶς ἐκβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ τὸν νωθέστατον ῥαιδίως γνῶναι καὶ δίαρμα ψυχῆς λαβεῖν: 
ἥ τε βραχύτης καὶ τὸ βάρος τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἀσύγκριτον.  
45 B67: ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός [τἀναντία ἅπαντα. οὗτος ὁ 





instance B23 (Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ἤιδεσαν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν.) where, as we saw, the 
reference of the tauta is not clear. In all such cases the obscurity is not intentional, and 
was not planned by Heraclitus, and therefore, does not represent or necessarily imply 
a philosophical position regarding the problem of language and communication of the 
logos. 
For several fragments it is not easy to decide whether they contain an ambiguity 
planned by Heraclitus and are obscure intentionally. In this case, it is up to the 
interpreter of the fragment. For instance, as I argued above, for me there is no 
intentional ambiguity in the position of the word aiei in fragment B1. This is because 
I do not think Heraclitus put the word there in order to show two possible readings of 
the sentence, but just wanted to express the divine and eternal aspect of the logos.46 
However, some scholars believe that that was the case, and that there is intentional 
ambiguity. 
2.2.2. Intentional obscurity or ambiguity  
On the other side of this categorisation we find reports that tell us that Heraclitus was 
obscure, ambiguous or hard to understand intentionally. Here too, we can classify 
fragments that clearly have two meanings by themselves, or in which a word has two 
meanings, or in which we notice that there is the intention of Heraclitus to shows us 
something more than the literal meaning of the words in the fragments. 
Most likely the first example of such interpretation in antiquity is Diogenes. He 
proposes that Heraclitus intentionally wrote obscurely so that only the most intelligent 
people could understand the book. In 9.6 he says: 
ἀνέθηκε δ᾽ αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν, ὡς μέν τινες, ἐπιτηδεύσας 
ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι <μόνοι> προσίοιεν αὐτῶι καὶ μὴ 
ἐκ τοῦ δημώδους εὐκαταφρόνητον ἦι. 
 
And he deposited it [the book] in the temple of Artemis, and as some say, 
he wrote it deliberately in the most obscure way, in order that <only> those 
                                                 





who were able could have access to it, and that it would not be easily 
ridiculed by common people.47 
In modern scholarship, this intentional ambiguity is best defended by Kahn, who views 
this idea as one of his principles in his approach to Heraclitus, i.e. the principle of 
linguistic density: ‘By Linguistic density I mean the phenomenon by which a 
multiplicity of ideas are expressed in a single word or phrase.’48 This does not mean, 
for Kahn, that any given meaning or interpretation of a word or fragment is valid but 
that we should take into account possible double meanings, puns, and wordplay, when 
interpreting the fragments. It could mean, though, that Heraclitus had the idea of a 
double interpretation of his fragments in mind. Regarding this principle, he says:  
It will always be convenient to speak of deliberate or intentional ambiguity. 
I think these expressions are harmless and justified, as long as it is clearly 
understood that there is no external biographical evidence for imputing 
such intentions to Heraclitus. For these expressions simply reflect the fact 
that we can construe an ambiguity in the texts as meaningful only if we 
perceive it as a sign of the author’s intention to communicate to us some 
complex thought.49  
However, the line between intentionality in Heraclitus’ obscurity is not a clear and 
precise one, but there are many fragments in which we can see that Heraclitus was 
saying one thing and at the same time referring, implicitly or explicitly, to another. 
This includes all the fragments in which he uses figures of speech, puns and different 
analogies, metaphors, similes, etc.  
Some examples are the following. As mentioned above, we have the word bios, 
which explicitly means ‘life’ and ‘bow’ in B48, and the verb homologeō in B50, which 
not only means ‘agree’ but also refers to its etymology: to come to the ‘same logos’.50 
Fragment B117 presents us with a metaphor where the child guiding the drunk man is 
                                                 
47 Barnes (1983), 108 n. 28, proposes a different interpretation for this passage. He says that ‘the “having 
planned...obscurely” is parenthetical: Diogenes means that Heraclitus placed the book in the temple so 
that only those in power should get at it; he does not mean (as most scholars suppose) that he wrote it 
obscurely so that only the nobs should understand it.’ Contra TEGP, 195: ‘Lucretius criticizes him for 
pandering to the crowd through his language, although to all appearances Heraclitus’ language was 
meant to, and did, limit his readership to the cognoscenti.’ See also Hussey (1999a), 361, who argues 
that the author of the Derveni Papyrus ‘has plenty of contempt for the lack of intelligence and 
enlightenment of “the many”, of “people”.’  
48 ATH, 89. 
49 ATH, 89. 





not necessarily an actual child but it may mean that a drunk person acts as if a child 
was guiding them.51 There is also intentional ambiguity when there is a change in 
syntax that means something else. For instance, as shown above for B67, in some 
fragments that deal with the unity of opposites, Heraclitus does not use a proper 
conjunction between the words that refer to the opposites but just juxtaposes the 
terms.52 This same omission of a conjunction happens also in fragment B60: ὁδὸς ἄνω 
κάτω μία καὶ ωὑτή. In my interpretation, this omission of a conjunction between 
opposite concepts and the decision to simply juxtapose them should be read as 
intentional in Heraclitus. It means that these concepts should be understood together 
and not as separate characteristics.53 We can include here as well most of the analogies 
and comparisons, word play, puns, and the like, as for instance the comparisons where 
Heraclitus uses the mathematical rule of three to refer to the divine realm in relation 
to the human realm and a lower level.54 
2.2.3. A hidden message 
Another difficult boundary is that between a hidden message and the previous idea of 
intentional ambiguity. The first passage that suggests such an interpretation of 
Heraclitus is by Lucretius. He does not call Heraclitus ‘obscure’ directly, but his 
speech is qualified by the adjective obscurus, and he gives us some reasons for doing 
so. He says in 1.635–644: 
Quapropter qui materiem rerum esse putarunt     
ignem atque ex igni summam consistere solo,  
magno opere a vera lapsi ratione videntur.  
Heraclitus init quorum dux proelia primus,  
clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanis  
quam de gravis inter Graios, qui vera requirunt;    
omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque,  
inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt,  
veraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt  
                                                 
51 See section 3.1.2 for my interpretation of B117. 
52 B67: ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός [τἀναντία ἅπαντα. οὗτος ὁ 
νοῦς], ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ, ὅ>, ὁπόταν συμμιγῆι θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἑκάστου. 
See section 2.1.2. 
53 See my analysis of B67 in section 2.1.2. 





auris et lepido quae sunt fucata sonore.55    
 
This is why those who thought that the principle of things was 
Fire, and that out of fire alone the whole is made of, 
Seem to fall away from true reason by a great deal. 
Of whom Heraclitus, as chief leader, began the battle,  
Famous for dark speech more among the silly 
Than among the serious Greeks, who search for true things. 
For the stupid admire and love more all those things 
Which they can discern hidden beneath ambiguous words, 
And they consider true whatever they can prettily grasp  
With their ears and is painted with polished sound. 
For Lucretius, Heraclitus is admired for his obscurity by people who like to find hidden 
meaning ‘under his twisted words’ (inversis sub verbis) an expression that indicates 
double meaning and ambiguity in general. 56  However, in this context Lucretius’ 
comment is most likely related to the phenomenon of allegorical interpretation, the art 
of finding the hidden and true meaning of a text. This interpretation of Heraclitus’ 
obscurity was supported a century later by Heraclitus Homericus (24.5), who says that 
Heraclitus of Ephesus wrote allegorically.57  
The best modern exponent of this more extreme position is Mouraviev. For 
instance, when speaking of fragment B22, χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν 
ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον. [‘Those looking for gold, dig much earth but find 
little.’], he says: 
This fragment [B22], though it looks like an innocent riddle rather easy to 
solve, is in fact a paradigm used by Heraclitus not only to tell us plainly 
that finding a grain of truth (gold is too transparent an image for us to have 
any doubts about its metaphorical meaning) requires a lot of work, a lot of 
digging but also to show us the object and the method of this work: the 
                                                 
55 Stolidi on line 641 is usually taken as a reference to the Stoics (Stoici). Cf. the idea of nice sounds on 
line 644 with B92, where the Sibyl is said to reach a thousand years despite uttering unperfumed and 
unadorned sayings.  
56 Inversis sub versis can have different interpretations, but the expression is usually thought to be a 
reference to the Stoics as well. See Atherton (2008), for background. See Montarese (2012), 201–8: ‘I 
am inclined to think that ambiguity and double meanings were the main reference in inversis sub verbis.’ 
Sedley (1998a), 13–14: ‘Contrast between, on the one hand, the clear, rational and unambiguous 
assertions of the pluralists, and, on the other, the Delphic ambiguities so characteristic of Heraclitus.’ 
Ernout (1925), 137: ‘Inversa verba are antithesis, opposites.’ 
57 Whether Lucretius thought Heraclitus or the Stoics were allegorizing, see Montarese (2012), 206. On 





thing to dig is the text — Heraclitus’ text or the text of reality — and the 
things to be dug out and deciphered are the hidden patterns it contains.58  
Both Lucretius and Heraclitus Homericus, as well as Mouraviev, seem to propose that 
Heraclitus’ book contains a message that is more meaningful but hidden, which must 
be extracted from the text or solved as a puzzle or a riddle. This is an idea with which 
I do not agree. The main reason is that, in antiquity, we only find the idea of a hidden 
message in texts of allegorical interpretation. It is true that we have some possible 
examples of allegorical interpretation in the time of Heraclitus; Theagenes of Rhegium 
(late sixth century BC) and others were already proposing by then some allegorical 
interpretations of Homer.59 However, the idea of purposely hiding a message when 
writing is not present in the early Greek tradition. Obbink says: 
The idea that allegory is one trope among others, for example, a kind of 
extended metaphor, is a later tradition. This development, which will 
inform a notion of allegory that is more domesticated and functional than 
we find in the classical period, will await the rhetorical critics of the late 
Hellenistic period. Nor do we find in the earliest period an idea of allegory 
as a self-conscious or distinct literary procedure of composing 
personification fictions, in which characters are correlated to abstract ideas 
in a one-to-one correspondence.60 
Heraclitus uses word-play, puns, metaphors, and other literary devices in order to 
convey a figurative meaning distinct from the literal meaning of the text (which we 
could call ‘allegory’, as ‘saying something else’ in general but not in the proper way 
of the later allegorical tradition). However, this does not mean that Heraclitus is hiding 
a message in a deeper layer of meaning. Unfortunately, we do not have any example 
close to Heraclitus’ time of a text written so that it has as a whole a deeper level of 
meaning, which is its true meaning, or even of hiding a message in a plain and 
meaningful text — unless of course, we count Homer and Hesiod’s readings and the 
results of later allegorical interpretations.61 The closest we can find to a text in which 
                                                 
58 Mouraviev (1996), 152. For a more extensive explanation of his theory and its application, see the 
third part of Mouraviev (2002), 213–386. 
59 See Most (1999), 339–340 and Obbink (2010), 18.  
60 Obbink (2010), 15–16. See additionally Hersman (1906), 7, who presents the birth of allegorical 
interpretation as a way of including traditional religious beliefs in a changing philosophical context. 
61 Perhaps such texts could be found in mystery religion and initiation cults, where the true message of 





we discover something that is suggested but not present in the text in that period is 
riddles, wordplay, and paradoxes, and all those examples that I described as intentional 
ambiguity. However, is this sort of ambiguity the same as hiding the true meaning of 
a sentence for the readers to find? 
As mentioned above, the dividing line is not clear. It is true that in a way you 
find a kind of hidden message in a fragment when you understand the reference of a 
pun or an allegory. However, I do not think that is the same as the proposals of 
Lucretius, Heraclitus Homericus, and Mouraviev.  
Heraclitus points to something else in many of his fragments and the reason is 
that his main message, the logos, cannot be communicated directly. In my 
interpretation, even though we have a cosmos that shows itself to us but the nature of 
which is hidden (B123), this does not mean that if we solve Heraclitus’ puzzle or 
decipher his code, we will understand the logos.62 There are two important arguments 
for this. First, as argued above, the logos is too complex and cannot be communicated 
this way, as a written message. And, second, as I will argue later, getting to understand 
the logos is a more complex process that requires a more active participation of a 
person and their soul: it cannot be just passed on as a description or a message.  
2.2.4. The oracle at Delphi  
The idea of comparing the style of Heraclitus with the Delphic Oracle comes 
considerably later in antiquity. The relation is only suggested by Lucian (second 
century AD), whose main character is in a dialogue with Heraclitus and, after making 
references to several fragments of Heraclitus, says in Vitarum Auctio 14: αἰνίγματα 
λέγεις, ὦ οὗτος, ἢ γρίφους συντίθης; ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφεῖς. 
[‘Oh you, do you speak riddles or frame intricate things? For you simply make nothing 
                                                 
62 See for instance Hölscher (1974), 233, who says: ‘His language, too, must be one of paradox, simile, 
and riddle, precisely insofar as it seeks to proclaim the essence of what is.’ ATH, 124, says: ‘And this 
parallel between Heraclitus’ style and the obscurity of the nature of things, between the difficulty of 
understanding him and the difficulty in human perception, is not arbitrary: to speak plainly about such 
a subject would be to falsify it in the telling, for no genuine understanding would be communicated. 
The only hope of “getting through” to the audience is to puzzle and provoke them into reflection. Hence 






clear, as Loxias (Apollo).’] However, two arguments are presented against this 
interpretation of fragment B93 as a model for Heraclitus’ style.63 Barnes says: 
Many modern scholars, it is true, implicitly endorse it; for they find a 
reference to such deliberate obscurity in [B 93] [...] Is not Heraclitus here 
acknowledging, and justifying, his oracular style? But that interpretation 
of B 93 is supported neither by the words of the text itself nor by any 
doxographical comment.64 
Barnes is right to point out that the fragment itself does not imply that Heraclitus likes 
the style of the oracle or that it is obscure in the same way they thought Heraclitus was 
obscure in antiquity. Additionally, it is meaningful that Plutarch (second century AD), 
who is the source of the fragment and who was himself a priest at Delphi, does not 
understand fragment B93 in that way.65 We do not find any other mention of Apollo 
or the Delphic Oracle in the fragments. Nevertheless, Heraclitus does mention the 
Sybil. The Sybil is related to Delphic Apollo, and performs a similar role as the Pythia 
in the Delphic Oracle but not exactly the same.66 However, Heraclitus does not seem 
to praise the voice of the Sybil. Thus, he says in B92: Σίβυλλα δὲ μαινομένωι στόματι 
ἀγέλαστα καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα φθεγγομένη χιλίων ἐτῶν ἐξικνεῖται τῆι 
φωνῆι διὰ τὸν θεόν. [‘The Sybil with frenzied mouth, uttering mirthless, unadorned, 
unperfumed sayings, reaches a thousand years with her voice because of the god.’67] 
Both the voice of the Pythia (or of the oracle at Delphi in general) and the voice of the 
Sybil come from Apollo. Why, then, would Heraclitus acknowledge and follow the 
                                                 
63 Additionally, Marcovich (1967), 51, says it is a narrow interpretation.  
64 Barnes (1983), 101.  
65 Plutarch, De Pythiae Oraculis 404D2–E7: ‘Indeed, if we contemplate the shining constellations, there 
is nothing that shows greater similarity in form, or which, as an instrument, is by nature more obedient 
in use than the moon. Receiving as it does from the sun its brilliant light and intense heat, it sends them 
away to us, not in the state in which they arrived, but, after being merged with it, they change their 
colour and also acquire a different potency. The heat is gone, and the light becomes faint because of 
weakness. I imagine that you are familiar with the saying found in Heraclitus, [B93]. Add to these words, 
which are so well said, the thought that the god of this place employs the prophetic priestess for men’s 
ears just as the sun employs the moon for men’s eyes. For he makes known and reveals his own thoughts, 
but he makes them known through the associated medium of a mortal body and a soul that is unable to 
keep quiet, or, as it yields itself to the One that moves it, to remain of itself unmoved and tranquil, but, 
as though tossed amid and enmeshed in the stirrings and emotions within itself, it makes itself more and 
more restless.’ Trans. Cole Babbitt (1936), my emphasis and brackets. 
66 See Fontenrose (1978), 160–62. 





style of the Pythia and not the Sybil, whose message is also divine and reaches a 
thousand years? 
The second argument states that in Heraclitus’ time the oracle was not 
ambiguous or, at least, ambiguity was not its most important characteristic. Fontenrose 
posits this problem and refers to the fact that Plutarch does not understand the fragment 
in that way either: 
It was not a reputation for ambiguity that Delphic Apollo had, but for truth-
telling. Quintus Cicero, as speaker in Marcus Cicero’s dialogue on 
divination, lauds Delphi’s record for truth over the centuries, and says 
nothing about ambiguities. The famous dictum of Herakleitos [B 93] [...] 
has strangely been taken to refer to the Delphic god’s ambiguities, without 
regard to the context in which Plutarch quotes Herakleitos. His Theon is 
making the point that the Pythia reflects Apollo’s voice as the moon 
reflects sunlight. It is her voice that consultants hear; the god does not 
speak to them, but makes his thoughts and intentions known through the 
Pythia’s body and soul: that is, through her he indicates his meaning.68 
Most scholars agree that the historical oracle in general was not ambiguous, or at least 
say that this was not its most important characteristic, and that its fame for ambiguity 
came later in antiquity.69 But if they are correct and it was the case that ambiguity was 
not a representative characteristic of the Delphic Oracle in Heraclitus’ time, the 
hypothesis that he followed its obscure and ambiguous style would be wrong.70  
                                                 
68 Fontenrose (1978), 238. 
69 Price (1985), 148: ‘The meaning of an oracle was not necessarily obvious [...] This is not to say that 
all oracles were bafflingly obscure or ambiguous, but that it was the responsibility of the recipient to 
ensure that he had interpreted correctly. Failure to do so could lead to disaster.’ Bowden (2005), 49: 
‘While some answers may not be instantly comprehensible, none of them is deliberately ambiguous.’ 
Morgan (1990), 156: ‘Ambiguity is undoubtedly one of the most celebrated traits of the Delphic oracle, 
and even though its extent and significance have been greatly exaggerated, disputes or uncertainties 
about the interpretation of responses, as recorded in ancient sources, are too frequent to allow us to 
dismiss it altogether […] Undoubtedly the majority of responses were straightforward, and, as Joseph 
Fontenrose has stressed, the oracle’s reputation for ambiguity was always overshadowed by its 
reputation for truth, and was anyway a late development.’ 
70 Some scholars do not think this is the case. See Maurizio (2001), 40 n. 14: ‘Not all oracles are 
ambiguous. Of the roughly six hundred oracles attributed to Delphi whose style and content vary greatly 
— some contain straightforward instructions about ritual matters in simple prose, others are in 
hexameter — one-third can be labelled ambiguous. This variety of styles does not require us (pace 
Fontenrose) to cull “authentic” oracles from forgeries. First, the ancients accepted all of these oracles 
as authentic. Second, in a cogent analysis of Delphi’s oracular style (De Pyth. or.), Plutarch explains 
that the generic features of ambiguity and verse while typical of the early Pythias’ oracular style, 
evolved into less poetic and more prosaic responses.’ Also Parker (1985), 301: ‘The recent claim that 
Apollo always said simply “yes” when asked “is it advantageous for me to do x” is therefore 
psychologically implausible. One looks for more art from the most famous of oracular gods […] Often 





We have, nevertheless, the consultation of Croesus in Herodotus, which is 
famously ambiguous: ‘Q: Should I make war on the Persians? And with what army 
should I ally myself? R: If you make war on the Persians [if you cross the Halys (verse 
form)] you will destroy a great realm. Find the strongest Hellenes and ally yourself 
with them (Herodotos).’71 Here the ambiguity was that Croesus did not know which 
realm would be destroyed, his or the Persian, and he understood that he would destroy 
the Persian Empire, when actually the oracle meant that he would destroy his own 
empire.72 Even regarding this case, which is the quintessential case for the oracle’s 
ambiguity, Parke and Wormell say that maybe Herodotus was ‘not pleased by the 
childish ambiguity attributed to Apollo.’73 They continue saying: ‘One cannot doubt 
that the oracle’s reply was strongly favourable without the suspicious ambiguities 
which the later versions contained.’74 In any case, whether Croesus’ response was 
actually ambiguous or not, it is clear that the later reception of the Delphic Oracle in 
literature understood this and other responses of the oracle as intentionally ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, it seems hard to know for certain whether that was the case in the late 
sixth century BC. We know that in Aristotle’s time (fourth century BC) the oracle was 
considered obscure, since he includes Croesus’ case as one of his examples of 
ambiguity.75 However, it is not clear whether Plato considered that the oracle was 
                                                 
with riddles, he was, like the Ifa diviner with his verses, forcing the client to construct by interpretation 
his own response.’ See also Tor (2016), 100: ‘Heraclitus’ style and the challenges it generates for active, 
reflective and careful interpretation — his authorial rhetoric and pronounced use of dense and pregnant 
paradoxes, word plays, analogies, riddles and aphorisms — closely recall Apollo’s oracles […] The 
trope of misinterpretation and mistaken inferences is of course central in the Delphic traditions.’ 
71 Fontenrose (1978), 302.  
72 There is a second ambiguous response to a consultation. When Croesus asked if he would reign for 
long, the oracle replied that ‘But when a mule shall have become king of the Medes, then, sot footed 
Lydian, flee by the pebbly Hermus, do not linger, nor feel shame at being a coward.’ Trans. Parke and 
Wormell (1956), 134. Croesus thought the oracle meant that he would reign forever because a mule 
could never become a king. But the mule was Cyrus, who was of mixed background. Parke and Wormell 
(1956), 134–136, suggest that this was invented later.  
73 Parke and Wormell (1956), 133. Their reason for saying this is that Herodotus quotes most of the 
oracle’s responses in their correct verse form, but the one about Croesus crossing the Halys he only 
paraphrases.  
74 Parke and Wormell (1956), 136. It is possible that Heraclitus took this ambiguous story (probably 
ambiguous in literature because of its impressive and dramatic power but not in real life) as 
representative of the style of the oracle, but it would be strange for Heraclitus to characterise the whole 
process of oracular soothsaying by one example, which seems to be an exception of the general rule.  
75 In rhetoric 3.1407a, Aristotle uses this as an example of either the second or the third rule of clarity, 
i.e. either using general instead of specific terms or of using ambiguous terms. It seems to me that the 
example would make more sense as using a general term, ‘great kingdom’ instead of specifying which 
kingdom. Additionally, ‘kingdom’ is not an ambiguous term in itself. I do not think it could be a ‘genus-





renowned for its ambiguity. It is true that Plato considers that the oracle sometimes is 
riddling.76 However, I believe it is meaningful that in Cratylus 428c Socrates is said to 
‘speak oracles’ (chrēsmōidein) when he describes his account about primary names, 
but the verb does not mean that he is speaking obscurely or in riddles but that what he 
says is truthful and divine. 77  It means that he is inspired by some divinity. 78 
Additionally, similar episodes in the classical period seem to indicate that the oracle 
was characterized by its ability to being always correct and predicting the future, even 
when people thought at some point that it did not.79  
Consequently, if ambiguity does not seem to be the most characteristic feature 
of the oracle for Plato, then it probably was not so for Heraclitus either. But then, to 
what was Heraclitus referring in fragment B93 when he says that the lord of Delphi 
does not speak nor conceals but gives signs (sēmainein) if not to his ambiguity? In 
order to propose my answer to this question, there is an important distinction that needs 
to be explained in respect to the process of the consultation of the oracle. A passage in 
Plato’s Timaeus, and the language he uses when describing how divination works, 
suggests that there is another part of the process of the consultation of the oracle that 
can be understood as obscure or ambiguous, and in which we find sings that need an 
interpretation. In 71e3–72b5 he says: 
                                                 
76 Most of the times Plato mentions Delphi, and oracles in general, he refers to its inspired and divine 
nature. However, in Apology 20e–21b and Charmides 164e9, he characterises a response, that Socrates 
is the wisest person, and the inscription ‘know yourself’ as riddling, respectively.  
77 It is important to point out here that Plato introduces Cratylus as a disciple of Heraclitus. This could 
give some extra force to the argument that for Heraclitus the oracle was not obscure but divine, since 
his disciple did not take it as obscure. However, as mentioned in section 2.1, the relation between 
Heraclitus and Cratylus is complicated. 
78 After Socrates’ exposition Cratylus says to Socrates in 428c: ‘Your oracular utterances — whether 
inspired by Euthyphro or by some other muse who has long inhabited your own mind without you 
knowing about it — seem to be pretty much spoken after my own mind.’ Trans. Reeve in Cooper (1997). 
Greek text: καὶ ἐμοὶ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς φαίνηι κατὰ νοῦν χρησμωιδεῖν, εἴτε παρ᾽ Εὐθύφρονος 
ἐπίπνους γενόμενος, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις Μοῦσα πάλαι σε ἐνοῦσα ἐλελήθει. 
79 See Griffin (2006), 51–52, about including prophesies of the Oracle as a literary device in tragedy 
and Herodotus, he says: ‘All these supernatural devices, both in tragedy and in Herodotus, have a two-
fold function. On the one hand, they establish the actions depicted as significant: not just something that 
happened, they were predicted, dreaded, evaded, and in the event came ineluctably to pass. Secondly, 
they show the interest of the divine and illuminate its workings.’ Following this idea, people did not 
think the oracle was wrong when Croesus was defeated, since in truth the oracle had been misinterpreted. 
The same can be said in other cases. For instance, Oedipus thought the oracle was wrong and he would 
not kill his father and marry his mother, when in reality he had misinterpreted the oracle because he did 





It comes as a sign that the god gave divination to human folly. For no one 
in their right mind has inspired and truthful divination, but only when they 
have altered their power of understanding having been bound in a dream 
or through sickness, or by some divine inspiration. However, it belongs to 
someone in their senses to understand and remember the things said by the 
state of divination and possession, whether in sleep or while awake. As 
well as to analyse all the visions that are seen in account of what and for 
whom they are a sign (sēmainein) of a future, past or present good or evil. 
But it is not the task of the one who was, and continues to be, mad to judge 
the things seen and heard by themselves. But as it was well said long ago, 
to conduct their own affairs and to know themselves belongs only to 
someone sound of mind. For this reason, it is customary to set a class of 
interpreters (prophētai) as judges in the inspired divinations. They are 
called ‘diviners’ (manteis) by some people who are completely ignorant of 
the fact that they are interpreters (prophētai) of completely enigmatic 
words and visions, and should not be called ‘diviners’ but most correctly 
‘interpreters of things divined’.80 
As reconstructed by Parke and Wormell, and registered in other works, the standard 
procedure for the consultation of the oracle was the following:81 the priest would read 
the question of the enquirer to the Pythia, then she would enter her trance and describe 
the prophetic images and words to the priest.82 He would interpret her words and give 
a response to the enquirer. In Plato’s passage, the ‘completely enigmatic words and 
visions’ are those of the inspired person, i.e. the Pythia in the case of the Delphic 
Oracle. Then, what is ambiguous or obscure is not the final message, the response in 
verse to the enquirer, but the signs produced and described by the Pythia that need to 
be interpreted by the priest in order to give that response to the enquirer. The same is 
the case for divination with birds, or ornithomancy: there are some markings in the 
                                                 
80 Trans. Zeyl in Cooper (1997) with modifications. See an analysis of this passage in Nagy (1989), 24–
29. For madness in this process, see Phaedrus 244b1–d5.  
81 See Parke and Wormell (1956), 33, for the description of this part of the consultation, and 17–45 for 
the entire process. The role of the interpreter is mentioned as well in Euripides, Ion 100, 369, and 413. 
Plutarch (De Pythiae Oraculis 397c), however, says that ‘as a matter of fact, the voice is not that of the 
god, nor the utterance of it, nor the diction, nor the meter, but all these are the woman’s.’ (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι 
θεοῦ ἡ γῆρυς οὐδ᾽ ὁ φθόγγος οὐδ᾽ ἡ λέξις οὐδὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀλλὰ τῆς γυναικός). This could be understood 
as a change in the procedure in Plutarch’s time.  
82 The terminology and parts of the procedure changed over time. Nagy (1989), 27, says that this is the 
case in particular in the diction of poetry, ‘where the prophecy of the mantis and the poetry formulated 
by the prophētēs are as yet one: there are instances where the word prophētēs designates the poet as the 
one who declares the voice of the muse […] A particularly striking example is Pindar fr. 150: “be a 





livers of birds, which are obscure and confusing signs for regular people but not for 
the experienced interpreter, as Plato himself says after the passage quoted above.83 
Nagy explains this process very clearly and relates it to fragment B93 and 
Timaeus 71e3–72b5. He says: 
As Heraclitus declares, the god at Delphi neither legei, ‘speaks, nor kruptei, 
‘conceals’: rather, he sēmainei, ‘indicates’. The verb sēmainō is derived 
from the noun sēma, which means ‘sign’ or ‘signal’ and which in turn 
derives from a concept of inner vision. Correspondingly, as we have seen 
the word theōros means literally ‘he who sees (root hor-) a vision (thea)’. 
Thus the god Apollo of the Oracle at Delphi, when he ‘indicates’, is 
conferring an inner vision upon the theōros, the one who consults him. 
Both the encoder and the decoder are supposedly operating on the basis of 
an inner vision. Greek usage makes it clear that the prophētēs, who 
communicates the words of Apollo to those who consult the god, likewise 
sēmainei, ‘indicates’ (cf. Herodotus 8.37.2). 
In Greek usage, someone sēmainei, ‘indicates’, that is, ‘makes a sēma’, 
when he or she speaks from a superior vantage point, as when a scout goes 
to the top a hill and then comes back down to indicate what can be seen 
from there (Herodotus 7.192.1, 7.219.1). By extension, someone ‘makes a 
sēma’ when he or she speaks from a metaphorically superior vantage point, 
as when an authoritative person makes a pronouncement that arbitrates 
between contending points of view (Herodotus 1.5.3). But the ultimate 
voice of authority belongs to the god of the Oracle at Delphi, whose 
supreme vantage point confers upon him the knowledge of all things, even 
the precise number of all grains of sand in the universe (Herodotus 
1.47.3).84 
Plato’s passage and Nagy’s point to the same idea: in fragment B93 Heraclitus is 
referring to the process in which the god Apollo communicates a message to the Pythia, 
not to the responses given to people consulting the oracle. The subject of fragment B93 
is the lord at Delphi, not the oracle or the Pythia; it speaks about the actions of the god 
when he communicates a message and not, necessarily, about the message that the 
                                                 
83 Timaeus 72 b5–72c1: ‘This then explains why the liver’s nature is what it is, and why it is situated in 
the region we say — it is for the purpose of divination. Now while each creature is still alive, an organ 
of this sort will display marks (σημεῖα) that are fairly clear, but once its life has gone, the organ turns 
blind and its divinations are too faint to display any clear marks (σημαίνειν).’ Trans. Zeyl in Cooper 
(1997) with modifications. Greek text: ἡ μὲν οὖν φύσις ἥπατος διὰ ταῦτα τοιαύτη τε καὶ ἐν τόπωι ὧι 
λέγομεν πέφυκε, χάριν μαντικῆς: καὶ ἔτι μὲν δὴ ζῶντος ἑκάστου τὸ τοιοῦτον σημεῖα ἐναργέστερα ἔχει, 
στερηθὲν δὲ τοῦ ζῆν γέγονε τυφλὸν καὶ τὰ μαντεῖα ἀμυδρότερα ἔσχεν τοῦ τι σαφὲς σημαίνειν. 





Pythia or the priest interpret as a response (unlike fragment B92, where the subject is 
the Sybil and her voice).  
Plutarch, who is the source of both B92 and B93, sees the matter in the same 
way. First, Apollo does not speak through the Pythia, as in possessing her and speaking 
with her mouth or voice (De Defectu Oraculorum 414e); the god does not compose 
the message, but the voice, utterance, meter, and ‘handwriting’ are of the Pythia (De 
Pythiae Oraculis 397b). Second, the god sends his message, an inner vision, which 
presumably has a divine form or format, through a medium, which distorts the message 
or adapts it to the human realm (to ‘men’s ears’ De Pythiae Oraculis 404d), in the 
same way that the moon distorts and adapts the light of the sun (404d), and in the same 
way whirlpools move in circles while keeping afloat objects that would naturally sink 
(404f). Third, the resulting message can only be expressed in what the nature of the 
medium allows (404f).  
In sum, when examining the meaning of fragment B93, we need to acknowledge 
that Heraclitus may be referring to three different messages or stages of a message. 1) 
The divine (Apollo’s) message, which knows everything and is precise in its 
foretelling. 2) The visions and sounds experienced and expressed by the Pythia, which 
represent the result of putting a message, which is originally in a divine format, through 
a human medium. 3) The interpretation of those visions and sounds rendered into 
Greek and (before Plutarch) in verse, which correspond to the response given to the 
enquirer.  
The original message of the god is perfect in itself, but when it goes through the 
Pythia it takes a human form, which results in the images that the priest has to 
interpret.85 Indeed, what she says requires interpretation, hence the need of a prophētēs, 
but the signs and the sēmainei do not refer to the final response in verse, as we have it 
in Croesus’ tale, but to the message that the Pythia speaks out and the priest, the 
prophētēs, has to interpret.86  
                                                 
85 In a more modern analogy, the message of the god is like a PDF file that you open using the Notepad. 
You get some strange text that does not make much sense; you can never see the original format but 
with practise many of its parts could be read by someone experienced in this kind of texts.  






In my interpretation of Heraclitus, and regarding B93 in particular, this can be 
understood as the difference between a divine language (the perfectly correct language 
of the logos if you will) and a human language. The logos corresponds to the original 
message of Apollo: the truth about the cosmos. The lord at Delphi does not tell this 
message to us in Greek or human language but uses the medium of the Pythia (or a 
bird’s liver in other cases) to ‘make a sēma’. The result of this message in the human 
realm depends on the nature of the medium; for the Pythia it is some noises and visions, 
and for the liver are other markings that are in accordance to the liver’s nature. The 
use of the verb sēmainein, means that the message requires interpretation because the 
god does not legei (he does not pronounce the logos of the message), he does not 
describe in Greek, or human language.87 The logos cannot be simply described, and 
this feature is what Heraclitus follows of B93; he agrees with the idea that the divine 
message from Apollo cannot be described (legein), and that the only way we can refer 
to it is indirectly. Heraclitus does not follow the Pythia or the priests at Delphi, he 
follows the idea that the divine message cannot be put directly in human language, and 
the idea that the divine (the logos) sends signs that tell the truth about the cosmos (be 
it in the form of the Pythia’s visions or the bird’s liver) to a properly trained ear or eye.  
2.3. What can be communicated? 
Aristotle tells us in Metaphysics 1010a11–13 that Cratylus took Heraclitus’ flux theory 
so far that the only way he could refer to physical things was not by using their names 
but by pointing his finger at them (sēmainein?). Our language was not good enough to 
describe a world that is constantly changing. As Plato and Aristotle noticed, one of the 
main problems of Heraclitus’ theory of flux is not the fact that things are constantly 
changing per se but that our language and knowledge do not work correctly when this 
happens.88 If Heraclitus thought that the logos could not be communicated to others 
and his alleged follower, Cratylus, as well as Plato and Aristotle, thought that the flux 
theory implied impossibility of communication through language, does that mean that 
                                                 
87 In this regard, the response of the oracle, even when obscure as in Croesus examples, always legei, 
describes a message. Perhaps the meaning requires interpretation but it is not the same as proper signs 
in a bird’s liver or in the strange visions and noises of the Pythia.  





Heraclitus thought that language was useless altogether? In this section I propose that 
for Heraclitus language has two principal functions. The first one is to lead people 
astray and indoctrinate them into false knowledge. The second function is to direct 
people towards the logos, first by making them recognise that they do not have correct 
understanding and, second, by showing them the correct way. 
2.3.1. Polymathiē vs nous  
The complexity of the logos and the limitations of human language are not the only 
reasons people fail to understand the logos. One important cause of this failure is 
people themselves.89 Heraclitus complains that they blindly follow the poets and other 
people considered wise, who in reality are not wise and do not understand the truth 
either. This is stated clearly by Heraclitus in B104: ‘What intelligence or 
understanding do they have? They follow popular bards and treat the crowd as their 
instructor, not realizing that the many are base, while few are noble.’90 The historian 
Polybius tells us in 4.40.2–3 (=Heraclitus A23) that the reason Heraclitus’ criticises 
the poets is that they lead people into ‘taking unreliable sources as authorities for 
controversial questions.’91 This means, among other things, that the poets and other 
authors managed to communicate what they thought to other people. Of course, they 
did not communicate to others the logos or true knowledge but something else, which 
may not be worth communicating at all. However, the fact that they influenced or 
persuaded them into believing what they themselves believed means that it is possible 
to transmit some sort of information using language.  
The difference between what is worth knowing and what is not seems to be 
represented by the words polymathiē and nous.92 Heraclitus puts together many poets, 
philosophers, and historians, in that they all have the incorrect kind of knowledge: they 
have polymathiē, when what we are supposed to acquire is nous. He says in B40:  
B40: πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ 
Πυθαγόρην, αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον. 
                                                 
89 The role of people and their souls will be treated in chapter 3. 
90 Trans. TEGP, Greek text: τίς αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; δήμων ἀοιδοῖσιν ἕπονται καὶ διδασκάλωι χρείωνται 
ὁμίλωι οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί. 
91 Trans. TEGP. 
92 For an analysis of these two concepts and fragments B40 and B129, see Granger (2004b) and Huffman 






Learning many things does not teach understanding. Else it would have 
taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, as well as Xenophanes and Hecataeus.93  
The full range of the word polymathiē is not clear. However, at a first glance, 
Heraclitus seems to be telling us that the knowledge of many things does not bring 
with it the possession of understanding (nous). Pythagoras was the best representative 
of this kind of approach to knowledge. In B81 he is called the ‘chief of all impostors’, 
and B129 provides us with more details about the meaning of polymathiē: ‘Pythagoras, 
son of Mnesarchus, practiced inquiry more than all men, and making a selection of 
others’ writings, he invented his own brand of wisdom: information-gathering, 
fraud!’94 Nevertheless, the principal error of Pythagoras was not enquiring into many 
things, but gathering information and copying theories from others.95  
We can communicate some kind of knowledge, which we could understand as 
‘facts’ or ‘raw information’ perhaps, but in order to acquire a true understanding of 
how this facts work we cannot blindly listen to the theories of others; we need to 
investigate them ourselves. Xenophanes had a similar view about the kind of 
knowledge his fellow Greeks learned from the poets and from the tradition in general, 
and accuses Homer and Hesiod of having taught false things about the gods to people 
(Xenophanes B10, B11, and B12).96 For Heraclitus, there is an important connection 
that others fail to understand, and which is related to the unity of opposites. This is 
explicitly stated in B57, where he says: ‘The teacher of the multitude is Hesiod; they 
                                                 
93 Trans. TEGP.  
94 Trans. TEGP, and Greek text: Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων 
καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑωυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. 
95 On fragments B129 and B40 see Marcovich (1969), 61–70; Huffman (2008); and TEGP, 187. I agree 
with Marcovich that the people mentioned here fail to understand because they have not achieved 
understanding of the true logos, and with TEGP, 187, that Pythagoras’ false knowledge is the result of 
‘a kind of copy-and-paste job, without originality.’ However, I think the main point, as I will argue, is 
that you cannot acquire this kind of knowledge from other people at all, not even from Heraclitus himself; 
you need to reach out and find it yourself by experiencing the world. For Heraclitus, enquiry (historiē) 
is a good practise, as it befits people who are interested in wisdom (philosophoi) in B35. See contra 
Granger (2004b), 249. Some scholars take B35 as ironic, for instance Guthrie (1962), 417. For enquiry 
as personal experience/sense perception, see section 3.2.1. 
96 Even though there are many similarities in their approach to the problems of communication, true 
knowledge, and divinity, Heraclitus still includes Xenophanes in those who did not understand. I would 
conjecture that Xenophanes’ scepticism about divine knowledge and his views on divinity were seen 
by Heraclitus as lack of understanding. TEGP, 187, says: ‘It is surprising to see Heraclitus attack 
Xenophanes, who likewise expresses a hostility to mythological accounts and who participates in the 
Ionian project — and shares a contempt for Pythagoras and Homeric ideas. Perhaps it is his popular 





believe he has the greatest knowledge — who did not comprehend day and night: for 
they are one.’97 For Heraclitus, Hesiod is spreading incorrect information and theories 
about the day and the night. This is because he treats them as separate and opposite 
events, when in Heraclitus’ view day and night are one totality:98 two sides of the same 
coin. Even though they are never present at the same time, they should be understood 
together.99 
Additionally, those things that we learn without understanding are only 
appearance, they seem to be (dokein) that which they are not. Heraclitus shows us that 
appearance is what most famous people can present to us in B28a: ‘The most illustrious 
man knows and maintains illusions.’100 All these false wise people are expert teachers 
of falsehoods. They raise us and teach us many things that appear to be truth but are 
not. The main problem of this transmission of wrong knowledge is that it happens 
without our awareness: for Heraclitus, we are being indoctrinated with incorrect beliefs 
without knowing it. That is the main idea in fragment B56:  
B56: ἐξηπάτηνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν 
παραπλησίως Ὁμήρωι, ὃς ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος πάντων. 
ἐκεῖνόν τε γὰρ παῖδες φθεῖρας κατακτείνοντες ἐξηπάτησαν εἰπόντες· ὅσα 
εἴδομεν καὶ ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα ἀπολείπομεν, ὅσα δὲ οὔτε εἴδομεν οὔτ᾽ 
ἐλάβομεν, ταῦτα φέρομεν.  
 
Men are deceived into wisdom about appearances, similarly to Homer, 
who was considered the wisest of all Greeks. For children who had killed 
some lice deceived him with a riddle: What we saw and caught, we leave; 
what we did not see and catch, we carry with us.101  
                                                 
97 Trans. TEGP, and Greek text: διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, 
ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν. 
98  See Mourelatos (1973), 34. Also Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1235a25–29 (=Heraclitus A22), 
characterises similarly Heraclitus’ critique of Homer, as a failure in understanding the unity in opposites: 
‘Heraclitus criticizes the poet who said, “would that strife might perish from among gods and men” 
[Homer Iliad 18.107]; for there would not be harmony without high and low notes, nor living things 
without female and male, which are contraries.’ Trans. TEGP, his brackets.  
99 See my analysis of the doctrine of unity of opposites in fragment B67 and B88 in section 2.1.2. 
100 Trans. TEGP, and Greek text: δοκέοντα ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει φυλάσσειν. Heraclitus here plays 
with the root dok-. In dokimōtatos it means ‘reputed’, ‘famous’, but in dokeonta it implies subjectivity, 
what appears to others or their opinion. He is most likely referring to the poets and other famous wise 
people of the time. 
101 Trans. TEGP, with modifications. I follow Graham and Marcovich (1967), 82, in that Homer was 
only considered wise but was not truly wise, because B42 indicates that for Heraclitus Homer should 
not be taught and is not a good educator. Then, in B56 Homer is not the wisest, but only considered the 





Under the idea that we are indoctrinated by other people with incorrect or incomplete 
knowledge, we can understand this riddle as follows: everyone, even people 
considered wise, like Homer, are tricked into believing things which seem true but are 
not. This works just in the same way as the children killing lice. On one hand, all the 
incorrect knowledge that we find in ourselves, the lice we catch, we get rid of and we 
stop considering true: we do not carry that pest with us. On the other hand, the incorrect 
knowledge that we do not see in our minds represents the lice that we do not catch and 
that we carry with us: we carry that pest with us. Everyone is deceived into believing 
wisdom about appearances because we carry this false wisdom without even knowing 
we do. It has been there with us since we were taught about it.  
With language and communication comes the power of indoctrination, but also 
of education. This is central for Heraclitus’ critique of the tradition and of his 
contemporaries. All those bad teachers are one of the main causes people fail to 
understand the logos. As we will see in the last chapter, the main problem with tradition 
is not only that it provides us with wrong knowledge about the divine and the cosmos 
but also that it stops us from looking for the true logos.  
2.3.2. The functions of language 
We turn now to the problem of how Heraclitus understands and uses language. I start 
by recalling that Heraclitus knew that he could not tell others the logos directly. If 
language cannot transmit the logos and the truth about the world, and its only function 
is seemingly instructing people into believing false theories, then what is the use of 
language in Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrine? What does it communicate? 
Additionally, why does he speak about the logos and try to tell people how to 
understand it, when they will always fail to understand it from him? Heraclitus 
                                                 
have anything that indicates that the adjective is being predicated in an ironic or dialectical way. In 
addition, Heraclitus seems to agree with Homer in B29 (‘The best choose one thing above all, the 
everlasting fame of mortals; the many gorge themselves like cattle.’ Trans. TEGP). Additionally, 
exapataō + pros is not a common construction but Hippolytus (source of B56) uses it again in De 
Consummatione Mundi 24.3: καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖ ὕπουλος ὢν καὶ δόλιος καὶ πάντας θέλων 
ἐξαπατῆσαι πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι αὐτὸν βασιλέα. ‘And [he] makes everything such by being putrid and 
deceitful, and wishing to deceive everyone into making him king.’ I assume, then, that Heraclitus means 
something like ‘deceiving people into believing something which appears to be but is not correct’: 
wisdom about appearances. See B54 (ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείσσων.) where the same word, 






considered that his predecessors and most wise people of the time used language to 
indoctrinate, and hence drove people away from the true logos. But is there any other 
way to use language, even when it cannot communicate the logos to others directly? I 
think we can safely assume that Heraclitus thought that he did not indoctrinate people 
into false knowledge, and that his usage of language did not lead to indoctrination into 
falsehood. I want to suggest that there are other ways in which language can be used, 
and recognize three main uses in Heraclitus. First, language can be used to show what 
the logos is not. Second, it can communicate or indicate the right way to the logos. 
And third, language can have a shocking effect, i.e. it can be used to surprise and shock 
us out of our complacency.102 
1) Language can show us what is not, what does not exist or is not true. In 
Heraclitus this mentioning of the inexistent takes two forms. A very concrete one, 
namely, he tells us what views are wrong and should not be followed. As we saw in 
the previous section, many of the fragments are devoted to communicating the idea 
that the traditional ways of understanding wisdom and knowledge are not correct. This 
simple idea, that what someone else says is not correct is perhaps the first message we 
need to get from him. What others have taught us needs to be contradicted and 
identified in ourselves as an incorrect belief, otherwise we will not have the motivation 
to look for the true knowledge. We need to catch the lice that we have not caught and 
stop carrying them with us. Additionally, in a less concrete way, saying that something 
is not the logos in the end tells something about the true logos. By saying what the 
logos is not, by denying that it has certain characteristics, Heraclitus is indirectly 
telling us what the logos is.  
2) Language is useful, as well, for the purpose of showing the correct path or the 
way to the logos. Heraclitus realized that he could not tell people the logos directly, 
but he developed an indirect way of showing it. This does not mean that he is hiding 
it as message in his fragments.103 This logos cannot be described but you can direct 
people to it, you can show them the way they have to travel in order to get at the logos. 
                                                 
102 See Lloyd (1966) on different modes of expression in ancient Greek philosophy, and Lloyd (1966) 
90–102, for Heraclitus in particular. 
103 As argued in section 2.2.3., some scholars propose that Heraclitus hides his true message and that 
we can decipher it in a way similar to an allegoric interpretation. See Mouraviev (1996) and third part 





Marcus Aurelius (4.46=B71) reports that Heraclitus said that ‘One should also bear in 
mind the man who forgets where the road leads.’ You cannot travel the road for 
someone else, you cannot replace them in the journey yourself. They have to achieve 
the goal themselves. Just as Heraclitus cannot tell people the logos directly but can 
show them how to get knowledge and understanding of it. He provides training and 
guidance for people interested in finding it. The first and clearer way to show the way 
towards the logos is fragment B50, where he invites people not to listen to him but to 
the logos. There are several fragments dedicated to give advice to people on how to 
get to this knowledge. For instance, fragments B35 and B55 invite people who are 
curious to investigate into many things and to experience them by themselves with 
their own eyes and ears (and sense perception in general). We find as well in the 
fragments some indications about adapting their souls in accordance to the logos.104 
Additionally, just as in the negative method of the first case, by telling us not to go in 
one direction, Heraclitus is showing us indirectly the correct path. 
There is another technique with which Heraclitus shows us the way: by using 
intentional ambiguity. As argued above, the use of allegory, word play, figures of 
speech and other particular uses of syntax and grammar, as well as what Frankel calls 
Heraclitus’ ‘thought pattern’, play the role of pointing to the truth or the logos 
indirectly.105 This kind of language, familiar to the poets and to the tradition, is useful 
when trying to describe something that cannot be described directly. While the first 
form of showing the way is more related to the kind of training and preparation that 
someone needs to undertake to understand the logos, this other form directs the mind 
of the person towards this understanding, it tells them what to expect of the divine and 
the logos, using analogies as a way to compare them to more mundane and day to day 
experiences. 
3) The third way in which language is functional is the use of paradoxes, and 
shocking statements and arguments in general. The objective of these is to make people 
doubt their current beliefs, and make them look for a new solution to the questions that 
the previous beliefs solved. I think Robinson’ expression for describing this 
                                                 
104 This is the topic of chapter 3. 





characteristic of Heraclitus is perfect: ‘philosophical shock-treatment’. 106  As the 
Sophists noticed later — contra Gorgias —,  language does not only transmit 
information and persuade people into believing arguments, it can also influence and 
change people behaviour without the need to transmit information or anything else 
whatsoever. I believe Heraclitus uses this technique as well. He probably told people 
they were wrong many times unsuccessfully. However, perhaps when presented with 
what he says in some fragments, their reaction was more interesting.  
Let us for instance take a look again at fragment B48, ‘The name of the bow is 
Life, but its work is death.’107 As a previous analysis shows, the first thing to notice is 
the wordplay in the word bios, which can mean ‘bow’ or ‘life’. However, the ‘shocking’ 
part of the fragment is that the opposition of life and death is present in the same object. 
I agree with Robinson that Heraclitus is showing in a way a feature of reality, namely 
the unity in opposition. However, what was most important was the effect on the 
listener rather than the contents of the fragments itself. Someone used to the traditional 
epics would see a clear division between the concepts of life and death. Fragment B48 
forces the hearer to think how these two opposite qualities are present in the image of 
a bow: in general a bow can be used to hunt where it kills an animal to procure food 
for a person’s survival, or, for war, where it kills an enemy to avoid its owner’s death. 
In either case, in order to save or keep life it has to produce death.108 The same object 
is cause for life and death.109 Perhaps a pun with the name of the object is not enough 
to argue there is a unity of opposites in the bow itself, but the fragment forces the 
listener to question their idea of life and death as separate and unrelated concepts, and, 
by shocking them out of the status quo, invites them to look for a more general 
understanding of the unity in opposites.110 
                                                 
106 Robinson (1991), 485: ‘As I understand him, Heraclitus has it as part of his goal to use philosophical 
shock-treatment to get across to a sceptical public the notion that the world's essential unity and 
changelessness are of greater moment than its real though inconsequential multiplicity and 
changeability. One way of doing this is to overstate, after the manner of extravagant advertising, features 
of the real that might lead the reader to this conclusion.’  
107 Trans. TEGP, and Greek text: τῶι οὖν τόξωι ὄνομα ΒΙΟΣ, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος. 
108 For the use of polarity in early Greek thought in general see Lloyd (1966), and in particular for the 
use of polar expressions in Heraclitus see Lloyd (1966), 98–101. For the concept of the bow in 
Heraclitus’ thought and style, see Vieira (2013). 
109 On the opposition of life and death, see Hussey (1991). 





In Meno 79e9–80b7, Plato presents us with a very similar image when Meno 
describes Socrates as a torpedo fish: 
Meno: Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always 
in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now 
I think you are bewitching me and beguiling me, simply putting me under 
a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, 
in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for 
it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you 
now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my 
tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. Yet I have made many 
speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very 
good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is.111 
In this analogy, Socrates does not convince people of his truth but uses language to 
make them question their own knowledge, so that they afterwards can look and try to 
find a proper solution to the questions they thought they had an answer for.112 I believe 
Heraclitus in the same way used paradoxes and other methods to shock people out of 
their traditional ideas, just as other early philosophers and sophist did, for instance 
Zeno. Perhaps this is what Heraclitus meant with fragment B11, ‘every four-footed 
beast is driven to pasture by blows.’113 Even though eating grass is necessary and 
pleasurable for them, you do not drive your herd to pasture by telling them how 
convenient this is for them, because they do not understand the whole concept.114 You 
move them there by force and other means and once they get there they understand 
                                                 
111 Trans. Grube in Cooper (1997). For an analysis of this passage in Plato see Scott (2006), 69–74. 
112 Plato explains the purpose or the good result about the torpedo fish’s shock in Meno 84b5–c9: 
‘Socrates: Have we done him any harm by making him perplexed and numb as the torpedo fish does? 
Meno: I do not think so. 
Socrates: Indeed, we have probably achieved something relevant to finding out how matters stand, for 
now, as he does not know, he would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could easily make 
many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double size and said that it must have a base 
twice as long. 
Meno: So it seems. 
Socrates: Do you think that before he would have tried to find out that which he thought he knew though 
he did not, before he fell into perplexity and realized he did not know and longed to know? 
Meno: I do not think so, Socrates. 
Socrates: Has he then benefitted from being numbed? 
Meno: I think so. 
Socrates: Look then how he will come out of his perplexity while searching along with me.’ Trans. 
Grube in Cooper (1997). 
113 Trans. TEGP, Greek text: πᾶν γὰρ ἑρπετὸν πληγῆι νέμεται. 
114 This idea is supported by fragment B29, where Heraclitus compares the many with cattle. ‘The best 






about the grass and its benefits. In the same way, people who are unable to directly 
understand the logos have to be driven to it by intellectual blows.  
Nevertheless, there is an important difference in the reasons for doing this in 
Socrates and in Heraclitus. The former shocks people because he genuinely does not 
have an answer to the question, and wishes to free others from having the wrong 
answer. He says later in 80c2–80d1: ‘[Soc.:] Now if the torpedo fish is itself numb and 
so makes others numb, then I resemble it, but not otherwise, for I myself do not have 
the answer when I perplex others, but I am more perplexed than anyone when I cause 
perplexity in others.’115 Heraclitus, on the other hand, has the correct answer himself. 
He cannot tell them the truth, or the logos, because they do not understand it, and 
language and the characteristics of the logos make this impossible. In a practical sense, 
however, they both serve the same purpose; they force people to question their beliefs 
and, as we will see in the next chapter, to look for answers themselves without blindly 
relying on traditional sources of knowledge.  
2.4. Conclusion 
Heraclitus inherited some concerns about language from other poets and philosophers. 
The most important one might be that, even though the gods attain it, truth is of a 
different nature and perhaps unreachable by us. Cratylus suggests that correct language 
is also important when it comes to knowing and understanding nature. The exact 
relation between Cratylus and Heraclitus is not clear. However, in the fragments we 
can see that Heraclitus is concerned with the problem of naming and of the correctness 
of names in general. This concern about language is also present in his own writing 
style. Heraclitus was obscure, sometimes accidentally, but many times intentionally 
and with a particular objective in mind: he wanted to show us something else. In my 
interpretation this does not mean, however, that he hid his true message or the logos, 
in the same way as we have it in the Homeric allegorists of the time. Heraclitus 
criticised his predecessors and contemporaries because they taught people false things. 
Given that polymathiē can be transmitted but not nous, and by listening to others we 
might by indoctrinated into falsehoods, with language and communication comes the 
                                                 





power of education. The logos itself is perhaps not susceptible to be taught in this same 
way, but there are other ways in which language and communication are useful for 
Heraclitus’ doctrine. First, language can be used to show us what the correct logos is 
not. Second, by analogy and guiding, it can indicate the way to the logos. And third, 
by the use of paradox and different figures of speech, language can have a shocking 





Chapter 3: Soul, sense perception, and 
understanding 
In previous chapters I argued that true knowledge is achieved by understanding the 
logos. However, this logos cannot be communicated to others directly, but only 
indirectly, and it has to be reached by each person individually. Examining the role of 
the soul and sense perception in understanding the logos will be the main purpose of 
this chapter. As previously mentioned, the word psychē is present in several of the 
fragments, but how we are supposed to understand it is not an easy question, and one 
that has been debated by several scholars. What we can be certain of is that the soul 
has a new and central role in Heraclitus’ philosophical doctrine.1  
In the first section, I outline the new concept of soul that can be found in 
Heraclitus’ doctrine and deduced from his fragments, which I argue suggests three 
main characteristics: 1) that soul is an element or stuff in the cosmos, 2) that soul is a 
central faculty attributed with functions inside the body, and 3) that in our souls is 
where our personal logoi, as I will call them, are found. In the second section, we will 
approach the problem of sense perception, how it works in Heraclitus’ doctrine, the 
role of the soul in the correct functioning of this process, and its importance. I argue 
that sense perception is how Heraclitus sees us acquiring understanding of the logos. 
However, we can only comprehend this logos after investigating ourselves and ridding 
ourselves of mistaken logoi, and by approaching the world though with a soul having 
been freed from false descriptions of the world. 
3.1. A new concept of soul 
Before Heraclitus, in the literary picture found in the early epic poetry, there are two 
ideas connected to the word psychē.2 First, it is mainly that without which one ceases 
                                                 
1 For this purpose, I take into consideration the modern commentaries on Heraclitus in general, but in 
particular for psychē in Heraclitus, see Nussbaum (1972), Claus (1981), Robinson (1986), Wilcox 
(1991), Schofield (1991), Laks (1999), Betegh (2007), and Mansfeld (2015).  
2 For psychē in Homer, see Onians (1951), Darcus-Sullivan (1979), Bremmer (1983), Clarke (1999), 





to have life. And, second, psychē is an image of the deceased in episodes when we 
hear about the souls that dwell in the house of Hades, and when the living have contact 
with dead relatives or friends.3 However, as pointed out by Nussbaum, this conception 
of the soul differs from later ideas in two ways.4 First, the life-giving characteristic is 
only mentioned when the soul is said to leave the body at the moment of death or when 
there is an imminent risk of death.5 Second, the soul is not considered a central organ 
that has control over different functions of the body, but just one among several other 
organs (thymos, kēr, frēn, noos).6 Consequently, the Homeric soul is never described 
as having any specific functions within the body.7 Soul, then, in the epics is primarily 
a condition for life, of which we only hear in negative contexts, i.e. of which we only 
know that its absence means death, and that it represents an image of dead people.8 
In early Presocratic philosophy, some mentions of the word psychē indicate a 
development towards the later concept of internal soul, and later reports also suggest 
that from Thales onwards soul started to be a philosophical concern.9 Perhaps the most 
meaningful one is a comment regarding Pythagoras’ theory of the reincarnation of the 
soul. According to Xenophanes’ fragment B7: ‘And once when he [Pythagoras] was 
passing a puppy being beaten they say he took pity and said this word: “Cease beating 
                                                 
3 These episodes are found in the nekyia in Odyssey 11, in the ‘second nekyia’ in Odyssey 24, some 
remarks of Circe in Odyssey 10, and in Iliad 23.65–107, when the soul of Patroclus comes to Achilles 
in a dream. On the authenticity of the second Nekyia, see Clarke (1999), 225–228.  
4 See Nussbaum (1972), 1–3; Schofield (1991), 22. 
5 For instance, Iliad 16.505: τοῖο δ᾽ ἅμα ψυχήν τε καὶ ἔγχεος ἐξέρυσ᾽ αἰχμήν [‘And at the one moment 
he drew forth the spear-point and the soul of Sarpedon.’ Trans. Murray (1924)]. Also Iliad 14.518–519: 
ψυχὴ δὲ κατ᾽ οὐταμένην ὠτειλὴν ἔσσυτ᾽ ἐπειγομένη [‘And his soul sped hastening through the stricken 
wound.’ Trans. Murray (1924)]. And Achilles puts his soul at risk in Iliad 9.322: οὐδέ τί μοι περίκειται, 
ἐπεὶ πάθον ἄλγεα θυμῶι αἰεὶ ἐμὴν ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος πολεμίζειν. [‘Neither have I aught of profit 
herein, that I suffered woes at heart, ever staking my life in fight.’ Trans. Murray (1924)]. The soul 
leaving the body can sometimes represent, most likely metaphorically, states of unconsciousness. See 
Cairns. (2003), 46 and n. 23. 
6 On these organs see Onians (1951), 23–25, and Clarke (1999), 53–55. It is important to note that 
thymos plays a role similar to psychē, in that its departure from the body means the death of a person 
(Iliad 13.653–655). However, it is never said that thymos goes to Hades. And unlike psychē, the gods 
are credited with thymos (Iliad 21.417). On thymos and its relation to psychē, see Onians (1951), 43–50 
and 94–96, respectively. 
7 See Cairns (2003), 50: ‘It remains true that ψυχή is credited with no active function in the living person, 
and that it engages the poet’s attention only when its loss is threatened.’ See also the psychē entry by 
Cairns in Finkelberg (2011).  
8 In Hesiod, most of the allusions to psychē are similar to those in Homer. Cf. Works and Days 686; 
Scutum 151, 173, 254; and fragments 76.7, 204.100, and 204.139. 
9 See Aristotle’s comment on Thales (A22), in De Anima 405a19–21: ‘It appears from what is recounted 
of him that Thales too understood the soul to be a source of motion, since he said the loadstone has a 
soul because it moves iron.’ Trans. TEGP. See also Aetius 1.3.4 about soul in Anaximenes. See 





him; for surely it is the soul of a friend which I recognized when I heard it howling!”’10 
As Schofield rightly points out, this fragment shows that psychē was understood as the 
self, if Pythagoras’ friend himself is thought to be in the dog.11  
Heraclitus, as previously mentioned, provides us with a novel theory of the soul. 
He most likely agrees with some of the traditional views about the soul. However, 
most importantly, he provides the soul with several new characteristics that directly 
contradict earlier conceptions. I shall argue that in Heraclitean thought there are three 
main new ideas about the concept of soul. First, soul is part of the cosmos as a material 
stuff or element and takes part in elemental transformations. Second, the soul performs 
specific functions inside the body and these functions work better or worse in 
accordance to the characteristics of each particular soul. And third, the soul is the place 
in our bodies where our logoi are and, most likely, where the processes of learning and 
understanding take place.  
3.1.1. Soul’s place in the cosmos  
As previously mentioned, Heraclitus inherited much of his cosmology from the 
Milesian philosophers.12 For Heraclitus, the cosmos was not created (B30), everything 
in it is composed by some basic elements, which transform into each other (B31, B36, 
B62, B67, B76, B84a, B125, and B126), and of which fire has a preeminent role (B30, 
B64, B66, and B90).13 It is within this picture that we can best make sense of fragment 
B36:  
B36: ψυχῆισι γὰρ θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, 
ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή. 
 
For souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth, but 
from earth water is born, and from water soul.  
                                                 
10 Trans. TEGP, Greek text: καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα φασὶν ἐποικτῖραι καὶ τόδε 
φάσθαι ἔπος: ‘παῦσαι μηδὲ ῥάπιζ᾽, ἐπεὶ ἦ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶ ψυχή, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀΐων. On 
soul in Pythagoreanism, see Huffman (2009). 
11 Schofield (1991), 26–27. Xenophanes’ testimony was based on the idea that Pythagoras believed in 
the doctrine of soul transmigration, for which we have compelling evidence. See KRS (2007), 235–238 
and TEGP, 928–929. 
12 See section 0.4.1. 





Fragment B36 situates the soul within the cycle of elemental changes: souls become 
water, water becomes earth, earth becomes water, and water becomes soul. The cycle 
of elemental transformation is not surprising in itself, given the background of a 
Milesian cosmology. Nevertheless, Heraclitus takes the traditional idea of the soul and 
seems to integrate it in the cosmological theories of the Milesians. The idea that soul 
is a stuff, a material, which takes part in elemental transformations, was probably new 
in the eyes of a reader contemporary to Heraclitus. However, the most shocking feature 
of this fragment is the description of how the first transformation takes place: ‘it is 
death for souls’, i.e. that souls can die.  
As mentioned above, the traditional picture of soul is a condition of life and an 
image of the dead. Therefore, the image of souls dying in B36 goes not only against 
the traditional idea of psychē in epic poetry, but also against later representations of 
the soul as the self.14 However, in fragment B85, Heraclitus shows us that he still 
thinks the soul is that without which you are not alive.15 Additionally, in B98 we hear 
that ‘Souls use a sense of smell in Hades.’16 Does this mention of souls in Hades mean 
that he believed in an afterlife in Hades as pictured in the epics? It is not very likely. 
Heraclitus does not seem to fully agree with traditional religious practices. 17 
Additionally, the death of the souls in B36 implies that souls would not reside in Hades 
indefinitely.18 Nussbaum goes so far as to propose that for Heraclitus there was no 
afterlife, and that fragment B98 ‘mocks the absurdity of the typical conception of a 
world of shades.’ 19  Nevertheless, the afterlife cannot altogether be excluded in 
Heraclitus. Other than this obscure mention of Hades, he says in B27 that ‘For men 
who die there await things they do not expect or anticipate.’20 Perhaps the afterlife is 
                                                 
14 As Schofield (1991), 26–27, suggests, the target of Heraclitus’ critique when saying that souls die is, 
most likely, Pythagoras’ theory of the reincarnation of the soul. 
15 B85: θυμῶι μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν θέληι, ψυχῆς ὠνεῖτει. [‘It is hard to fight with the heart’s 
desire; for whatever it wishes it buys at the price of soul.’ Trans. Marcovich (1969)]. Cf. Iliad 9.401–2: 
οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον οὐδ᾽ ὅσα φασὶν /Ἴλιον ἐκτῆσθαι. [‘For in my eyes not of like worth with 
life is even all that wealth that men say Ilios possessed.’ Trans. Murray (1924)]. See Reinhardt (1916), 
196 n. 2; Marcovich (1967), 387. 
16 Trans. TEGP, Greek text: αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ᾽ Ἅιδην. On fragment B98 and the sense of smell in 
Heraclitus, see Osborne (2009), 425–428. 
17 Cf. B67, B32, and B15 for Heraclitus opinions on traditional religion. For Heraclitus’ views on 
religion and divinities see Adomenas (1999); Trépanier (2010), 282–288; Most (2013). 
18 On the possibility of an afterlife in Heraclitus, see Mansfeld (2015), 85–90. 
19 Nussbaum (1972), 156. 





not as humans have supposed, but it seems that something awaits them after death 
regardless. I assume that if souls die and become water, the identity of a person is not 
preserved indefinitely, and this afterlife would not be the same as the traditional one 
in Hades. However, since we do not know when the process of transformation of soul 
into water takes place, some sort of afterlife as shades in Hades is still possible for 
Heraclitus.21  
With regard to cosmology, the implications of fragment B36 are as follows. Our 
souls are made of a material called ‘soul’ in the fragment. This material takes part in 
the elemental transformations that other elements in the cosmos have, i.e. it turns into 
some elements, and other elements turn into it. That these elemental transformations 
take place following a measure, a proportion or a balance, is shown by the use of the 
opposite concepts of death and birth in the fragment (thanatos and gignomai): when 
an amount of material dies an equal amount is born. 22  However, this is not a 
representation of all elements and all their possible changes. The fragment shows a 
particular cycle of elements, a process that is part of the whole but not a complete and 
all-encompassing cosmic cycle. I think that B36 does not need to represent a full cycle 
of all the elemental changes, in the same way that B31 (‘The turnings of fire: first sea, 
and of sea half is earth, half fireburst […] <Earth> is liquefied as sea and measured 
into the same proportion it had before it became earth.’23) does not represent all of 
them either. Neither in B31 nor in B36 does Heraclitus mention all elements. 
Consequently, soul does not need to be identified with any other element in B36, as 
many scholars propose.24 Similarly, as Schofield and Betegh note, in B36 the change 
from ‘souls’ in the plural to ‘soul’ in the singular is a meaningful one.25 I agree that 
                                                 
21 Fragment B25 (μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι. [‘For deaths that are greater greater 
portions gain.’ Trans. TEGP]) could also imply an afterlife different from the traditional one.  
22 Cf. B30, B31, B76b, and B76c. This idea follows the general principle of the unity of opposites, as 
explained in section 2.1.2: most people see separately, for instance, the death of water and the birth of 
earth, when in reality both phenomena are part of one balanced process that unifies them. On the 
problem of the death and birth of the souls in B36, see Betegh (2013), 251–254. 
23 Trans. TEGP, Greek text: πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ 
πρηστήρ […] <γῆ> θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ 
γενέσθαι γῆ 
24 Kirk (1954), 340–41; Marcovich (1967), 361; and TEGP, 192, say that soul represents fire in the 
elemental cycle of B36. ATH, 239, says it represents air. Betegh (2007), 22, follows Aristotle’s 
interpretation in De Anima 405a25–27 to argue that soul is ‘all states of matter covered by exhalations 
from the lowest level of atmospheric air to the uppermost layer of celestial fire.’  
25 Betegh, following Schofield, argues that the change from the plural (ψυχῆισιν) to the singular (ψυχή) 





this change implies that souls in the plural represent personal and embodied souls 
(closer in meaning to ‘the self’), while psychē in the singular represents the cosmic 
material of which such souls are made. However, I think that since the private soul is 
responsible for many bodily and mental functions, and provides life to us, it dies as a 
whole after the separation from the body has taken place, and not in parts when inside 
the body, as suggested by several scholars.26 
However, the most important aspect of B36 for our present investigation is that 
it suggests a connection between the external or cosmic soul and the internal soul. As 
a material ‘stuff’, the soul is a part of the cosmic elemental cycle. At the same time, 
this means that our souls as material inside our bodies change as well, and the newly 
acquired functions of the soul probably could be explained in physical terms. 
3.1.2. Soul in the body 
B117: ἀνὴρ ὁκόταν μεθυσθῆι, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνήβου σφαλλόμενος 
οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκη βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων.  
 
When a man is drunk he is led by an immature child, stumbling, not 
perceiving where he goes, with a wet soul.27 
 
 
B118: αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη. 
 
A dry soul is wisest and best.28 
 
 
B67a: Sicut aranea stans in medio telae sentit quam cito musca aliquem 
filum suum corrumpit itaque illuc celeriter currit quasi de fili persectione 
dolens, sic hominis anima aliqua parte corporis laesa illuc festine meat 
                                                 
the second as a ‘mass term’, which indicates the cosmic substance/element soul. See Schofield (1991), 
25 and Betegh (2007), 6–13. 
26 From the idea that souls become wet in B117 Marcovich proposes that when the soul of the drunk 
man gets wet some of its parts become water and die. And this death is the process described in B36, as 
a parallel with the way in which the elements work in the cosmos. See Marcovich (1967), 361–62. 
However, my interpretation is closer to that of Kirk (1954), 339–342: that the death of the person 
coincides with the death of the soul, i.e. the soul becomes water (or fire) not inside the body but shortly 
after the person dies. The main reason for supporting this argument is that being wet or moist because 
of contact with alcohol in B117 and the soul dying to become water in B36 are two different things. On 
hygros in B117 see Schofield (1991), 21. Perhaps B77, ψυχῆισι τέρψιν (μὴ θάνατον) ὑγρῆισι γενέσθαι. 
[‘It is joy (not death) for souls to become wet.’ Trans. TEGP], is making this point. 
27 Trans. TEGP. 





quasi impatiens laesionis corporis, cui firme et proportionaliter iuncta 
est.29  
 
As a spider standing on the middle of its web feels as soon as a fly breaks 
any of its threads, so that towards that place it quickly runs as if it felt pain 
from the cut of the thread. In the same way, when any part of the body is 
hurt, the soul of a person hastily goes there as if it did not tolerate the 
wounding of the body, to which is firmly and proportionally connected.  
These three fragments have a common feature: we can see that Heraclitus is attributing 
characteristics to soul acting inside the body. Psychē is related not only to the material 
and cosmic plane as an element, but also, as a private soul, psychē affects how we 
interact with the world.  
Fragment B117 would seem almost trivial without the Homeric context. Maybe 
Heraclitus is just stating the fact that when we are drunk we cannot walk and perceive 
properly, like a child, and our mind is confused and drowned in alcohol.30 But the 
implications of the fragment go much further. Heraclitus is saying something new 
about the concept of soul (especially if contrasted with B118), i.e. that the embodied 
soul can change its composition or state: it can be either wet or dry. This means that, 
unlike Homeric soul, for Heraclitus souls can be modified by external physical factors. 
The consequences of making soul an element, which participates in elemental 
transformations, is that the human soul has to become an element as well and, 
accordingly, be affected by material and elemental constraints.  
Additionally, these material modifications affect the bodily and mental functions 
of the person whose soul has changed. If we take B118 into consideration, we can say 
that some material compositions of the soul are better than others in that they perform 
those functions correctly: a wet soul does not function properly, because it gives its 
owner the same abilities as a toddler, but, presumably, a dry soul would provide a 
person with better bodily and mental abilities. The abilities connected to the soul in 
B117 are sense perception and motion, but if we think of this fragment as an exemplary 
case, it is likely that Heraclitus associated many other functions with the physical 
composition of the soul. At the very least we could argue that this is the case for those 
mental and bodily functions that are impaired by drunkenness. Marcovich suggests, 
                                                 
29 Fragment B67a is rejected by many. See discussion below. 





for instance, that in B117 the wetness of the soul also causes loss of memory and 
attention, since the drunk man represented in the fragment also forgets where he is 
going.31  
One interpretation would have Heraclitus say that whenever someone is drunk 
they are carried by a child or in the same situation as being carried by a child. But this 
is not very likely. In my interpretation, fragment B117 presents us with a metaphor 
that explains an aspect of the body-soul relation. The mention of the child is 
meaningful, and it is probably hinting at a relation with the divinity.32  There are 
different levels of perfection for the soul, and the soul of someone who is drunk is 
equivalent to that of a child, which is as low as a human soul would be in comparison 
to a divinity.33 Thus, the child in B117 is the drunk man himself, who by effects of 
material changes rendered his soul worse, and now his soul (and he himself) is like a 
child with regard to most mental and physical functions. 34  These differences are 
caused by the composition and material changes of his soul.  
Regarding the simile that the spider is to the spider-web as the soul is to the body 
in B67a, Kahn follows Marcovich in observing that there is nothing from Heraclitus 
in the quotation.35 For many reasons, it would be hard to argue that the fragment is 
original. First off, we do not have the Greek text, so we cannot judge the composition, 
syntax, word choice, dialect, etc. Second, because the wording and clarity of the 
fragment do not resemble the usual Heraclitean style, i.e. there are no oppositions, 
comparisons with divinities, or extrapolations. And third, because it is not common for 
Heraclitus to use an analogy and clearly explain every part of it (with the exception 
perhaps of B5 and B114, which are not that clear in reality). Nevertheless, the general 
idea of the fragment is consistent with other fragments that mention the soul in 
Heraclitus. The soul plays an important role in bodily and mental functions, such as 
sight, movement, memory, and, as we will see, in hearing and other abilities. The 
                                                 
31 Marcovich (1967), 381.  
32 As was argued in section 1.3.2. See Frankel (1938b), 309–337. Also as Marcovich (1967), 382, 
notices, the opposition child-adult is recurrent in Heraclitus. Cf. fragments B56, B121, B79, and B52.  
33 If we follow the argument of Frankel (1938b), this fragment could imply that there is a divine soul 
(perhaps a world-soul?), which moves the body of the cosmos, perceives, understands, etc. better than 
the soul of an adult human being, in the same way that the soul of an adult human being moves the body, 
perceives, and understands better than the soul of a child. See section 1.3.2. 
34 Contra Robinson (1986), 306–307, who proposes a more literal reading. 





fragment is most likely a paraphrase or interpretation of an original saying. I would 
conjecture that Heraclitus said something such as ‘The soul is like a spider in its web, 
stretched out, contracted in, it reaches everywhere.’ And in B67a we find an 
explanation or a paraphrase of the main point of a different phrase.36 I would not 
support my arguments based on the interpretation of this fragment. However, it is 
meaningful that a fragment about specific characteristics of the soul-body relation has 
been attributed to Heraclitus. This implies that he was later recognised as one of those 
who proposed that the soul was a central faculty that unifies and controls the body.37  
3.1.3. The logos inside the soul 
B115: ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑωυτὸν αὔξων.  
 
Soul has a logos that increases itself. 
 
 
B45: ψυχῆς πείρατα [ἰὼν] 
οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι  
ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν·  
οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει. 
 
He who travels every road will not find out the limits of the soul [as he 
goes], so deep a logos does it/he have. 38 
Fragment B115 is considered spurious by some scholars, among other reasons because 
its source, Stobaeus 3.1.180a, attributes it to Socrates.39 However, from fragment B45 
we know that soul has a logos. Consequently, the only problem with accepting this 
fragment as original would reside in the self-augmentation (ἑωυτὸν αὔξων) of the 
logos inside the soul. The acceptance of this idea would be dependent on how we 
understand soul and logos here. Heraclitus may be talking about the cosmic logos 
inside a cosmic soul, or about a logos inside a particular soul, or about both of them, 
                                                 
36 Most likely a Stoic gloss: see Marcovich (1967), 578–579. However, it does not mean that there is 
nothing Heraclitean to it. Many of the passages Marcovich quotes there to show that B67a is Stoic are 
Stoic comments on Plato’s Timaeus, and, as I said in section 1.2.3, some ideas, in particular those about 
the cosmic logos in the Timaeus, are very Heraclitean. See Robinson (2013), 325. 
37 See Schofield (1991), 22–23. 
38 Text and tr. after Betegh (2009), 404. 






i.e. about logoi in souls in general. In accordance with my interpretation of the word 
logos in Heraclitus, I understand logos in B115 as ‘description’ or ‘account’, not as 
‘measure’ or ‘proportion’. 40  But I refrain from understanding this fragment as a 
reference to the cosmic logos, because if the logos is just as we understood it before (a 
complete and divine description of the cosmos), it would not need to increase itself in 
any way. Therefore, I think this fragment must refer to our personal logos or logoi, 
which I assume can vary in scope and correctness. These can be augmented and 
perfected, until at some point they finally come to agree with the universal logos, or 
homo-logein (B50). 
We know that soul is a natural place to find logoi according to Plato, for whom 
logos may mean ‘discourse’, ‘account’, or, when not expressed by anyone, ‘thought’.41 
So Philebus 39a1–7: ‘If memory and perceptions concur with other impressions on a 
particular occasion, then they seem to me to inscribe words [logoi] in our soul, as it 
were. And if what is written is true, then we form a true judgement and a true account 
[logos] of the matter.’42 This passage provides us with a close parallel to Heraclitus’ 
views on the logos inside the soul. Plato suggest that sense perception creates logoi in 
our souls, and our opinions and thoughts about the matter are some sort of logos as 
well. Heraclitus should not hold an opinion all too different than this, since we know 
that sense perception is the source of a logos we can understand in our souls. 
At Theaetetus 189e–190a, Plato tells us something which resonates with a 
previous analysis of the cosmic logos:  
It seems to me that when the soul thinks, it is simply carrying on a 
discussion [logos] in which it asks itself questions and answers, affirming 
and denying. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual 
process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and 
without divided counsel, we call this its judgement. So, in my view, to 
                                                 
40 For the reasons of my interpretation of logos as ‘description’, see section 1.2.4. Marcovich (1966), 
29–30, disregards this fragment because ‘the measure [logos] implies something constant, and a 
“measure which increases itself” is unlikely to me.’ However, this is only a problem if we understand 
logos to mean ‘measure’, which does not seem like the best option here. It is true that logos has the idea 
of proportion in B31, but there we find the expression εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λὀγον. And I believe that is not a 
sufficient reason, or that we do not have enough evidence, to argue that logos means ‘measure’ or 
‘proportion’ by itself in Heraclitus. Cf. Powell (1938), s.v. λόγος (11), where it only means ‘proportion’ 
when in a particular expression but not on its own. 
41 See also Sophist 263e2–6 and Timaeus 36d–37c (quoted in section 1.2.3). For an analysis of this and 
other similar passages related to thought and internal dialogue in Plato, see A.G. Long (2013), 109–116. 





judge is to make a statement, and a judgement is a statement [logos] which 
is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed 
to oneself.43  
This second passage relates logos in the soul to thought and personal judgement. For 
Plato there are logoi that are not addressed to anyone but silent. There is another 
passage in which Plato talks about a silent logos within the soul, as I mentioned 
above.44 At Timaeus 36d–37c, he says that the world-soul speaks out a logos, though 
a logos without a sound, describing in detail how everything is disposed in the cosmos. 
I argued that this logos Plato speaks of is strongly related to the cosmic logos in 
Heraclitus. Then, for Plato logoi, understood as some silent description, are present 
inside both the world-soul and the individual souls.45 This does not mean, of course, 
that Plato is necessarily commenting on Heraclitean theories, but it shows that these 
ideas were current at that time, perhaps influenced by Heraclitus or other Heraclitean 
thinkers. So then, so far as our fragment is concerned, it was not strange for Heraclitus 
to think of logos as something that resides in the soul and that represents a description, 
an account or a theory. 
However, if fragment B115 talks about the personal logoi in individual souls, 
what is the meaning of this self-augmentation? We said that if the cosmic logos is the 
complete description of the cosmos, then it would not need to augment itself in any 
way. However, if we take this to refer to our personal logoi, in our souls, the fragment 
has a clearer meaning. Our logoi are not complete, whereas the cosmic logos is; they 
can always be augmented by our personal experience of the world. I shall follow 
Nussbaum’s interpretation of this fragment, i.e. that it refers to the soul’s ‘capacity for 
learning’.46 When you experience new things, your logos, your description or account 
of the universe, grows.47  
                                                 
43 Trans. Levett and Burnyeat in Cooper (1997). 
44 See section 1.2.3. 
45 See also Phaedrus 276a. 
46 Nussbaum (1972), 15. 
47 Owen (1979–1980), 10, proposes an interesting interpretation, referring to Plato’s Phaedrus 276e9–
277a2: ‘Discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but 
produces a seed from which more discourse grows in the character of others.’ He calls it a ‘perpetual 
self-renewing discourse.’ Also, cf. Empedocles B17.14 and B110, where there is the same idea of 





I turn now to fragment B45. The fragment posits a similar problem as that of 
B115. We can understand soul and logos in two ways: as our logos in our personal 
soul, and as the cosmic logos in a cosmic soul.48 Then, the expression ψυχῆς πείρατα 
could be understood either as the internal limits of one’s soul or as the limits of the 
soul as a stuff in the world. Some scholars, following Aristotle’s interpretation of 
Heraclitus as a material monist, and soul as the first principle, defend the first 
interpretation. For instance, Kahn argues that peirata is a concept related to 
Anaximander’s apeiron. 49  This means that, in his interpretation, soul is like the 
apeiron: it is everywhere and in everything, and somehow endless, more or less like 
the world-soul in Plato’s Timaeus.50 Correspondingly, in Kahn’s interpretation the 
search for the limits of the soul is an outer search, which implies an actual physical 
travelling around the world. The result of his interpretation is that logos, as a 
characteristic of this soul, is everywhere as well.  
Marcovich further proposes that there is a contraposition of a horizontal 
dimension, represented by hodos, and a vertical dimension, represented by bathys.51 If 
so, the fragment suggests that you can actually find the limits of the soul, but not in 
the traditional way of looking, over the earth’s surface, but inside ourselves, because 
the limits are inside the human organism.52 I think Marcovich is right in that the idea 
of looking outside in the world is implied in the wording of the fragment. However, 
the vertical-horizontal contraposition, which shows the idea of an impossible search 
                                                 
48 Snell (1960), 17–18, takes the fragment as referring to internal processes. As well as Nussbaum 
(1972), 15 and TEGP, 192. Marcovich (1967), 366–370, says that the limits cannot be found outside 
because they are inside the human body, in its blood. Some others point out that the fragment can refer 
to either or both realms but do not defend any particular position. See Robinson (1987), 110; McKirahan 
(1994), 147; and ATH, 128–129, however, he says that B45 suggests an external search. See also Curd 
(2013), 238–244. 
49 ATH, 126–130. Robinson (1986), 305, makes a similar suggestion. 
50 Do we have enough evidence to argue that Heraclitus thought of a world-soul as well? As Betegh 
(2009), 410–411, suggests, ‘the logos of the cosmic soul may well be the universal logos that each of 
us should listen.’ We know that soul can be everywhere as an element (B36). We also know that for 
Heraclitus the cosmos is somehow organised and steered by this logos, which describes everything as 
it is (B1). And in B30 he could be indicating that the cosmos or its order is a living being (πῦρ ἀείζωον). 
It seems that the ever-living fire is showing us the idea that an order that has ever existed is, at least, 
some sort of living being that moves and has measures for its movements. According to Hussey (1999a), 
319, the author of the Dereveni Papyrus could be suggesting a similar interpretation of Heraclitus’ 
doctrine. 
51 Marcovich (1967), 366. 






because you are not looking in the right place, does not work correctly.53 First, because 
roads can go up and down (B60: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ωὑτή. [‘A road up-down is 
one and the same.’]) and, as I will show, the word bathys does not, of necessity, imply 
a vertical dimension. 
My interpretation of the fragment takes the first part as Betegh does, i.e. ψυχῆς 
πείρατα [ἰὼν] οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν as ‘He who travels every 
road will not find out the limits of the soul [as he goes]’.54 I agree with Marcovich that 
souls have physical or material limits, because they are an element and still part of, 
and confined by, the physical world, or with Betegh that souls have extension.55 
However, even when we exhaust or go through (even ‘walk through’) all of a soul’s 
material aspect, there is still a deep logos that we do not see, an aspect of the soul that 
we miss by physically examining it, i.e. if we limit ourselves to its physical aspect. 
As for the second part of the fragment, the question about the meaning of this 
‘deep logos’ is not easy to answer.56 If, as I mentioned above, this logos is an account 
or a description in the soul, and not a proportion or measure, then this assumption 
proves useful now, as it would be much harder to explain how a proportion or a 
measure can be deep.57 The general meanings of the word bathys tend to imply that 
something is ‘spacious’, such as a ship or a courtyard, both of which are deep in this 
way. In most cases, it is used to describe something that has the following 
characteristics: 1) an inner space, usually large; 2) an outer surface; 3) what is 
contained on the inside is not seen from the outside, or at least not clearly.58 It does 
not require one to go down still further in a vertical direction, but the idea of being on 
                                                 
53 Betegh (2009), 407, suggests, among other possibilities, that bathys could mean ‘high’ and the limits 
be interpreted in a vertical dimension.  
54 Betegh (2009), 404. 
55 Marcovich (1967), 366–67. Betegh (2009), 406. 
56 Regarding the authenticity of the second part of the fragment, I believe Betegh (2009), 403–404, 
provides strong arguments in its favour. 
57 ATH, 129, says: ‘On first reading, logon echei should mean something like “it has something to say”, 
“it has the right (or the capacity) to speak”.’ I believe this approach is correct in that logos here means 
something related to speech and not ‘proportion’ or ‘measure’, in particular because the ‘barbarian souls’ 
in B107 imply a relation between soul and language or speech. Kirk (1954), 39, says that logos means 
‘measure’. I find this very difficult to accept, mainly because a ‘deep measure’ does not make much 
sense, i.e. that expression could not have meant ‘big size’, ‘large quantity’, or the like. 
58 Powell (1938) and LSJ, s.v. βαθύς. Homer uses bathys to describe a forest (ὕλη, Od. 17.316), a 
crop/cornfield (λήϊον, Il. 2,147), a ship (ναῦς, Od. 9.144), a courtyard (ἀυλή, Il. 5.587) , whirlpool (δίνη, 
Od. 6.116), and sea (ἅλα, Il. 1.532; ἠιών, Il. 2.93), bay (κόλπος, Il. 2.560), sand (ἄμαθος, Il. 5.587), pit 





the inside, of being somewhere difficult to reach, and unknown, is enough to be bathys. 
The general use of the word shows us that the idea of a vertical plane as opposed to a 
horizontal plane, as has been proposed by Marcovich, may not be correct, since we 
find depth in woods and cornfields not because of going further down, but across, in a 
horizontal fashion. But what does it mean for a logos to be deep in this way? 
When describing internal entities of the body or mind, bathys can be used, 
perhaps metaphorically, to talk about the inner realm of a person.59 Homer uses ‘deep’ 
once with this meaning at Iliad 19.125: ὣς φάτο, τὸν δ᾽ ἄχος ὀξὺ κατὰ φρένα τύψε 
βαθεῖαν. [‘So she spoke, and sharp pain smote him in his deep heart.’] In this passage 
the expression φρένα βαθεῖαν does not mean ‘spacious heart’ nor ‘big heart’, but 
something like ‘deep inside himself’, ‘in his most inner core’. Similarly, Aeschylus 
uses this metaphorical meaning in the two following passages: 
Deep thought is certainly needed to save us: the eye, like that of a diver, 
must scan right to the bottom — a clear-sighted eye, not one unduly fogged 
by wine (Suppliants 407–9).60 
 
So the prophet spoke, wielding calmly his shield all of bronze. On its circle 
there was no image; for he desires not the appearance of excellence but the 
reality, harvesting a deep furrow in his mind from which good counsels 
grow (Seven against Thebes 590–94).61 
These examples are enough to show us that the use of bathys to describe 
metaphorically the internal ‘world’ of a person is close to Heraclitus. I follow Snell’s 
idea that here we are talking about a different realm, ‘that it has its own dimension, 
                                                 
59 Snell (1960), 17, suggests that the lyric poets were the first ones to use ‘deep’ in this sense. 
60 Trans. Sommerstein (2009). Greek text: δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου/ δίκην κολυμβητῆρος 
εἰς βύθον μολεῖν/ δεδορκὸς ὄμμα μηδ᾿ ἄγαν ὠινωμένον. Cf. with the metaphor of a diver needed to find 
something in deep waters as when you try to understand something difficult, which is the same Socrates, 
according to Diogenes, uses to describe Heraclitus’ book. Diogenes Laertius 2.22: φασὶ δ᾽ Εὐριπίδην 
αὐτῶι δόντα τὸ Ἡρακλείτου σύγγραμμα ἐρέσθαι, ‘τί δοκεῖ;’ τὸν δὲ φάναι, ‘ἃ μὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα: οἶμαι 
δὲ καὶ ἃ μὴ συνῆκα: πλὴν Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ. [‘They say Euripides gave him [Socrates] 
Heraclitus’ treatise and asked, “What do you think?” He replied, “What I understand is excellent; what 
I don’t understand probably is too, but it would take a Delian diver to recover it.”’ Trans. TEGP] It is 
interesting to notice, too, that this passage agrees with other ideas present in Heraclitus’ fragments, in 
particular unreliable sense perception in B107, and the effects of drunkenness in B117. 
61 Trans. Sommerstein (2009). Greek text: τοιαῦθ᾿ ὁ μάντις ἀσπίδ᾿ εὔκηλος νέμων/ πάγχαλκον ηὔδα. 
σῆμα δ᾿ οὐκ ἐπῆν κύκλωι·/ οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ᾿ εἶναι θέλει,/ βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς 





that it is not extended in space.’62 Souls, as part of the materials that constitute the 
cosmos, have a physical extension, but it does not seem to work alike for the logoi 
inscribed in them. These logoi render the soul much more extensive, or extensive in a 
different way. They give their souls some additional content or information that is not 
accessible directly through their physical realm.63 This, however, does not mean that 
logoi are metaphysical entities.64  Just in the same way as a book has a physical 
extension that can be easily measured by our senses, but inside it there is a logos, a 
description, a story, which requires a different kind of perception in order to be 
understood; so we can say that there is a whole new world inside a book. In that same 
way, the cosmos has a logos that describes how it is, and our souls have logoi that 
describe, correctly or not, how things are. We can travel the world and see everything 
in it, but miss the logos that it contains. In the same way, our souls have a physical 
delimitation, but their true limits we can only access when we try to read and 
understand the logoi that are inside them.  
To sum up, we can say that the soul for Heraclitus has the following 
characteristics. The soul is now integrated to the physical realm. This idea is what 
causes the main changes in the idea of soul in Heraclitus, compared to the traditional 
views; soul is a stuff and it is bound to the rules of elemental transformation and other 
physical constraints. Additionally, Heraclitus explicitly attributes physiological and 
psychological functions to the embodied soul, which may vary from soul to soul 
depending on their state and quality (dry-wet), among other physical changes. These 
changes play a role in the correct functioning of sense perception, self-motion, and 
memory. Much is still vague but the proper functionality of these abilities is affected 
by the soul’s dryness or wetness. Lastly, the soul is where we have our personal logoi. 
                                                 
62 Snell (1960), 17. See also TEGP, 188, who says that ‘Heraclitus seems to recognize an inner world 
which can reflect the outer world, if we are not sleepwalking through life.’ 
63 The expression οὕτω ἔχει, present in B45, is used by Herodotus and Plato to say something like ‘that 
is how it is/stands’ (Cf. Herodotus 1.126.5, 7.161.2, 8.125.2, and 9.9.2. And Plato, Statesman 271c1; 
Laws 716d4; Gorgias 450a9; Euthydemus 190c9; Philebus 19c2, 36e9; Parmenides 146c8. Xenophon, 
Hellenica 5.2.18, and 7.1.8. Sophocles, Antigone 38 and Electra 938). Could οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει be 
taken as an impersonal expression, meaning ‘the deep logos is as such/that is how the deep logos works’? 
Or, if soul is the subject of ἔχει, could οὕτω be modifying ἔχει? Then the expression would mean ‘it has 
a deep logos in such a way/in that way’. 
64 However, I like to see fragment B45 as a metaphor to express an insight about metaphysics. I agree 
with Curd (2010), 14, who thinks that in Heraclitus the cosmic logos is somehow immaterial and that 
‘in struggling to explain his new idea of logos, Heraclitus certainly moves towards, and I think embraces, 





Our logoi can be augmented and become more extensive, complete, and precise, and 
agree with the cosmic logos. Additionally, the fact that logoi reside inside the soul 
means that, even though souls have a physical extension, there is some portion or 
aspect of them that we miss when we only consider their physical part and not their 
logoi.  
3.2. Sense perception, soul, and logoi 
We turn now to the problem of sense perception and its relation to knowledge in 
Heraclitus. In antiquity, both Plato and Sextus suggest that Heraclitus considered sense 
perception an unreliable means of acquiring knowledge. For Plato (Theaetetus 152d), 
Heraclitus’ theory of flux, in which nothing can be stable, would prevent our senses 
from grasping anything correctly. According to Sextus (Adversus Mathematicos 126), 
the criterion of truth for Heraclitus is not sense perception but the logos. In one sense, 
at least, they are both correct. As we will see, Heraclitus thinks that your senses can 
deceive you, and that for this reason you should not trust in them exclusively. However, 
the fact that the senses can often deceive you does not imply that they do not play an 
important role in the process of knowledge. For this process to work correctly there 
must be a particular connection between soul, the logos, and the senses. I shall argue, 
in agreement with several other scholars, that sense perception for Heraclitus is not a 
sufficient cause but a necessary cause for understanding the logos. 
There are two important caveats when approaching the topics of soul and sense 
perception in Heraclitus, both rightly pointed out by Laks.65 First, even though the 
fragments of Heraclitus show an interest in psychology and a development of the 
concept of soul, Heraclitus does not appear to have a theory of sense perception, i.e. a 
theory in which the exact mechanisms of the acquisition of knowledge through the 
senses are explained in physical terms.66 And, second, it is unclear to what extent 
Heraclitus distinguished between perception and thought.67 This implies, also, that it 
is uncertain whether Heraclitus identified organs that perceive and organs or faculties 
that interpret things perceived as two separate things. My analysis does not intend to 
                                                 
65 Laks (1999). 
66 Laks (1999), 254. 





solve either of these problems but to identify the role that Heraclitus attributes to sense 
experience in the acquisition of knowledge. 
3.2.1. Sense perception 
The logos itself cannot be communicated to others directly, as we have seen, and it is 
the guidance of Heraclitus that directs us to the logos and helps us achieve an eventual 
understanding of this logos. But in the end we have to listen to it and understand it 
ourselves. A common theme in the fragments, itself one of the keys for understanding 
the logos (B1 and B50), is personal experience. We are able, at least potentially, to 
correctly understand the world that surrounds us. Some of the suggestions for 
accomplishing this can be found in the following fragments: 
B35: χρὴ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι.68 
 
Men who are eager for wisdom should enquire into many things. 
 
 
B55: ὅσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω.  
 
Things of which there is sight, hearing, experience, these I prefer.  
 
 
B101a: ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες.  
 
The eyes are better witnesses than the ears. 
Regarding B35, the word histōr and its cognates, usually meaning ‘enquirer’, may 
imply three things in this context. First, that we should experience the world with our 
senses as much as we can, second, that we should do this in regard to many different 
topics, and third, that we should gather information from as many sources as possible.69 
In Heraclitus, it should not mean gathering theories from other people. As we saw 
above, this last idea, enquiring from others, is actually harshly criticised by Heraclitus 
in several fragments, but in particular in B129, where he criticises Pythagoras for 
practising historiē to collect or copy knowledge from others.70 Therefore, it seems that 
                                                 
68 For a discussion about the authenticity of fragment B35 and the use of the word φιλόσοφος, see 
Marcovich (1967), 26–27, and Casadesús Bordoy (2015). 
69 Powell (1938) and LSJ, s.v. ἱστορέω. 





this enquiring is recommended when you enquire into many things by yourself but not 
when you gather many things from other people. Consequently, in B35 the kind of 
enquiring he is suggesting refers to personal experience. Nevertheless, personal sense 
perception in itself is not the only requirement in understanding the world. As some 
scholars have pointed out, for Heraclitus, collecting this kind of information from 
sense experience is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding.71 As I 
shall argue, there are other important requirements in this process. However, what 
fragment B35 clearly states is that Heraclitus considers sense experience (i.e. as much 
as enquiring implies sense experience) an important and necessary part of 
understanding or at least of being on the correct way to understanding.  
Fragment B55 proposes something similar, and perhaps in clearer terms. There 
are two points to analyse here. First, what is that over which Heraclitus prefers those 
things that you can see, hear, and experience? Or, in other words, what are those things 
of which there is no sight, hearing, and experience? And, second, what does the word 
mathēsis imply in the fragment? I follow Marcovich’s analysis of the latter in order to 
answer the former. The word mathēsis in fragment B55 means ‘perception’, 
‘apprehension’, ‘one’s own experience’.72 I do not think that Heraclitus is making an 
ontological claim here, a claim that only physical things or things that can be perceived 
by the senses should be taken into consideration as making up reality, i.e. one must not 
assume that Heraclitus is a crude empiricist. Instead, he is indicating that the things 
you experience yourself are preferable to those you do not. I believe that those things 
over which experiential things are preferable are things told to you by other people, 
that is, things of which you have indirect experience, and of which you yourself think. 
Therefore, I shall risk making a differentiation between the sense of hearing in B55 
(akoē) and the ears as witnesses in B101a. Both fragments mention sight and hearing, 
                                                 
71 See Marcovich (1967), 27–28; ATH, 106-110; TEGP, 188: ‘Wisdom apparently starts in sense 
experience and inquiry based on such experience.’ Also Robinson (1987), 119: ‘Experiential knowledge 
is important to the conscientious investigator into the real.’ 
72 Marcovich (1967), 21. This is the only mention of mathēsis in the fragments, but Heraclitus uses a 
participle of the verb manthanein clearly meaning ‘sense perception’ or ‘experience’ in fragment B17: 
οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ 
δοκέουσι. [‘Most people do not understand those things which they encounter, and they do not know 
them after having experienced them, but they think they do.’] The word mathēsis is not found in 
Herodotus but he sometimes uses manthanein as ‘perceiving’. Powell (1938), s.v. μανθάνω IV, and LSJ, 





though in B35 the mention not of organs but of senses and above all mathēsis indicate 
that Heraclitus is referring to things that can produce sounds and images, and that these 
can be experienced in such ways.73  
Fragment B101a suggests a similar idea: the evidence of the senses and one’s 
own experience are preferable to second hand stories and indirect experience. This was 
a common saying after Heraclitus.74 Marcovich says that ‘it could mean the following: 
“between the two ways for men to reach the Logos, by themselves or instructed by 
Heraclitus, the first has preference; because, as traditional wisdom has it: eyes are more 
accurate witnesses than ears.”’75 I agree that people should look for the logos by 
themselves and, as I said, that they should personally experience many things. Both 
the fragment and the saying are talking about a different kind of hearing than fragment 
B55, as mentioned above. Heraclitus is not saying that it is better to see a dog in the 
distance than it is to hear it barking in the distance, because that would be a bit too 
obvious and not worth to make into a proverb or saying. The word martys implies in 
either case, seeing or hearing, that there is a testimony, a certain message reported to 
us by the senses. In the case of hearing, presumably it is not just a sound made by the 
dog but a report of this dog and of its barking on the part of someone else. Hence I 
take the fragment to state the following: ‘It is better for your understanding to see 
something yourself than to hear it from somebody else’. This reading is supported by 
Heraclitus’ critique of popular authorities, since people wrongly trust in what the poets 
and the multitude say, when most of them are bad and just a few are good (B104), and 
Heraclitus has heard other logoi which fail to understand the main principles of the 
cosmos (B108).76  
Consequently, fragments B35, B55, and B101a indicate the opposite of what 
Plato and Sextus make of Heraclitus’ views on sense perception. Heraclitus prefers 
things you can directly perceive, not the information brought forth by other people, 
not reports and second-hand experience. This is one of his suggestions for people 
looking to understand the logos. He encourages people interested in wisdom 
                                                 
73 I follow ATH, 106, who states that B55 ‘expresses not so much an epistemic ranking of the senses as 
the reliance upon direct experience rather than upon hearsay.’ This idea is also conveyed by fragments 
B40 and B129. See Granger (2004b), 246–252. 
74 See Marcovich (1967), 23 and n. 1. 
75 Marcovich (1967), 24.  





(philosophers?) to experience the world by themselves as much as they can. This 
preference for empirical experience and not for reports and logoi from others is 
consistent with Heraclitus’ critique of his predecessors and contemporaries, and also 
with the fact that logos cannot be communicated directly to others. You can achieve 
understanding of the logos by experiencing and understanding the world but not by 
listening to what others have to say about it. This idea represents Heraclitus’ 
suggestion to people interested in knowledge and also explains the role that each 
person has in acquiring knowledge. As argued above, our souls hold logoi that may 
agree with the cosmic logos and result in its understanding. Those logoi in ourselves 
we can obtain and expand with our experience of the world. However, as I shall argue 
next, sense experience is not the only condition for understanding; as Plato and Sextus 
suggest, Heraclitus assumes that your senses can (and usually do) deceive you. 
3.2.2. Barbarian souls 
Sense perception by itself is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
understanding the logos. As argued above, Heraclitus’ concept of soul is different than 
that of the epic tradition. One of the most important changes in the conception of soul 
is that its physical composition affects the proper functioning of some bodily and 
mental functions. This happens, for instance, in B117 when someone is drunk and has 
a wet soul. Now, since sense perception is one of the functions governed by the soul, 
its proper functionality is affected in the same way by changes in the soul. This means 
that the message received by the senses can be more or less precise, or rather right or 
wrong, depending on others characteristics of the soul. In fact, Heraclitus tells us about 
those cases in which sense perception is not reliable in the two following fragments: 
B17: οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ 
μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι. 
 
Most people do not understand those things which they encounter, and 











Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for people when they have barbarian souls. 
We previously saw that for Heraclitus what you experience yourself is better than what 
you experience through others, and that in this way seeing is better than hearing. 
However, these two fragments show us that experience is not itself a guarantee of 
understanding. In B17 we find that coming into contact with things does not mean we 
understand them when perceiving them. The term mathēsis, which Heraclitus prefers 
in fragment B55, seems to be insufficient because most people fail to understand when 
they experience (mathontes). However, the most important part of fragment B17 is not 
the failure to understand or to know the things they experience. What is most 
interesting is that people think they do. People have the physical experience, they use 
their senses and perceive what is in front of them, but the result is the same or worse 
than if they had not experienced it at all. This same idea is present in other fragments 
discussed in previous sections; sometimes people do not know how to hear (B19), or 
they hear but do not understand like the deaf (B34).77 But, how do we know whether 
our senses are deceiving us? We know that the soul plays an important role in several 
physical and psychological functions. From fragment B117 it is possible to infer that 
sense perception would be deceiving or unreliable to that same drunk person who is 
unable to walk properly. It is clear that sense perception is deceptive when somebody 
is drunk, but Heraclitus is making a much stronger point in B17: even when people are 
sober and, so to say, in their right minds, whenever they go out to the world and 
experience things, there is a failure somewhere in the process of sense perception that 
prevents them from understanding correctly.78  
Fragment B107 points to the soul, too, as the thing responsible for this 
malfunctioning in the process of sense perception. Still, it is quite unlikely that a 
                                                 
77 For my interpretation of fragment B34, see section 0.5. As I argue in section 1.3.3, this lack of 
understanding what they experience, including Heraclitus’ words, is one of the main points Heraclitus 
wants to get through in the second part of fragment B1 (ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι πειρώμενοι). Perhaps 
fragments B40, B22, and B18, are pointing in a similar direction. 
78 This failure could be understood as ‘they see, but do not understand’, i.e. their eyes and ears work 
well but not their minds/souls. However, as mentioned above, it is not clear whether Heraclitus 
discriminates in the process of sense perception between organs that perceive and faculties that interpret 
what is perceived, such as reason/thought. See Laks (1999), 254-262. I agree with A.A. Long (2013) 
that Heraclitus presents some ideas that are heading towards identifying those faculties. Nevertheless, I 
think in the case of sense perception the fragments do not recognise any such faculty yet. For instance, 
people experience but seem like they do not (B1), they hear but are like deaf (B34), and their eyes and 





‘barbarian soul’ is the same as the wet soul of the drunk person in fragment B117. 
Consequently, it seems that a soul can differ in another way. Its state can vary so far 
as this is a barbarian or non-barbarian soul, and this modification also affects its 
functions. There is also a difference between a drunk man misperceiving something 
and someone not understanding their experience when sober: we are aware of the 
misperception of drunkenness, but we are not aware of this when we are sober and our 
souls are ‘barbarian’. There is something else that affects our souls and makes some 
of its functions work incorrectly. But what exactly is this ‘barbarity’ that souls can 
have? 
The first problem which we have to deal with here is that, if the fragment is not 
spurious, this is one of the first attested uses of the word barbaros.79 ‘Barbarian souls’ 
could be interpreted in three ways: 1) taking the expression as a metonymy, i.e. as 
souls belonging to people who do not speak Greek. 2) If we take barbaros to mean 
‘brute’, ‘dumb’, ‘uncomprehending’, the phrase would mean that if your soul is not 
intelligent, sense perception will deceive you.80 3) The last option is that the term 
means ‘uncomprehending of language’.  
I shall disregard the first option, since this is a very strange way to say that  
non-Greeks are unable to understand through the medium of sense perception.81 As for 
the second option, the problem of understanding barbaros as ‘uncomprehending’ and 
souls as ‘intellect’ is that it would make the statement a tautology: ‘If you have an 
intellect that does not understand, then you will not understand what you hear and see’. 
Scholars tend to go for a variation of the third option. 82  Nussbaum proposes an 
interesting option: that Heraclitus proposes ‘that your senses will deceive you if you 
                                                 
79 LSJ and TLG, s.v. βάρβαρος. Homer uses a similar word in the Iliad, βαρβαρόφωνος (2.867) meaning 
‘non-Greek-speaking people’. 
80 This is the interpretation of Wheelwright (1959), 26: it refers ‘to men who can make only meaningless 
sounds like “bar bar,” and so cannot communicate.’ And Barnes (1979), 148. However, in the LSJ, the 
original, and also general, meaning of the word is ‘non-Greek’ when construed as an adjective, and 
‘non-Greek-speaking-person’ when construed as a noun. Its pejorative meaning, i.e. ‘uncivilised’, 
‘rude’, ‘brutal’, the one we often use nowadays, is not even found in Herodotus, so it is unlikely that 
Heraclitus used it with that meaning. Powell (1938), s.v. βάρβαρος. 
81 If Heraclitus wanted to say that, why would he have said ‘barbarian soul’ instead of ‘barbarians’ 
straight away? I concur with Barnes (1979), 148, who observes that ‘Heraclitus is hardly advancing the 
chauvinist thesis that non-Greek speakers cannot attain knowledge.’ 
82 Language of sense perception: Kirk (1954), 376; Marcovich (1967), 47–48. Language of logos: 
McKirahan (1994), 146. Both: ATH, 107; Robinson (1987), 151. See also TEGP, 188; Guthrie (1962), 





do not have an accurate understanding of your own language.’83 The word barbaros is 
related to language in its most basic meaning, and I agree that this is the best way to 
understand it in the fragment, but should we go as far as Nussbaum and say that it 
means someone who does not understand their own language?  
Considering the meaning of the fragment as a whole, the most shocking idea of 
fragment B107 is this: the image that each person acquires of the world from sense 
perception is mediated by something inside their soul, i.e., as Hussey puts it, our 
preconceptions affect how we perceive the world.84 However, who are those that do 
not have a barbarian soul and can correctly understand what they perceive? There are 
very few choices, other than Heraclitus himself. Perhaps a good prophētēs, who is able 
to understand the divine message in the visions of the Pythia or in a bird’s liver, could 
be an example of someone who has a non-barbarian soul.85 We also hear of Bias in 
fragment B39: ἐν Πριήνηι Βίας ἐγένετο ὁ Τευτάμεω, οὗ πλείων λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων. 
[‘In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutames, whose logos is greater than the rest.’86] But 
neither a prophētēs nor Bias nor anybody is explicitly said to understand the logos. On 
the contrary, as previously mentioned, Heraclitus thinks that most people fail to 
understand the logos, which I believe in turn implies that most people fail to 
understand what they experience. Therefore, it seems that Heraclitus is not only saying 
that sense perception is deceptive sometimes, but that what people hear and see does 
not correspond to reality in most of the cases and most of the time. This same idea is 
represented by Heraclitus with the picture of the sleepwalkers.87 Most people are like 
sleepwalkers, who are walking on earth but whose minds and senses are seeing 
something else as in a dream, or a personal realm which corresponds to their private 
understanding (B2). But if nobody understands what they experience, or the logos, 
                                                 
83 Nussbaum (1972), 10. 
84 Hussey (1999b), 90: ‘Heraclitus is aware that the testimony of the senses is already shaped by our 
preconceptions. This makes it easier for him to explain how people, paradoxically, can fail to see what 
is before their eyes and hear what is filling their ears.’ 
85 A prophētēs is not deceived by sense perception because what others would see as a strange noise, as 
a vision or as a simple liver, the prophētēs sees them as what they actually are: a particular divine 
message. See section 2.2.4.  
86 As pointed out by Guthrie (1962), 420–421 and Marcovich (1967), 525, the expression πλείων λόγος 
was common in Ionic dialect to mean ‘to have esteem’ or ‘to be esteemed’. Perhaps Heraclitus intends 
a pun in B39, meaning that Bias also has a logos better than the rest. This could imply that Bias was 
another person who understood the logos. 





correctly, should we conclude, then, that only Heraclitus has a non-barbarian soul? 
And is there a way for other people to, so to speak, de-barbarise their souls so that they 
can rely on the testimony of their senses? 
3.2.3. Know thyself  
The first epistemological suggestion of Heraclitus is that we can only understand the 
logos by going out and experiencing the world ourselves but without having a 
barbarian soul: by listening directly to the logos (B50).88 The exact process of how 
sense perception works is not explained by Heraclitus.89 However, the personal logos 
in our soul, the logos which represents our description of the world, can be increased 
through sense experience and compared with the cosmic logos: it can come to agree 
(homologein in B50) with the common logos (B2). Nevertheless, as was just proposed, 
most people have a barbarian soul and do not understand what they perceive. However, 
it seems that they have the capacity to do so, as ‘Thinking is common to everyone.’ 
(B113).90 In my interpretation, when Heraclitus says that people have the ability to 
understand but usually do not, he is referring to the problem of indoctrination.91 We 
have the ability to understand but because bad teachers have taught us wrong logoi 
about the world we cannot understand it. Moreover, Heraclitus says in B116 that we 
not only have the ability of thinking or understanding but also the ability of self-
knowledge: ‘All people have share in self-knowledge and sound thinking.’92 As I shall 
argue next, the solution for the problem of the ‘barbarian soul’ might be found in 
another fragment connected to self-knowledge, fragment B101: 
B101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.  
 
I went in search for myself. 
                                                 
88 Two other important suggestions regarding knowledge are fragments B18 (‘If one does not hope for 
the unhoped for, one will not discover it, since it is undiscoverable and inaccessible.’ Trans. TEGP) and 
B22 (‘Those seeking gold dig much earth and find little.’ Trans. TEGP). 
89 See Laks (1999), 254. 
90 See section 1.3. 
91 See sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 






Our previous analysis of fragment B45 suggests that our souls are more extensive 
because of the logoi inside them, and that this idea implies that it is possible to look 
inside ourselves.93 However, it is not clear what we achieve by investigating our own 
souls. We know that the way to the logos is through sense perception with a non-
barbarian soul, but what role does self-knowledge play in the process of achieving 
correct knowledge? What is that which we should look for within ourselves that may 
help us comprehend or guide us to a better understanding of the world?  
Regarding self-knowledge, Granger proposes that ‘the only “journey” Heraclitus 
mentions as worth making is into one’s soul, in search of oneself (B101).’94 As we saw 
above, Heraclitus distinguishes himself from his predecessors by making a difference 
between true knowledge or understanding (nous) and an unconnected collection of 
knowledge (polymathiē) in B40.95 This true knowledge of his, the knowledge of the 
logos, is not personal or private but the opposite: it is common and universal (B1, B2). 
As such, it is not likely that this knowledge comes solely from introspection. We need 
to see and investigate the world ourselves and ‘listen’ directly to the logos, and 
understand how everything is one (B50). 96  I shall argue that Heraclitus suggests 
introspection not because our souls are a place where we can find the cosmic logos but 
because it is the place where we can fix whatever is stopping us from understanding 
sense perception correctly. 
When we read fragment B101 in the context of Heraclitus it is impossible not to 
think about the legendary maxim of the Delphic Oracle: γνῶθι σεαυτόν.97 What was 
the exact relation between the saying of Heraclitus and the Delphic maxim is very hard 
to establish.98 Whether the maxim was first said by someone else and then put at the 
                                                 
93 See Nussbaum (1972), 15. TEGP, 192, agrees that B45 is connected to self-investigation, and self-
increasing in B115 to the process of learning. Contra Marcovich (1967), 57, and 368, who takes logos 
as ‘measure’ and seems to take these fragments as describing only physical or cosmic processes. See 
section 3.1.3. 
94 Granger (2004b), 257. 
95 See section 2.3.1. 
96 Cf. with the two paths of enquiry, truth and opinions, in Parmenides B1 and B2. In particular the 
mention of a deaf and blind people who are an undiscerning tribe in Parmenides B6. 
97 Most sources and references to fragment B101 connect it to the Delphic maxim. See survey of sources 
in Marcovich (1967), 53–56. 
98 Wilkins (1979), 12–13, says that B116 was ‘the earliest apparent reference’ to the Delphic maxim, 
but dismisses their possible relation because ‘however much self-examination the words ἐδιζησάμην 
ἐμεωυτόν may imply, there is no indication that in using them Heraclitus himself had γνῶθι σεαυτόν in 
mind.’ For the origin of the Delphic maxim, I will follow Clarke and Wormell (1956), 389: ‘The 





entrance of the oracle or pronounced by the oracle first and then made more popular 
by wise people referring to it, we may safely assume that the idea of self-knowledge 
that it proposes was widely famous in that time. Therefore, when Heraclitus mentions 
a journey in search of the self, he was most likely referring to the idea expressed by 
this famous maxim.  
However, it is important to notice that searching is not the same as knowing; as 
Marcovich points out, dizēmai in B101 is not equivalent to gignōskō. Unlike 
Marcovich, I do not believe this to show that the maxim and the fragment are not 
related, but, on the contrary, that using a different wording was actually Heraclitus’ 
intention.99 Heraclitus knows and understands the words of the famous maxim, and 
the importance of self-knowledge. Moreover, he proceeds to look for himself first in 
order to know himself.100 Plato, who deals with this maxim in several dialogues, seems 
to take it this way as well.101 In Phaedrus 229e9–230a9 he says:  
But I have not time for such things; and the reason, my friend, is this. I am 
still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really 
seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood 
that. This is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is 
generally believed, and, as I was just saying, I look not into [skopō] them 
but into my own self: Am I a beast more complicated and savage than 
                                                 
Herodotus does not mention it explicitly, he seems already to know the Seven Sages and their typical 
sayings. The actual authorship of the three maxims set up on the Delphian temple may be left uncertain. 
Most likely they were popular proverbs, which tended later to be attributed to particular sages.’ 
99 Marcovich (1967), 57, says that the fragment is not related to the Delphic maxim because ‘neither 
δίζησθαι means the same as γινώσκειν, nor ἐμεωυτόν as ψυχή.’ Contra Marcovich see Herodotus’ use 
of dizēmai, Powell (1938) and LSJ, where it means ‘look for’, ‘try to find out’, as most scholars take it 
and not ‘ask’, ‘enquire’ as Marcovich does. And that psychē was used to refer to the self before 
Heraclitus, see Schofield (1991), 25–27. 
100 Most scholars interpret the fragment in relation to self-knowledge and the Delphic maxim. Kahn 
(1979), 116: ‘This is as straightforward a paradox as any in Heraclitus. Normally one goes looking for 
someone else. How can I be the object of my own search? This will make sense only if my self is 
somehow absent, hidden, or difficult to find. Thus XXVIII [B101] states, or presupposes, what one 
might have thought was a distinctly modern reading of the Delphi gnōthi sauton: self-knowledge is 
difficult because a man is divided from himself; he presents a problem for himself to resolve. We are 
surprisingly close here to the modern or Christian idea that a person may be alienated from his own 
(true) self.’ Guthrie (1962), 419, connects fragment B101 to the Delphic maxim too. And Robinson 
(1987), 147, and KRS (2007), 210–211, suggest a similar interpretation. Contra see Wilkins (1917), 
who shows that most of those interpretations of the Delphic maxim where done in Antiquity, mainly by 
Plato and Neo-Platonists.  
101 Plato discusses about ‘know thyself’ in Alcibiades I, Philebus, Phaedrus, Protagoras, and mentions 





Typhon, or am I a tamer, simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle 
nature?102 
Plato uses skopō to convey something similar to Heraclitus’ dizēmai: that you need to 
go and find or investigate yourself, before investigating other things.103 Your own self 
has an impact upon knowledge and understanding of other things. In other passages 
Plato shows us that to know yourself is equivalent to knowing your soul, and the result 
of not doing so is that many people think they are wiser than they really are.104 I believe 
that the thing inside yourself that you need to look for and change in order to come to 
a better understanding of the world is the same in Plato and in Heraclitus: your own 
and personal logos.105 
Diogenes Laertius, who is a source of B101, gives us an interesting story about 
the life of Heraclitus, which perhaps is just a collection of tales and legends told before 
him. However, whatever its origin, I think it offers a good interpretation of Heraclitus’ 
epistemology. He says the following in 9.5:  
And he [Heraclitus] became a marvellous person from boyhood, for even 
while young he used to say that he knew nothing, but when grown up, he 
used to affirm that he knew everything. And he was no one’s pupil, but he 
used to say that he had ‘investigated himself’ [B101], and had learnt 
[mathein] everything by himself.106 
In this context, saying that you do not know anything is not only a problem of 
ignorance but it is mainly about rejecting or questioning what you have been taught 
before, namely, popular tradition. It is certain that Heraclitus had been taught and we 
                                                 
102 Trans. Nehamas and Woodruff in Cooper (1997). 
103 See Wilkins (1979), for a thorough analysis of the different interpretations in antiquity. The Delphic 
maxim had many interpretations in antiquity, one of the first ones was ‘know your measure’, and a 
common one was ‘know your place (immortal vs mortal)’. It seems to be directed in general as a 
criticism to arrogance and people who do not know their place. Perhaps Heraclitus fragment B43 (ὕβριν 
χρὴ σβεννύναι μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν. [‘Arrogance needs to be extinguished more than a fire.]) points in 
the same direction. 
104 Alcibiades 130e8: ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι ἑαυτόν. [‘So the command 
that we should know ourselves means that we should know our souls.’] See also Philebus 48c9–49a6. 
105 If we compare again Heraclitus’ intention to the simile of the torpedo fish in Meno 79e9–80b7 (see 
section 2.3.2.), there are three general stages of knowledge: 1) having a wrong logos, 2) aporia followed 
by not having a wrong logos, and 3) having a logos that agrees with the cosmic logos. 
106 Greek text: Γέγονε δὲ θαυμάσιος ἐκ παίδων, ὅτε καὶ νέος ὢν ἔφασκε μηδὲν εἰδέναι, τέλειος μέντοι 
γενόμενος πάντ᾽ ἐγνωκέναι. ἤκουσέ τ᾽ οὐδενός, ἀλλ᾽ αὑτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ᾽ 
ἑαυτοῦ. It is possible that the use of manthanien here implies that Heraclitus learned by himself through 






know that he knew some theories of other philosophers and poets. That is why you 
need to know yourself and go in search for yourself. To know yourself means here to 
know what you know and what you do not, and to know your mistakes, also to know 
what you have been taught and whether it is correct. As argued above, Heraclitus’ 
critique of his predecessors and contemporaries, in fragments B40 and B129 in 
particular, points in this direction. It is a call against cultural indoctrination; against 
letting other people fill your soul with their incorrect logoi. This was the main problem 
with polymathiē; it is bad because it is a collection of opinions (logoi) from others.107 
When people blindly believe those opinions they will never be able to see and 
understand the world themselves because they would only see it through the eyes of 
those who indoctrinated them.  
A barbarian soul is then a soul that has an incorrect opinion or logos about the 
world, and that soul sees the world from the perspective of someone else, which 
represents a private understanding and not the common logos (B2). Someone with an 
incorrect logos experiencing the world understands as much of it as someone who does 
not speak Greek understands a conversation with Greek-speaking people. This 
happens not because people are inherently uncomprehensive of the language but for 
the opposite reason, because they naturally have the ability to comprehend but were 
taught the wrong language.108 Then, the first step in order to de-barbarise your soul is 
to seek and understand the incorrect logos that you already have inside yourself. Then, 
after you realise that you know nothing in reality, you can start seeing the world from 
an unbiased perspective, understanding what your unhindered sense perception reports 
to you: a true description of the universe that agrees with the divine and cosmic logos. 
3.3. Conclusion 
The soul for Heraclitus has the following characteristics. Even though soul keeps the 
function that the tradition attributed to it as a condition of life, Heraclitus includes soul 
as a material that takes part in the cosmic transformation of the elements. Since souls 
                                                 
107 See section 2.3.1. 
108 I assume the wrong language depends on the context and not on the thought that Greek was a better 
language than others. However, it would be hard to push the analogy further than what I have said so 
far, especially because you can learn two or more languages at the same time but I do not think you can 





transform into water, consequently they can die, an idea that contradicts the traditional 
views about the soul. Heraclitus also explicitly attributes particular physiological and 
psychological functions to the embodied soul, which may vary from soul to soul 
depending on their state and quality. The soul inside the body can become dry or wet, 
and be barbarian or non-barbarian. Additionally, soul is a material but it is special in 
that it can contain logoi. This means that even when we can ‘reach’ the physical limits 
of souls, the contents of their logoi make their limits impossible or very hard to reach. 
This idea implies, as well, that a logos and its depth make the soul to be a different sort 
of realm or space, through which you can travel or explore.  
Finally, for Heraclitus sense perception is a requirement for the understanding 
of the logos. People need to explore and experiment the world by themselves in order 
to understand it. However, sense perception is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition. People who have a ‘barbarian soul’, a soul that does not understand the 
language of the logos or of reality, do not see things as they really are. Nevertheless, 
it seems that this can be changed. That thing in your soul that you need to change in 
order to understand sense perception correctly is its private logos. Self-knowledge is a 
requirement for people who have been taught incorrect logoi by others; they must look 
into themselves, and identify and question their own wrong logoi. Once they are free 
from incorrect logoi, their souls will stop being barbarian and will be able to 







The objective of the first chapter was to examine the object of knowledge in Heraclitus’ 
epistemology, the concept of logos. It was argued that when Heraclitus uses the word 
logos, particularly in fragments B1, B2, and B50, he is not referring to his own speech 
but to something different and independent of him. This is mainly supported by 
fragment B50, where he encourages us to listen to the logos and not to Heraclitus, in 
order to understand fundamental truths of the cosmos, such as that everything is one. 
Additionally, an analysis of fragment B1, in particular of the words aei and eontos in 
the first line, and of Timaeus 27c1–d5 shows that Heraclitus evokes the epic formula 
for the immortality of the gods, and the fact that he mentions logos in the first part of 
his speech most likely implies a reference to the traditional invocation of the divinity. 
Therefore, the logos is also eternal and divine. Moreover, the similarity between 
Heraclitus’ description of the logos in the fragments and the logos in the world-soul in 
Plato’s Timaeus 36d–37c suggests that a cosmic-logos theory can be plausibly 
attributed to Heraclitus. In consequence, it is likely that he used an analogous idea 
when considering his divine logos. Lastly, based on the previous characteristics and 
on an analysis of the word logos in Theaetetus 206d1–208d3, I propose that the logos 
is an eternal and perfect description of the universe. This description can be understood 
in three non-exclusive ways: a descriptive description, a prescriptive description, and 
an abstract description. 
Moreover, since the logos has such characteristics, I proposed that it cannot be 
communicated directly to others using language. This idea, that the full divine truth is 
impossible to communicate to people was present in the time of Heraclitus, and we 
find it in a way in the traditional views of the epic poets. Also, for Xenophanes, the 
access to this kind of truth was completely out of bounds for humans, even if they by 
chance managed to describe it correctly. Heraclitus most likely had a position similar 
to that of his predecessors and contemporaries regarding the problem of 
communication. For him, just as for his predecessors, there is an important difference 
between two realms: the divine and the human. The truth we seek in order to achieve 
knowledge is part of the divine realm and for this same reason Heraclitus cannot 





object of knowledge, that which we want to reach in order to achieve understanding of 
the cosmos, is by itself one of the obstacles that Heraclitus presents to us in his 
fragments. 
In the second chapter I treat the problem of language, communication and their 
role in Heraclitean epistemology. The poets, philosophers, and other wise people 
inherited some concerns about language to Heraclitus. The most important one might 
be that the language of the gods, just as their truth, is of a different nature and perhaps 
inaccessible for humans. Cratylus suggests that a correct language is also necessary 
when it comes to knowing and understanding nature. The exact relation between 
Cratylus and Heraclitus is not clear. However, in the fragments we can see that 
Heraclitus is concerned with the problem of naming and of the correctness of names 
in general. This concern about language is also present in his own writing style. 
Heraclitus was obscure, sometimes accidentally, but many times intentionally and with 
a particular objective in mind: he wanted to show us something else. In my 
interpretation this does not mean, however, that he hid his true message or the logos 
itself in his book or fragments, in the same way as we have it in the allegorical 
interpretations of the time. Heraclitus criticised epic poets, historians, and philosophers 
because they taught people false things. Given that polymathiē can be transmitted but 
not nous, and by listening to others we might by indoctrinated into falsehoods, 
Heraclitus addresses the problem of education. The logos itself is perhaps not 
susceptible to be taught in this same way as any other personal logos, but there are 
other ways in which language and communication are useful for Heraclitus’ doctrine. 
First, language can be used to show what the correct logos is not. Second, by metaphor, 
analogy, and other indirect figures of speech, language can indicate the right way to 
logos. And third, by the use of paradox and different figures of speech, language can 
have a shocking effect and move people to question their incorrect logoi. 
The third element in Heraclitus’ epistemological thought is the soul. For 
Heraclitus, the soul keeps some of the functions that the tradition attributed to it as a 
condition of life. However, unlike them, Heraclitus includes soul as a material that 
takes part in the cosmic transformation of the elements. Additionally, he explicitly 
attributes particular functions to the human soul, which may vary from soul to soul 





be barbarian or non-barbarian. These changes in the soul affect many of its functions, 
including sense perception, hearing, sight, and mental processes, such as memory and 
understanding. Additionally, the soul is the place where we can find our personal logoi. 
Even when we can ‘reach’ the physical or material limits of souls, their logoi make 
their real limits impossible or very hard to reach. This idea implies, as well, that a logos 
makes the soul to be a different, new realm or space.  
Finally, for Heraclitus sense perception is a requirement for understanding the 
logos. People need to experience the world in order to understand it. However, sense 
perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. People who have a soul that 
does not understand the language of the logos or of reality, a ‘barbarian soul’, do not 
see things as they really are. Nevertheless, it seems that souls can change and become 
better. In order to understand sense perception correctly, people need to change their 
personal, incorrect logoi. Self-knowledge is the first step for people who have been 
taught incorrect logoi; they must look into themselves, and identify and question their 
own wrong logoi. Once they are free from incorrect logoi, their souls will be able to 
understand reality through sense perception and, consequently, they will see the true 
logos of the cosmos. 
 Even though the interpretation of Heraclitus’ doctrine presented here agrees and, 
in many cases, relies on arguments and points of view already defended by ancient and 
modern scholars, it is as a whole a new contribution to the problem of understanding 
Heraclitus. In particular I believe the following points represent original arguments 
that lead to new possibilities in the interpretation of his philosophical doctrine. First, 
the idea that the logos is a linguistic item that perfectly describes the whole cosmos in 
a prescriptive and descriptive way and that represents an abstraction or extrapolation 
of human logoi. Second, that this logos cannot be communicated directly to other 
people in the same way human speech is communicated and that Heraclitus was aware 
and explicit in his text about this impossibility. Third, that Heraclitus uses a particular 
language not because he is trying to hide his true message but because he wants to 
cause an impression in indoctrinated people: he encourages us to think by ourselves 
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